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Debate	   concerning	   the	   relationship	   between	   ethics	   and	   aesthetics	   has	   re-­‐emerged	   in	  
contemporary	  aesthetic	  literature.	  All	  of	  the	  major	  contemporary	  positions,	  I	  argue,	  treat	  
this	   relationship	   as	   existing	   between	   the	   ‘moral	   value’	   of	   art	   and	   its	   aesthetic	   value.	  
Throughout	   this	   thesis	   I	  analyse	  the	  various	   ‘value-­‐based’	  positions	   (ethicism,	  moderate	  
moralism,	   and	   contextualism)	   and	   examine	  whether	   their	   accounts	   of	   this	   relationship	  
hold.	  My	  aim	  is	  to	  explore	  whether	  an	  alternative	  account	  —	  in	  which	  the	  aesthetic	  value	  
of	  art	  can	  be	  enhanced	  or	  negated	  through	  its	  ‘moral	  significance’,	  rather	  than	  its	  ‘moral	  
value’	  —	   is	   plausible.	   I	   argue,	   that	   given	   the	   failure	   of	   these	   value-­‐based	   positions	  we	  
should	   favour	   a	   ‘significance-­‐based	   contexutalist’	   approach	   that	   is	   better	   equipped	   to	  
account	   for	   the	   complexity	   of	   both	   our	   engagement	  with	   art,	   and	   the	  moral	   reflection	  

























There	  has	  long	  been	  debate	  over	  the	  relationship	  between	  ethics	  and	  aesthetics.	  Much	  of	  
this	   concerns	   the	   extent,	   if	   any,	   by	   which	   these	   two	   realms	   of	   enquiry	   interact.	   One	  
particular	  question	  that	  has,	  for	  the	  last	  two	  thousand	  years,	  failed	  to	  reach	  any	  kind	  of	  
acceptable	   resolution	   concerns	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   value	   of	   art	   —	   or	   what	   we	   now	  
commonly	  refer	  to	  as	  its	  ‘aesthetic	  value’	  —	  is	  any	  way	  affected	  or	  constituted	  in	  part	  by	  
its	  ‘moral	  value’.	  	  
	  
Traditionally,	  both	  Plato’s	  The	  Republic	  and	  Aristotle’s	  Poetics	  have	  shaped	   the	   rhetoric	  
and	   debate	   to	   which	   this	   relationship	   has	   given	   rise.	   Yet	   arguably	   the	  most	   important	  
work	  to	  directly	  address	  this	  issue	  came	  in	  the	  form	  of	  David	  Hume’s	  Of	  the	  Standard	  of	  
Taste,	  in	  which	  he	  laid	  down	  the	  mantle	  that	  has	  recently	  been	  influential	  in	  grounding	  a	  
number	   of	   well	   formulated	   positions	   (Gaut,	   1998,	   2007)	   (Carroll,	   1996,	   1998,	   2000a,	  
2003,	   2006)	   (Kieran,	   1996a,	   2001,	   2006a,	   2006b,	   2010)	   (Jacobson,	   1997,	   2007)	   which	  
defend	   the	  claim	   that	   the	  moral	   value	  of	  art	   can	   indeed	  constitute	  part	  of	   its	  aesthetic	  
value.	  
	  
Further	   debates	   surrounding	   the	   notion	   of	  what	   constitutes	   ‘aesthetic	   value’	   have	   also	  
seen	  the	  rise	  of	  an	  ‘autonomist’	  position,	  which	  stands	  in	  direct	  contrast	  to	  the	  moralism	  
defended	  by	  Hume	  and	  his	  contemporaries.	  Influenced	  by	  the	  works	  of	  philosophers	  such	  
as	  Clive	  Bell	  and	  Arnold	  Isenberg,	  autonomism	  holds	  that	  the	  concepts	  of	  moral	  value	  and	  
aesthetic	   value	   remain	   distinct	   at	   all	   times,	   with	   one	   never	   directly	   affecting	   or	  
constituting	  the	  other.	  	  
	  
This	   thesis	   will	   offer	   an	   account	   of	   the	   debate	   as	   it	   currently	   stands.	   I	   will	   begin	   by	  
offering	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  outlying	  positions	  (radical	  moralism	  and	  radical	  autonomism)	  
with	  the	  purpose	  of	  setting	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  debate.	  An	  account	  of	  moderate	  autonomism	  
(Anderson	  &	  Dean,	  1998),	  arguably	   the	  strongest	  position	   in	   favour	  of	   such	  a	  view,	  will	  
then	   be	   outlined	   and	   examined.	   The	   third	   chapter	  will	   explore	   and	   criticize	   a	   cognitive	  
argument	   commonly	   defended	  by	   the	  moralist	   positions,	  with	   the	   aim	  of	   showing	   that	  




However,	   this	   third	   chapter	  will	   also	  offer	   an	   alternative	   to	   the	   ‘value-­‐based’	   approach	  
that,	   as	   it	   will	   be	   argued,	   is	   taken	   by	   the	   three	   major	   moralist	   positions	   (ethicism,	  
moderate	  moralism,	  and	  cognitive	  immoralism).	  	  
	  
This	  alternative	  position	   (Mullin,	  2002,	  2004)	  —	  which	  will	  be	   referred	   to	  as	   the	   ‘moral	  
significance	  thesis’	  —	  will	  be	  outlined	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  exploring	  whether	  or	  not,	  given	  the	  
failure	  or	  success	  of	  the	  value-­‐based	  accounts	  (that	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  depth	  in	  chapters	  
3,	  4,	  and	  5),	  the	  moral	  significance	  thesis	  might	  present	  a	  viable	  alternative	  for	  explaining	  






Currently,	  the	  debate	  surrounding	  the	  ethical	  criticism	  of	  art	   is	   framed	  by	  two	  opposing	  
views.	  There	  are	  those	  who	  argue	  that	  the	  aesthetic	  value	  of	  art	  interacts	  with	  —	  and	  is	  
affected	  by	  —	  its	  moral	  value	  (moralists);	  and	  there	  are	  those	  who	  firmly	  hold	  that	  moral	  
value	   never	   directly	   interacts	   with	   or	   affects	   the	   aesthetic	   value	   of	   artworks	  
(autonomists).	   The	   latter	   view,	   autonomism	   is	   a	   position	   that	   has	   strong	   ties	   with	   the	  
aesthetics	   of	   Kant,	   as	  well	   as	   to	   later	   proponents	   of	   the	   formalism	  movement	   such	   as	  
Clive	  Bell	  (1914)	  and	  Roger	  Fry	  (1920).	  However	  with	  both	  the	  decline	  of	  formalism	  and	  
the	  recent	  resurgence	  of	  ethical	  criticism,	  there	  have	  been	  few	  attempts	  to	  clearly	  outline	  
and	   defend	   the	   autonomist	   thesis1.	   James	   Harold	   correctly	   points	   out	   that	   as	   a	   result,	  
autonomism	  has	  been	   “defined	   largely	  by	   its	   critics”	   (2011,	  p.	   137).	   Indeed,	   arguments	  
both	   for	  and	  against	  autonomism	   in	   its	  various	   forms	  are	  often	  presented	  as	  quickly	  as	  
those	   seeking	   to	   advance	  moralist	   arguments	   reject	   them,	  with	   few	   thorough	  accounts	  
offered	  (Gaut,	  2007)	  (Carroll,	  2000a)	  
	  
This	  chapter	  will	  begin	  by	  briefly	  examining	  two	  views:	  radical	  moralism,	  the	  thesis	  that	  
                                                
1	   In	  the	  recent	  literature	  I	  am	  only	  aware	  of	  three	  direct	  attempts	  to	  defend	  autonomism,	  see	  Anderson,	  
James	  C.,	  and	  Dean,	  Jeffrey	  T.,	  “Moderate	  Autonomism”,	  (1998),	  Dickie,	  George,	  “The	  Triumph	  in	  
Triumph	  of	  the	  Will”,	  (2005),	  and	  Harold,	  James,	  “Autonomism	  Reconsidered”,	  (2011).	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the	   value	   of	   art	   is	   reducible	   to	   its	   moral	   value;	   and	   radical	   autonomism,	   which	  
alternatively	  holds	  that	  that	  moral	  value	  of	  art	  is	  not	  a	  legitimate	  aspect	  of	  its	  evaluation,	  
and	  therefore	  never	  counts	  towards	  its	  value.	  Although	  neither	  of	  these	  two	  positions	  is	  
seriously	   defended	   in	   the	   contemporary	   debate,	   they	   represent	   the	   polar	   extremes	   of	  
both	  the	  autonomist	  and	  moralist	  arguments	  and	  offer	  valuable	  insights	   into	  the	  nature	  
of	  the	  current	  debate.	  These	  positions	  will	  be	  briefly	  outlined	  and	  some	  reasons	  for	  our	  
rejecting	  them	  will	  be	  discussed.	  A	  positive	  account	  of	  a	  ‘moderate’	  autonomist	  position	  
more	   recently	   defended	   by	   Anderson	   and	  Dean	   (1998)	  will	   then	   be	   offered.	  Moderate	  
autonomism	   holds	   that	   the	   moral	   value	   of	   art	   is	   a	   legitimate	   aspect	   of	   its	   overall	  
evaluation,	  but	  that	  this	  moral	  value	  never	  interacts	  with	  or	  affects	  the	  aesthetic	  value	  of	  
an	  artwork.	  It	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  this	  form	  of	  autonomism	  offers	  the	  strongest	  opposition	  
to	   moralism.	   Finally,	   some	   problems	   for	   this	   moderate	   position	   will	   be	   identified	   and	  
discussed.	  	  
	  
2.1. ‘Radical Moralism’ and ‘Radical Autonomism’ 
	  
Radical	  moralism	   is	   the	   thesis	   that	   the	  overall	   value	  of	   art	   is	   ultimately	   reducible	   to	   its	  
moral	   value.	   Although	   this	   position	   fails	   to	   find	   any	   serious	   defenders	   in	   the	  
contemporary	  debate	  concerning	  ethical	  criticism,	  historically	  the	  works	  of	  both	  Plato	  and	  
Tolstoy	  have	  been	  linked	  to	  radical	  moralism.	  
	  
One	  of	  Plato’s	  major	  criticisms	  of	  art	  held	  that	  its	  expressive	  power	  was	  so	  strong	  that	  the	  
ideal	  state	  would	  do	  well	  to	  censor	  it;	  Plato’s	  censorship	  of	  art	  was	  in	  his	  view	  necessary	  
to	  avoid	  the	  ethical	  corruption	  of	  those	  who	  came	  into	  contact	  with	  it.	  Berys	  Gaut	  points	  
out	   that	   Plato’s	   condemnation	  of	   art	  —	  which	  was	   at	   the	   time	   an	   important	   source	  of	  
classical	  Greek	  education	  (Allen,	  2002)	  —	  directly	  challenged	  the	  fundamental	  notion	  that	  
the	  relationship	  between	  poetry	  and	  ethics	  was	  a	  positive	  one	  (Gaut,	  2007,	  p.	  3).	  Story-­‐
telling	   was	   especially	   prominent	   in	   the	   education	   of	   young	   Greeks,	   and	   it	   is	   here	   that	  
Plato	  believed	  we	  should	  exercise	  caution	  by	  supervising,	  or	  to	  put	   it	  bluntly,	  censoring,	  
the	  production	  of	  such	  stories	  (The	  Republic,	  377c,	  378e).	  For	  Plato,	  the	  ethical	  value	  of	  
art	   superseded	   all	   other	   art	   relevant	   values.	   Furthermore,	   Plato	   argued	   that	   the	  more	  
artistically	  pleasing	  a	  work	  of	  art	  was,	  the	  more	  powerful	   its	  corruptive	  influences	  could	  
become.	  He	  wrote:	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We	  shall	  ask	  Homer	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  poets	  not	  to	  be	  angry	  with	  us	  if	  we	  
strike	   out	   these	   passages,	   and	   any	   others	   like	   them.	  Not	   that	   they	   lack	  
poetic	  merit,	  or	  that	  they	  don't	  give	  pleasure	  to	  most	  people.	  They	  do.	  But	  
the	  more	  merit	   they	   have,	   the	   less	   suitable	   they	   are	   for	   boys	   and	  men	  
who	   are	   expected	   to	   be	   free,	   and	   fear	   slavery	   more	   than	   death.	   (The	  
Republic,	  387b)	  
	  
The	   passages	   Plato	   referred	   to	   above	   are	   those	   held	   to	   be	   either	   “untrue”,	   or	   which	  
misrepresent	   the	   nature	   of	   things;	   for	   example,	   the	  mythologies	   of	   Homer	   and	  Hesiod	  
were	   condemned	  as	  being	  ones	   that	   give	   “the	  wrong	   impression	  of	   the	  nature	  of	   gods	  
and	  heroes”	  (The	  Republic,	  377e).	  Plato	  explicitly	  attacks	  artists	  who	  present	  the	  gods	  as	  
being,	   or	   performing	   any	   action,	   that	   is	   anything	   other	   than	   “good”	   or	   “right”	   (The	  
Republic,	  380c).	   Importantly,	  Plato’s	   fear	  of	   the	  moral	  debasement	   that	  art	   could	   inflict	  
upon	  the	  youth	  of	  his	  perfect	  state	  was	  one	  borne	  out	  of	  respect	  for	  art’s	  power.	  He	  held	  
that	  “[…]	  rhythm	  and	  mode	  penetrate	  more	  deeply	  into	  the	  inner	  soul	  than	  anything	  else	  
does;	  they	  have	  the	  most	  powerful	  effect	  on	  it,	  since	  they	  bring	  gracefulness	  with	  them”	  
(The	  Republic,	  401e).	  However,	  because	  Plato	  held	  the	  instrumental	  moral	  value	  of	  art	  to	  
be	  the	  overriding	  factor	  in	  its	  evaluation	  qua	  art,	  his	  position	  can	  be	  subsumed	  under	  the	  
radical	  moralism	  banner:	  works	  that	  are	  morally	  praiseworthy	  are	  valuable	  as	  art,	  while	  
unethical	  works	  are	  not	  valuable,	  regardless	  of	  their	  other	  artistic	  merits.	  Plato’s	  moralist	  
views	  found	  later	  support	  from	  Tolstoy,	  who	  —	  in	  his	  infamous	  What	  is	  Art?	  —	  defended	  
a	   similar	   ideal	   that	   effectively	   confined	   the	   value	  of	   art	   to	   its	   ability	   to	   “unite	   all	  men”	  
through	  the	  “transmission”	  of	  proper	  moral	  and	  spiritual	  feelings	  (1904,	  p.	  192).	  Tolstoy	  
valued	  art’s	  ability	  to	  evoke	  emotion;	  however,	  like	  Plato,	  he	  argued	  that	  with	  this	  ability	  
came	  a	  great	  responsibility.	  He	  wrote,	  “Art	  is	  not	  a	  pleasure,	  a	  solace,	  or	  an	  amusement;	  
art	   is	   a	   great	   matter.	   Art	   is	   an	   organ	   of	   human	   life,	   transmitting	   man’s	   reasonable	  
perception	   into	   feeling”	   (1904,	   p.	   210).	   Furthermore,	   Tolstoy	   counted	   only	   art	   that	  
“transmits”	   these	   “universal	   feelings”	   as	   being	   valuable.	   Regarding	   his	   vision	   for	   the	  
“future”	  of	  art,	  he	  wrote:	  	  
	  
[…]	  art	  transmitting	  feelings	  flowing	  from	  antiquated,	  worn-­‐out	  religious	  
teaching,	  -­‐	  Church	  art,	  patriotic	  art,	  voluptuous	  art,	  transmitting	  feelings	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or	   superstitious	   fear,	   of	   pride,	   of	   vanity	   […]	   will	   be	   considered	   bad,	  
harmful	  art,	  and	  will	  be	  censured	  and	  despised	  by	  public	  opinion”	  (1904,	  
p.	  193).	  
	  
For	  both	  Plato	  and	  Tolstoy	  the	  value	  of	  art	  existed	  almost	  entirely	  in	  its	  capacity	  to	  act	  as	  
a	  vehicle	   for	  moral	  and	   intellectual	  enlightenment.	  Both	   identify	  an	  element	  of	  art	   that	  
we	   would	   now	   call	   ‘aesthetic’.	   For	   Plato	   these	   existed	   in	   the	   “rhythm”	   and	   “mode”	  
utilized	   by	   story-­‐tellers	   (The	   Republic,	   401e);	   while	   Tolstoy	   spoke	   of	   “form”,	   and	  more	  
specifically,	   the	  capacity	   for	  his	   ‘future-­‐art’	   to	  convey	   feeling	  briefly,	   simply,	  and	  clearly	  
(1904,	  p.	  197).	  However,	   in	  keeping	  with	   the	   thesis	  of	   radical	  moralism,	  both	  Plato	  and	  
Tolstoy	  argue	  that	  the	  positive	  or	  negative	  moral	  effects	  of	  art	  are	  the	  overriding	  factor	  in	  
its	  overall	  value.	  
	  
Unsurprisingly,	   radical	  moralism	   has	   been	   heavily	   criticised.	   Its	   claim	   that	   the	   value	   of	  
artworks	  is	  “reducible”	  to	  moral	  value	  (Kieran,	  2006b,	  p.	  56)	  stands	  in	  direct	  opposition	  to	  
both	  contemporary	  autonomist	  and	  moralist	  accounts	  of	  ethical	  criticism.	  Both	  allow	  for	  a	  
plurality	   of	   values:	   such	   as	   aesthetic,	  moral,	   cognitive,	   historical,	   and	   political	   value,	   to	  
count	  towards	  the	  evaluation	  of	  art	  (Anderson	  &	  Dean,	  1998)	  (Dickie,	  2005)	  (Gaut,	  2007)	  
(Carroll,	   2010).	   It	   should,	   however,	   be	   taken	   into	   consideration	   that	   Plato’s	   goal	   in	  The	  
Republic	  was	   very	   different	   from	   the	   goals	   of	   either	   autonomism	   or	  moralism	   as	   they	  
stand	   today.	   Plato	   was	   far	   more	   interested	   in	   the	   instrumental	   effects	   of	   moral	   and	  
immoral	   art,	   and	   less	   interested	   in	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	  moral	   and	  
aesthetic	  value;	  yet	  his	  claim	  that	  art	  containing	  “poetic	  merit”	  is	  more	  morally	  dangerous	  
by	   virtue	   of	  what	  we	  would	   later	   call	   its	   ‘aesthetic’	   qualities	   is	   one	   that	   implies	   such	   a	  
relationship.	  Plato’s	  argument	   regarding	  both	   the	  perceived	  effects	  of	  art	  on	  our	  moral	  
education,	  and	  the	  need	  for	  state	  censorship	  of	   ‘dangerous’	  or	   ‘immoral’	  art,	   frames	  an	  
important	   yet	   distinct	   issue	   from	   the	   one	   currently	   at	   stake	   between	   autonomism	   and	  
moralism,	   with	   the	   former	   being	   concerned	   primarily	   with	   the	   effects	   of	   art,	   and	   the	  
latter	   being	   concerned	   only	   with	   the	   relationship	   between	   moral	   and	   aesthetic	   value.	  
Tolstoy	  was	  much	  like	  Plato	  in	  that	  he	  saw	  the	  value	  of	  art	  as	  being	  tied	  to	  its	  ability	  to	  
“transmit”	   feelings	   and	   ideas.	   However	   Tolstoy	   was	   more	   optimistic	   in	   his	   vision	   than	  
Plato,	   with	   his	   art	   of	   the	   future	   playing	   an	   increasingly	   positive	   role	   in	   the	   “union”	   of	  
mankind,	   and	   negative	   or	   harmful	   works	   of	   art	   being	   self-­‐censored	   through	   “public	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opinion”	  rather	  than	  by	  some	  imperialistic	  third	  party	  (Tolstoy,	  1904,	  p.	  193).	  However	  	  it	  
can	   be	   reasonably	   argued	   that	   there	   are	   many	   works	   of	   art	   which	   possess	   no	   moral	  
dimension	   whatsoever.	   Carroll	   writes,	   “Much	   pure	   orchestral	   music	   as	   well	   as	   many	  
abstract	   visual	   designs	   and	   decorations	   count	   as	   art,	   but	   they	   promote	   no	   ethical	  
viewpoints	   and,	   therefore,	   are	   not	   susceptible	   to	   ethical	   evaluation”	   (Carroll,	   2000a,	   p.	  
352).	  If	  Carroll	  is	  correct	  here,	  then	  Plato	  and	  Tolstoy	  would	  likely	  see	  little	  or	  no	  value	  in	  
these	  particular	  works	  of	  art;	  this	   is	  an	  evaluation	  that	  stands	   in	  clear	  opposition	  to	  our	  
current	   intuitions	   about	   these	   kinds	   of	   artworks.	   We	   can,	   and	   do,	   value	   the	   kinds	   of	  
artworks	  that	  Carroll	  points	  to	  even	  if	  these	  are	  devoid	  of	  moral	  value;	  it	  therefore	  seems	  
plausible	  to	  claim	  that	  there	  value	  must	  lay	  elsewhere.	  Exactly	  where	  this	  value	  does	  lie	  is	  
contentious,	   but	   we	   need	   only	   to	   admit	   that	   it	   exists	   somewhere	   outside	   the	   moral	  
sphere	  of	  value	  to	  show	  that	  the	  claim	  of	  the	  radical	  moralists	  is	  untenably	  strong.	  
	  
Standing	  in	  direct	  contrast	  to	  radical	  moralism	  is	  the	  thesis	  of	  radical	  autonomism.	  Radical	  
autonomism	   holds	   that	   the	   moral	   value	   of	   art	   is	   never	   a	   legitimate	   aspect	   of	   its	  
evaluation,	  and	  therefore	  never	  contributes	  to	   its	  value	  as	  art.	  Furthermore,	   it	  stands	  in	  
direct	  opposition	  to	  the	  radical	  moralist	  thesis	  as	  outlined	  above,	  which	  holds	  that	  moral	  
value	  supersedes	  all	  others	  in	  our	  evaluation	  of	  art.	  	  
	  
Our	  best	  account	  of	  radical	  autonomism	  comes	  from	  the	  work	  of	  Clive	  Bell,	  who,	   in	  Art	  
(1914),	  proclaimed	  that	  “significant	  form”	  was	  not	  only	  the	  essential	  property	  present	  in	  
all	   works	   of	   art,	   but	   furthermore	   that	   it	   was	   the	   only	   property	   by	   which	   art	   could	   be	  
coherently	  evaluated	  (p.	  6).	  Thus,	  Bell	  pursues	  a	  highly	  restrictive	  argument	  for	  formalism	  
by	  claiming	  not	  only	  that	  the	  value	  of	  art	  lies	  outside	  any	  other	  domain	  of	  value,	  but	  also	  
that	   it	  makes	  no	  sense	  whatsoever	  to	  hold	  art	  up	  against	  moral,	  cognitive,	  historical,	  or	  
political	  value.	  Autonomism	  looks	  to	  fall	  out	  of	  formalism,	  and	  indeed	  Jacobson	  lists	  it	  as	  
one	  of	   its	   central	   tenets	   (1997,	  p.	  157).	  But	  where	  more	  moderate	   formalists	  argue	   for	  
the	   autonomism	   of	   art	   on	   the	   grounds	   that	   the	   “ulterior”	   value	   of	   art	   has	   no	   bearing	  
whatsoever	  on	  its	  “aesthetic	  value”	  (1997,	  p.	  157),	  Bell’s	  radical	  thesis	  argues	  instead	  that	  
it	  is	  simply	  inappropriate	  to	  evaluate	  art	  by	  anything	  other	  than	  its	  significant	  form	  (1914,	  
p.	   6).	   Furthermore,	   one	   need	   not	   reject	   formalism	   to	   argue	   against	   autonomism	   —	  
although	   many	   do	   —	   and	   in	   chapter	   4	   we	   will	   see	   that	   Carroll	   goes	   some	   way	   in	  




For	  Bell,	  significant	  form	  consisted	  of	  the	  combination	  of	  lines	  and	  colours	  that	  were	  able	  
to	  produce	  what	  he	  called	  an	  “aesthetic	  emotion”	   in	  the	  viewer	  (1914,	  p.	  6).	  He	  argued	  
that	  only	  the	  grasping	  of	  the	  significant	  form	  alone	  could	  produce	  this	  aesthetic	  emotion,	  
and	  that	  such	  an	  emotion	  was	  only	  likely	  to	  be	  found	  in	  art2.	  It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  Bell’s	  
argument	   is	  circular	   in	  that	  he	  asserts	  significant	  form	  as	  being	  capable	  of	  producing	  an	  
aesthetic	   emotion,	   yet	   defines	   the	   former	   primarily	   by	   its	   being	   able	   to	   produce	   the	  
latter.	  However,	  as	  McLaughlin	   (1977)	  points	  out	   in	  Bell’s	  defence,	  Bell	   is	  attempting	  to	  
distinguish	  between	   two	  kinds	  of	  emotion	   that	  he	   takes	   to	  be	  strictly	  distinct	   from	  one	  
another:	   “aesthetic”	   emotion	   and	   “life”	   emotion	   (p.	   434-­‐5).	   Thus	   Bell	   is	   arguing	   for	   a	  
notion	  of	   form	  as	  an	  “end	   in	   itself”,	   rather	   than	  one	  which	  opens	  us	  up	   to	   ‘feel’	   things	  
that	  we	  might	  do	  in	  our	  experience	  of	  the	  actual	  world	  (1977,	  p.	  435-­‐6).	  This	  being	  said,	  
Bell	  does	  little	  to	  explain	  or	  clarify	  this	  view.	  
	  
While	  Bell	  granted	  that	  certain	  works	  could	  “suggest”	  emotion	  or	  “convey”	  information,	  
he	   maintained	   that	   such	   works	   do	   not	   count	   as	   art	   (1914,	   p.	   8).	   For	   an	   object	   to	   be	  
considered	  ‘art’,	  Bell	  argued	  that	  we	  must	  be	  moved	  by	  the	  significant	  form	  itself	  and	  not	  
simply	  by	  the	   ideas	  or	   information	  suggested	  or	  conveyed	  by	  this	  form.	  He	  writes:	  “The	  
representative	  element	  in	  a	  work	  of	  art	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  harmful;	  always	  it	  is	  irrelevant.	  
For,	  to	  appreciate	  a	  work	  of	  art	  we	  need	  bring	  with	  us	  nothing	  from	  life,	  no	  knowledge	  of	  
its	  ideas	  and	  affairs,	  no	  familiarity	  with	  its	  emotions.”	  (1914,	  p.	  10).	  He	  claimed	  that	  all	  we	  
must	  bring	  was,	  “[…]	  a	  sense	  of	   form	  and	  colour	  and	  a	  knowledge	  of	  three-­‐dimensional	  
space”	   (1914,	   p.	   10).	   Bell’s	   latter	   claim	   leaves	   no	   room	   for	   the	   content	   of	   art	   to	   count	  
towards	   its	  value.	  Content	  may	  of	  course	  be	   linked	  to	  the	  form	  of	  a	  work,	   for	  example:	  
the	   overall	   unity	   of	   the	   lines,	   colour	   and	   use	   of	   three-­‐dimensional	   space	   utilized	   in	  
painting	  an	  elephant	  will	  be	  tied	  directly	  to	  what	  is	  represented.	  However,	  for	  Bell	  what	  is	  
represented	  plays	  no	  role	  in	  the	  value	  of	  the	  artwork.	  
	  
Roger	   Fry	   (1920)	   is	   to	   an	   extent	   sympathetic	   towards	   Bell’s	   notion	   of	   significant	   form.	  
However,	  he	  asserts	  that	  Bell’s	  dismissal	  of	  content	  and	  meaning	  from	  his	  vision	  of	  art’s	  
                                                
2	  Bell	  admitted	  that	  certain	  people	  might	  have	  what	  seems	  like	  an	  “aesthetic	  emotion”	  towards	  nature.	  
However,	  he	  believed	  that	  this	  phenomenon	  was	  only	  similar	  to,	  and	  not	  the	  same	  as	  the	  aesthetic	  
emotion	  produced	  by	  works	  of	  art	  (1914,	  p.	  7)	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value	  is	  surely	  in	  error.	  Fry	  argues	  instead	  that,	  although	  the	  “meaning”	  and	  the	  “form”	  of	  
a	  work	  are	  likely	  to	  produce	  distinct	  emotional	  responses	  the	  value	  of	  art,	  and	  what	  Bell	  
describes	  as	  ‘significant	  form’,	  must	  be	  more	  than	  “harmonious	  patterns”	  and	  “agreeable	  
arrangements	  of	   form”	   (1920,	  p.	  167).	   Fry	   states,	   contrary	   to	  Bell,	   that	   significant	   form	  
must	   exist	   in	   the	   “expression	   of	   an	   idea”	   rather	   than	   merely	   with	   the	   creation	   of	   a	  
“pleasing	  object”	   (1920,	  p.	  167).	  However,	   like	  Bell,	  Fry	  has	   little	  more	   to	  say	   regarding	  
the	   exact	   nature	   of	   this	   significant	   form;	   his	   main	   objection	   towards	   Bell’s	   original	  
conception	  of	  the	  term	  being	  that	  spectators	  able	  to	  focus	  purely	  on	  the	  formal	  features	  
of	  an	  artwork	  are	  exceedingly	  rare	  (1920,	  p.	  166).	  	  
	  
Bell	  defends	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  form	  and	  the	  content	  of	  an	  artwork	  are	  distinct	  entities,	  
and	   that	  only	   the	   former	  counts	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  evaluation	  of	  art.	   It	   follows	   for	  Bell	  
that	  to	  evaluate	  an	  artwork	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  moral,	  political,	  or	  cognitive	  value	  is	  to	  evaluate	  
the	   work	   in	   question	   as	   being	   something	   other	   than	   art.	   Addressing	   the	   ethical	   case	  
specifically,	   Bell	   states:	   “You	  may,	   of	   course,	  make	   ethical	   judgements	   about	   particular	  
works,	  not	  as	  works	  of	  art,	  but	  as	  members	  of	  some	  other	  class,	  or	  as	   independent	  and	  
unclassified	  parts	  of	  the	  universe	  […]	  In	  such	  a	  case	  you	  will	  be	  making	  a	  moral	  and	  not	  an	  
aesthetic	  judgement.”	  (1914,	  p.	  31).	  It	  should	  be	  restated	  here	  that	  radical	  autonomism	  is	  
closely	  tied	  to	  the	  extreme	  nature	  of	  Bell’s	  formalist	  thesis.	  This	  thesis	  holds	  that	  the	  only	  
essential	  and	  therefore	  relevant	  feature	  of	  art	  is	  significant	  form,	  which	  can	  be	  identified	  
only	  through	  our	  knowledge	  of	  form,	  colours	  and	  three-­‐dimensional	  space.	  Bell’s	  brand	  of	  
autonomism	  is	  radical	  because	  it	  holds	  not	  only	  that	  the	  moral	  value	  of	  art	  has	  no	  bearing	  
upon	   its	   aesthetic	   value,	   but	   rather	   that	   the	   moral	   evaluation	   of	   art	   is	   entirely	  
inappropriate	  altogether.	  
	  
Rejection	  of	  Bell’s	  extreme	  formalism	  has	  led	  radical	  autonomism	  to	  be	  likewise	  rejected.	  
Objections	   have	   especially	   been	   levelled	   against	   Bell’s	   claim	   that	   the	   value	   of	   artworks	  
rest	  upon	  their	  significant	  form	  alone,	  without	  any	  further	  appreciation	  being	  given	  to	  the	  
representations,	   ideas,	   and	   themes	   that	   many	   works	   offer.	   While	   Bell’s	   conception	   of	  
significant	   form	   —	   as	   well	   as	   the	   radical	   autonomism	   that	   it	   establishes	   —	   might	   be	  
appealing	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  way	  that	  it	  attempts	  to	  provide	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  essential	  
aesthetic	  features	  which	  may	  prevail	  in	  purely	  visual	  or	  audible	  art	  forms	  such	  as	  painting,	  
sculpture,	   or	   classical	   music,	   significant	   form	   is	   unable	   to	   properly	   account	   for	   other	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forms	  of	  art,	  including	  narratives.	  Carroll	  argues,	  contrary	  to	  Bell’s	  earlier	  claim	  regarding	  
the	   insignificance	   of	   content	   in	   our	   evaluation	   of	   artworks,	   that	  we	  must	  bring	   certain	  
kinds	   of	   understanding	   and	   knowledge	   with	   us	   when	   appreciating	   narrative	   art.	   He	  
writes:	  	  
	  
No	   storyteller	   portrays	   everything	   that	   might	   be	   portrayed	   about	   the	  
story	  she	  is	  telling;	  she	  must	  depend	  upon	  her	  audience	  to	  supply	  what	  is	  
missing	  and	  a	  substantial	  and	  ineliminable	  part	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  understand	  
a	   narrative	   involves	   filling	   in	   what	   the	   author	   has	   left	   out	   […]	  
Furthermore,	  what	  must	  be	  filled	  in	  this	  way	  comes	  in	  all	  different	  shapes	  
and	   sizes,	   including	   facts	   of	   physics,	   biology,	   history,	   religion	   and	   so	   on	  
(1996,	  p.	  225).	  	  
	  
By	  Carroll’s	  view,	  not	  only	  do	  we	  utilise	  our	  own	  knowledge	  to	  fill-­‐out	  narratives	  —	  by	  for	  
example,	  presupposing	  that	  Hamlet	  is	  human,	  or	  has	  a	  heart,	  brain,	  and	  kidneys,	  although	  
Shakespeare	  does	  not	  specifically	  point	  this	  out	  to	  us	  —	  we	  also	  bring	  with	  us	  a	  kind	  of	  
knowledge	   which	   concerns	   human	   psychology.	   Carroll	   calls	   this	   “folk-­‐psychological”	  
knowledge	   (1996,	   p.	   225).	   Such	   knowledge,	   he	   argues,	   allows	   us	   to	   understand	  why	   a	  
character	   in	   a	   narrative	   may	   despair	   and	   weep	   when	   his	   love	   towards	   another	   is	  
unrequited,	   as	   it	   allows	   us	   to	   infer	   the	   psychological	   states	   of	   characters	   and	   connect	  
these	   states	   to	   circumstances	  and	  events	  within	   the	  narrative.	   In	   regards	   to	   the	  ethical	  
dimension	  of	  artworks,	  of	  which,	  again,	  the	  radical	  autonomist	  holds	  to	  be	  inappropriate	  
to	   the	   evaluation	   of	   art	   qua	   art,	   Carroll	   argues	   that	   in-­‐fact	   the	  mobilisation	   of	   “moral	  
emotions”	  is	  often	  integral	  to	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  narratives	  (1996).	  This	  view	  argues,	  for	  
example,	  that	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  say	  that	  that	  we	  have	  understood	  or	  grasped	  Oedipus	  
the	  King	  if	  we	  do	  not	  feel,	  or	  at	  least	  recognise,	  that	  pity	  and	  fear	  are	  emotions	  prescribed	  
by	  the	  play.	  	  
	  
Granted	  that	  many	  works	  of	  art	  deal	  with	  ethical,	  political,	  and	  social	  issues,	  if	  we	  accept	  
Carroll’s	  claim	  that	  many	  of	  these	  works	  require	  some	  form	  of	  ‘filling-­‐in’	  from	  the	  viewer,	  
the	  rejection	  of	  the	  radical	  autonomist’s	  thesis	  follows.	  This	  is	  because	  acceptance	  of	  such	  
a	  thesis	  would	  result	  in	  many	  works	  being	  rendered	  unintelligible	  or	  denied	  status	  as	  art	  
altogether.	  However,	  in	  arguing	  that	  we	  must	  bring	  part	  of	  ourselves	  to	  fill-­‐out	  and	  make	  
 10 
sense	  of	  narratives,	  Carroll	  can	  only	  show	  that	  the	  content	  of	  artworks	  is	  relevant	  to	  our	  
overall	  evaluation	  of	  art	  and	  not	  that	  this	  content	  is	  aesthetically	  valuable.	  His	  objection	  is	  
therefore	  one	  that	  can	  stand	  against	  Bell’s	  narrow	  account	  of	  formalism,	  but	  not	  against	  a	  
more	   moderate	   account	   of	   autonomism	   that	   allows	   the	   content	   of	   artworks	   to	   count	  
towards	  their	  aesthetic	  value.	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  Bell	  might	  have	  argued	  that	  his	  account	  of	  significant	  form	  
is	   only	   relevant	   to	   visual	   arts	   such	   as	   painting	   and	   sculpture,	   and	   therefore	   held	   that	  
Carroll’s	   objection	   regarding	   narratives	   are	   poorly	   aimed.	   Indeed,	   Bell	   does	   limit	   his	  
argument	  to	  visual	  arts	  (1914,	  p.	  6),	  although	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  such	  an	  argument	  
would	  strengthen	  rather	  than	  weaken	  Bell’s	  claims.	  Narrative	  art	  including	  literature,	  film,	  
theatre,	   and	   other	   performance	   based	   arts	   have	   a	   well	   established	   position	   in	   our	  
conception	  of	  ‘art’;	  and	  a	  theory	  which	  denied	  these	  practices	  ‘art’	  status	  should	  only	  be	  
considered	  a	  more	  impoverished	  view	  for	  doing	  so.	  
	  
Although	   both	   radical	   moralism	   and	   radical	   autonomism	   are	   positions	   that	   should	   be	  
rejected	  for	  their	  narrow	  accounts	  of	  aesthetic	  value,	  they	  do	  provide	  a	  kind	  of	  boundary	  
in	   which	   the	   ethical	   criticism	   of	   art	   can	   occur.	   We	   should	   not	   accept,	   as	   the	   radical	  
moralist	  does,	  that	  the	  value	  of	  art	  can	  be	  reduced	  to	  moral	  value,	  nor	  should	  we	  accept	  
that	   the	   moral	   evaluation	   of	   art	   is	   always	   inappropriate.	   Fortunately,	   there	   is	   a	   more	  
appealing	  version	  of	  autonomism	  that	  accepts	  both	  a	  broader	  account	  of	  formalism,	  and	  
the	  legitimacy	  of	  ethical	  criticism.	  
	  
2.2. Moderate Autonomism 
	  
Moderate	  autonomism	  is	  the	  thesis	  that	  the	  moral	  value	  of	  art	  is	  a	  legitimate	  aspect	  of	  its	  
evaluation;	   however,	   it	   holds	   that	   this	   moral	   value	   remains	   distinct	   from	   and	   never	  
directly	   affects	   the	  aesthetic	   value	   of	   an	   artwork.	   Unlike	   its	  more	   radical	   counter-­‐part,	  
moderate	   autonomism	   accepts	   that	   the	   moral	   dimensions	   of	   artworks	   are	   relevant	   in	  
evaluating	  their	  ‘overall’	  value	  as	  art.	  In	  doing	  so	  it	  absorbs	  the	  above	  objection	  levelled	  
against	   Bell’s	   formalism:	   that	   we	   must	   engage	   our	   moral	   knowledge	   in	   order	   to	  
understand	  the	  content	  of	  art	  and	  make	  certain	  artworks	   intelligible.	   Instead,	  moderate	  
autonomism	   readily	   grants	   this.	   Arnold	   Isenberg	   admits,	   “We	   are	   already	  moral	   beings	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when	   we	   enter	   the	   theatre	   or	   open	   a	   book.”	   (1973,	   p.	   276).	   Yet,	   in	   keeping	   with	   the	  
autonomist	   tradition,	   the	  moderate	   thesis	  maintains	   that	  aesthetic	  and	  moral	  value	  are	  
distinct,	   and	   that	   under	   no	   circumstances	   does	   a	  moral	   defect	   constitute	   an	   aesthetic	  
defect,	  nor	  does	  a	  moral	  merit	  constitute	  an	  aesthetic	  one.	  Anderson	  and	  Dean,	  who	  have	  
formulated	   and	   defended	   a	  more	   recent	  moderate	   autonomist	   thesis,	   state:	   “In	   short,	  
both	  sorts	  of	  criticism	  are	  appropriate	   to	  works	  of	  art	  but	  the	  categories	  of	  moral	   [and]	  
aesthetic	  criticism	  always	  remain	  conceptually	  distinct.”	  (1998,	  p.	  153,	  my	  emphasis).	  As	  
such,	   their	   account	   of	   moderate	   autonomism	   can	   be	   interpreted	   as	   holding	   that	   the	  
‘artistic’	   value	   of	   an	   artwork	   consists	   of	   a	   plurality	   of	   relevant	   features,	  with	   aesthetic,	  
moral,	  and	  cognitive	  elements	  all	  regarded	  as	  sub-­‐sets,	  and	  legitimate	  candidates	  for	  the	  
evaluation	   of	   art.	   However,	   the	   crucial	   claim	   of	   the	   autonomist	   position	   is	   that	   these	  
other	  artistic	  values	  do	  not	  directly	  affect	  aesthetic	  value.	  They	  write:	  	  
	  
In	   some	   instances	   the	   legitimate	   aesthetic	   criticism	   of	   an	   artwork	   can	  
surround	   aspects	   of	   the	  moral	   subject	  matter	   of	   a	  work,	   i.e.	   the	  moral	  
content	  of	  a	  work	  can	  contribute	  to	  or	  detract	  to	  the	  aesthetic	  aspects	  of	  
a	   work.	   What	   distinguishes	   [moderate	   autonomism]	   from	   the	   views	   of	  
[moralism],	  however,	  is	  our	  claim	  that	  it	  is	  never	  the	  moral	  component	  of	  
the	   criticism	   as	   such	   that	   diminishes	   or	   strengthens	   the	   value	   of	   an	  
artwork	   qua	   artwork	   […]	   The	   conflicts	   are	   not	   within	   the	   aesthetic	  
domain;	  they	  are	  between	  the	  aesthetic	  and	  the	  moral	  domains	  	  (1998,	  p.	  
153).	  
	  
The	   challenge	   this	   statement	   sets	   for	   moralism	   is	   clear:	   where	   an	   artwork’s	   aesthetic	  
value	  looks	  to	  be	  enhanced	  or	  deformed	  by	  its	  moral	  value,	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  is	  on	  the	  
moralist	  to	  show	  that	  it	  is	  the	  moral	  value	  that	  is	  responsible	  for	  positively	  or	  negatively	  
affecting	   aesthetic	   value;	   Or,	   as	   Dickie	   (2005)	   claims,	   the	  moralist	  must	   show	   that	   the	  
reason	  a	  work	   is	  morally	  and	  aesthetically	  defective	   is	   the	  same	  (p.	  153).	  Anderson	  and	  
Dean	  would	  allow,	  for	  example,	  that	  a	  novel’s	  exploration	  of	  morally	  felicitous	  or	  dubious	  
perspectives	  might	  combine	  with	   the	  work’s	   formal	  and	  structural	  elements	   to	  offer	  an	  
experience	  that	  we	  take	  to	  be	  highly	  aesthetically	  valuable.	  The	  mistake	  of	  the	  moralist,	  
they	  would	  argue,	  is	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  moral	  value	  of	  the	  perspective	  prescribed	  by	  such	  a	  
novel	  affects	  directly,	  to	  any	  extent,	  the	  aesthetic	  value	  of	  the	  work.	  While	  these	  distinct	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spheres	  of	  value	  can	  play	  off	  against	  one	  another,	  they	  can	  never	  merge	  or	  overlap.	  	  
	  
	  Anderson	  and	  Dean	  defend	  their	  claim	  that	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  values	  remain	  separate	  
by	  arguing	  that	  the	  moderate	  autonomist	  has	  a	  prima	  facie	  reason	  to	  suppose	  that	  these	  
two	   values	   are	   conceptually	   distinct.	   Furthermore,	   they	   claim	   that	   rather	   than	   directly	  
affecting	  one	  another,	  as	  the	  moralist	  argues,	  they	  sometimes	  “come	  into	  conflict”	  where	  
the	  evaluation	  of	  art	  is	  concerned	  (1998,	  p.	  151).	  Cain	  Todd	  puts	  this	  nicely,	  writing,	  “[…]	  
it	  seems	  possible	  that	  a	  work’s	  moral	  defects	  could	  impair	  its	  aesthetic	  value,	  where	  this	  
does	  not	   entail	   that	   the	   relevant	   ethical	   flaws	   in	   the	  work	   are	  as	   such	  aesthetic	   flaws”	  
(2007,	  p.	  217).	  Anderson	  and	  Dean	  argue	  that	  this	  supposition	  best	  explains	  the	  way	  we	  
feel	  when	  we	   attempt	   to	   reconcile	   the	   alleged	  morality	   (or	   immorality)	   of	   an	   artwork,	  
with	  its	  aesthetic	  success	  or	  failure	  (1998,	  p.	  164).	  Due	  to	  this	  prima	  facie	  distinction	  they	  
claim	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  lies	  with	  the	  moralist	  to	  show	  that	  the	  moral	  value	  can	  directly	  
affect	   its	  aesthetic	   counterpart.	  This	   claim	   is	   convincing	   to	   the	  extent	   that	  we	  seem	  to,	  
more	   often	   than	   not,	   treat	  matters	   of	   aesthetic	   and	  moral	   value	   as	   separate	   as	  we	   go	  
about	  our	  everyday	  lives.	  We	  might,	  for	  example,	  refuse	  to	  buy	  a	  suit	  that	  is	  on	  inspection	  
both	  handsome	  and	  excellently	   tailored,	   if	  we	   find	  out	   that	   it	  was	  produced	  using	  child	  
labour;	  but	  we	  would	  not	  take	  the	  suit	  to	  be	  less	  handsome	  or	  well	  tailored	  on	  account	  of	  
its	   immoral	   production.	   Instead,	   either	   our	   fashion	   sense	   will	   win	   out	   over	   our	   moral	  
concern,	   or	   the	   other	   way	   around.	   So	   why	   should	   it	   be	   any	   different	   where	   art	   is	  
concerned?	  What	   reason	  do	  we	  have	   to	   think	   that	   these	   two	   kinds	  of	   distinct	   kinds	  of	  
values	   will	   overlap	   rather	   than	   measure	   up	   against	   each	   other?	   Some	   answers	   will	  
hopefully	  be	  provided	  in	  the	  following	  chapters,	  however	  for	  now	  it	  is	  enough	  to	  say	  that	  
Anderson	  and	  Dean	  consider	  the	  ball	  to	  be	  squarely	  in	  the	  moralists’	  court.	  	  
	  
As	  for	  Anderson	  and	  Dean’s	  claim	  that	  maintaining	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	  moral	  and	  
aesthetic	   value	   will	   “best	   explain”	   cases	   where	   these	   two	   kinds	   of	   value	   seem	   to	   be	  
pulling	   in	   different	   directions,	   their	   position	   indeed	   allows	   for	   an	   explanation	   which	   is	  
simple,	  yet	   that	  at	   the	  same	  time	  attempts	   to	  account	   for	  much	  of	   the	  complexity	   that	  
surrounds	  our	  evaluation	  of	  artworks.	  Rather	   than	  claiming,	  as	  moralism	  does,	   that	   the	  
moral	   value	   of	   an	   artwork,	   under	   certain	   conditions,	   constitutes	   an	   aesthetic	  merit	   or	  
defect,	   Anderson	   and	   Dean	   hold	   that	   in	   such	   cases	   the	   moral	   and	   aesthetic	   value	   of	  
artworks	   contend	  with	   one	   another,	   pulling	   in	   opposite	   directions.	   For	   example,	   while	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works	   such	   as	   Marqis	   de	   Sade’s	   120	   Days	   of	   Sodom	   might	   possess	   some	   aesthetic	  
qualities,	   these	   are	   not	   diminished,	   but	   buried	   by	   the	   sheer	   immorality	   of	   the	   works	  
attitudes.	  Similarly,	  Anderson	  and	  Dean	  point	  out	   that	   the	  aesthetic	  value	  of	  Nabokov’s	  
Lolita	  is	  often	  taken	  to	  eclipse	  what	  some	  interpret	  to	  be	  its	  morally	  dubious	  perspective	  
(1998,	  p.	  163).	  Arguing	  as	  they	  do,	  Anderson	  and	  Dean	  require	  no	  further	  mechanism	  to	  
explain	  how	   these	   two	  kinds	  of	   value	   can	  make	   themselves	  present	   in	  our	   experiences	  
with	  art.	  Much	  like	  the	  way	  the	  lyrics	  of	  a	  song	  can	  sometimes	  make	  it	  difficult	  to	  focus	  on	  
the	  melody,	  their	  argument	  holds	  that	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  value,	  although	  conceptually	  
distinct,	   can	   come	   into	   conflict	   with	   one	   sometimes	   winning	   out	   over	   the	   other.	  
Moderate	  autonomism	  is	  therefore	  a	  position	  which	  attempts	  to	  provide	  an	  explanation	  
regarding	   the	   conflict	   between	   our	   “aesthetic	   interest”	   and	   our	   “moral	   convictions”,	  
rather	  than	  one	  that	  sees	  these	  two	  kinds	  of	  value	  as	  directly	  affecting	  each	  other	  in	  any	  
systematic	  way	  (1998,	  p.	  150).	  	  
	  
It	  was	  noted	  earlier	  that	  autonomism	  seems	  to	  fall	  out	  of	  formalism,	   in	  that,	   if	  only	  the	  
formal	  components	  of	  artworks	  are	  aesthetically	  valuable,	  then	  moral	  value	  —	  although	  it	  
may	  influence	  aesthetic	  value	  by,	  for	  example	  attributing	  to	  the	  ‘unity’	  or	  ‘integrity’	  of	  the	  
work	   —	   is	   not	   in	   itself	   aesthetically	   valuable	   or	   disvaluable.	   In	   addition,	   as	   Todd	   has	  
argued,	  the	  plausibility	  of	  the	  numerous	  positions	  present	  in	  the	  ethical	  criticism	  debate	  
is	   crucially	   hinged	  upon	   exactly	  what	   counts	   as	   being	   “aesthetically	   valuable”	   (2007,	   p.	  
217);	  yet	  Anderson	  and	  Dean	  fail	  to	  offer	  an	  account	  of	  aesthetic	  value	  in	  regards	  to	  their	  
defence	  of	  moderate	  autonomism.	  While	   they	  do	  not	  explicitly	  endorse	   formalism	  they	  
do	  seem	  to	  allude	  at	  times	  to	  a	  formalist	  conception	  of	  aesthetic	  value.	  For	  example,	  they	  
explicitly	  count	  as	  aesthetic	  merits:	  “narrative	  structure”,	  “camera	  work”,	  “dialogue”,	  and	  
elsewhere	  make	   reference	   to	   an	   artwork’s	   “[…]	   richly	   detailed	   and	   highly	   aestheticized	  
formal	  features”	  (1998,	  p.	  165).	  But,	  as	  formal	  features	  might	  only	  make	  up	  a	  part	  of	  what	  
they	  consider	  to	  be	  aesthetically	  valuable,	  we	  should	  not	  tie	  them	  to	  formalism	  because	  
of	   this	   alone.	   However,	   without	   a	   positive	   argument	   of	   aesthetic	   value	   moderate	  
autonomism	  leaves	  itself	  open	  to	  both	  criticism	  and	  alternative	  accounts	  concerning	  the	  
ways	  in	  which	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  value	  might	  interact.	  Furthermore,	  Todd	  has	  suggested	  
that	  Anderson	  and	  Dean	  conflate	   ‘aesthetic’	  and	   ‘artistic’	  values	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  
see	  the	  value	  of	  art	  qua	  art	  as	  being	  “equivalent	  to	  its	  aesthetic	  value”	  (2007,	  p.	  218).	  If	  
Todd’s	   claim	   is	   correct,	   then	   Anderson	   and	   Dean’s	   argument	   concerning	   the	   moral	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evaluation	  of	  art	  seems	  to	  face	  some	  confusion.	  Moderate	  autonomism	  grants	  that	  moral	  
value	   is	  a	   legitimate	  aspect	  of	  arts	  evaluation;	  however,	   if	   the	  value	  of	  art	   is	  purely	   the	  
sum	  of	  its	  aesthetic	  value,	  then	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  these	  moral	  evaluations	  matter	  at	  
all.	  Instead,	  this	  suggests	  that	  evaluating	  art	  morally	  would	  be,	  as	  Bell	  said,	  to	  evaluate	  it	  
as	  something	  other	  than	  art	  (Bell,	  1914,	  p.	  31).	  	  
	  
However	  Todd’s	  claim	  may	  be	  too	  quick.	  If,	  as	  suggested	  above,	  we	  understand	  Anderson	  
and	  Dean’s	  argument	  to	  be	  distinguishing	  between	   ‘aesthetic’	  and	   ‘artistic’	  values,	   then	  
they	   are	   able	   to	   allow	   that	   while	   moral	   value	   can	   count	   towards	   an	   artwork’s	   artistic	  
value,	  it	  will	  not	  count	  towards	  the	  aesthetic	  value	  of	  the	  work.	  Seen	  in	  this	  way	  artistic	  
value	  includes	  as	  a	  subset	  both	  aesthetic	  and	  moral	  value,	  with	  the	  overall	  or	  all-­‐things-­‐
considered	   value	  of	  art	  being	   tantamount	   to	   this	   artistic	   value.	  One	   reason	   for	   thinking	  
that	  Anderson	  and	  Dean	   implicitly	  endorse	   this	  distinction	  can	  be	   found	   in	   their	  earlier	  
argument	   that	   the	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  components	  of	  artworks	  can	  pull	  us	   in	  different	  
directions.	   If,	   as	   they	   argue,	   the	   moral	   evaluation	   of	   art	   is	   appropriate	   to	   art	   (as	   is	  
aesthetic	  evaluation),	  and	  if	  as	  they	  also	  argue	  “[…]	  In	  the	  case	  of	  [some]	  works	  […]	  what	  
makes	  them	  so	  fascinating	  –	  beyond	  their	  command	  of	  narrative	  structure,	  and	  character	  
development,	   and	   skill	  with	   language	  –	   is	   that	  while	   their	  moral	  perspectives	  are	  alien,	  
the	  works	  are	  (perhaps	  disturbingly)	  commanding”	  (1998,	  p.	  166);	  then	  there	  must	  surely	  
be	  some	  sense	  in	  which	  both	  the	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  spheres	  of	  value	  are	  contributing	  to	  
some	   wider	   notion	   of	   artistic	   value.	   Furthermore,	   Anderson	   and	   Dean’s	   claim	   that	   in	  
some	   cases	   an	   artwork’s	   moral	   value	   can	   ‘override’	   its	   aesthetic	   value,	   or	   vice	   versa,	  
indicates	   that	   they	  would	   be	   apt	   to	   evaluate	  works	   such	   as	   120	   Days	   of	   Sodom	   to	   be	  
artistically	  disvaluable	   in	   that	   the	   immoral	  perspective	  of	   the	  work	  buries	   the	  aesthetic	  
element,	  yet	  still	  consider	  the	  work	  to	  be	  aesthetically	  valuable	  to	  some	  extent.	  
	  
By	  any	  means,	  Anderson	  and	  Dean’s	  failure	  to	  explicitly	  provide	  an	  adequate	  account	  of	  
aesthetic	   value,	   or	   to	   clearly	   distinguish	   between	   aesthetic	   and	   artistic	   value,	  must	   be	  
seen	  as	  a	  problem	  for	  moderate	  autonomism.	  Such	  an	  account	   is	  especially	  necessary	   if	  
Anderson	  and	  Dean	  expect	  to	  shift	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  to	  rest	  entirely	  with	  the	  moralists.	  
Furthermore,	   while	   moderate	   autonomism	   provides	   a	   clear	   and	   simple	   explanation	   of	  
how	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  value	  can	  come	  into	  conflict,	  or	  alternatively,	  work	  in	  unison,	  its	  
failure	   to	   properly	   define	   the	   latter	   domain	   of	   value	   opens	   their	   account	   to	   various	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moralist	  accounts	  of	  how	  this	  kind	  of	  interaction	  occurs.	  	  	  
	  
Now	   that	   the	   moderate	   autonomist	   position	   has	   been	   outlined	   we	   have	   an	   account	  
against	  which	  we	  can	  measure	  the	  relative	  strength	  of	  the	  moralist	  positions	  that	  will	  be	  
examined	  in	  the	  following	  chapters.	  The	  following	  chapter	  will	  examine	  a	  particular	  line	  of	  
argument	  that	  forms	  a	  ‘common	  ground’,	  in	  that	  it	  is	  endorsed,	  to	  some	  extent,	  by	  all	  of	  




3. Art and Cognitive Value 
 
The	  point	  of	  contention	  between	  moderate	  autonomism	  and	  moralism	  concerns	  whether	  
or	   not	   the	   moral	   value	   of	   an	   artwork	   is	   ever	   relevant	   to,	   or	   constitutes	   a	   part	   of,	   its	  
aesthetic	  value.	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter	  we	  saw	  Anderson	  and	  Dean	  present	  a	  case	  for	  the	  
negative	  view,	   concluding	   that	  while	  moral	   and	  aesthetic	   values	   sometimes	   “come	   into	  
conflict”	   with	   one	   another,	   the	   former	   never	   directly	   affects	   or	   constitutes	   the	   latter.	  
Moralists	  have	  attempted	   to	  deny	  moderate	  autonomism	  by	  arguing	   that	   the	   cognitive	  
and	   moral	   understanding	   manifested	   by	   artworks	   is	   not	   only	   artistically,	   but	   also	  
aesthetically	   valuable.	   This	   brand	   of	   ‘cognitive	   moralism’	   generally	   rests	   upon	   three	  
common	   claims;	   the	   ‘concept	   claim’	   that	   art,	   and	   our	   evaluation	   of	   it	   often	   utilizes	  
cognitive	   concepts	   and	   terms	   (Kieran,	   2006a),	   (Gaut,	   2007),	   (Carroll,	   1998);	   the	  
‘understanding	   claim’	   that	   art	   can	   manifest	   moral	   understanding	   and	   convey	   insights	  
(Kieran	  2006a,	  2006b),	  (Carroll,	  1998,	  2003,	  2000a,	  2002),	  (Gaut,	  2007),	  (Jacobson,	  1997);	  
and	   the	   ‘prescribed	   response	   claim’,	   that	   art	   often	  aims	  at	   eliciting	   responses	   that	   rest	  
upon	   cognitive	   and/or	  moral	   assumptions	   (Kieran,	   2006a,	   2006b),	   (Carroll,	   1998,	   2000a	  
2006,	   2008),	   (Gaut,	   1998,	   2007).	   For	   these	   cognitive	   moralists	   the	   understanding	  
manifested	  by	   artworks	   and	   the	  moral	   value	  of	   their	   content	   sometimes	   constitutes	  or	  
directly	  affects	  the	  aesthetic	  value	  of	  those	  works.	  Throughout	  this	  chapter	  these	  claims	  
will	  be	  examined	  and	  a	  number	  of	  problems	  for	  cognitive	  moralism	  will	  be	  outlined.	  It	  will	  
be	   shown	   that	  all	   of	   these	  accounts	   inevitably	   take	  as	  aesthetically	   valuable	  only	   those	  
cognitive	   and	   moral	   features	   that	   are	   meritorious.	   An	   alternative	   account	   of	   the	  
interaction	   between	   the	   moral	   and	   aesthetic	   properties	   of	   artworks	   will	   then	   be	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considered;	  this	  account,	  which	  we	  might	  call	  the	  ‘moral	  significance	  thesis’,	  claims	  that	  
this	   interaction	   does	   not	   rest	   squarely	   upon	   cognitive	   or	  moral	   ‘value’.	   The	   aim	  of	   this	  
chapter	  is	  to	  examine	  and	  address	  the	  problems	  surrounding	  cognitive	  moralism,	  as	  well	  
as	  to	  offer	  an	  alternative	  non-­‐value	  based	  approach.	  	  	  
	  
Before	  we	  proceed,	  it	  should	  be	  made	  clear	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  talk	  of	  ‘cognitive	  value’	  and	  
‘moral	   value’.	   Cognitive	   value	   as	   defended	   by	  moralism	   is	   a	  matter	   of	  whether	   a	  work	  
manifests	   understanding	  —	  which	   is	   cognitively	  meritorious	  —	  or	  misunderstanding	  —	  
which	   cognitively	   defective	   —	   in	   regards	   to	   the	   moral	   attitudes	   it	   demonstrates.	   For	  
example,	  we	  might	  say	  that	  the	  understanding	  of	  horror	  or	  despair	  manifested	  in	  much	  of	  
Goya’s	  The	  Disasters	  of	  War	  series	  is	  cognitively	  meritorious,	  insofar	  as	  it	  sits	  nicely	  with	  
the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  already	  understand	  both	  horror	  and	  despair.	  Goya’s	  choice	  of	  black	  
and	   white,	   his	   focus	   on	   the	   abject,	   and	   his	   refusal	   to	   glorify	   or	   celebrate	   any	   victory,	  
defeat,	  or	  military	  action	   leaves	  us	  with	  an	  account	  of	  war,	   famine,	  rape	  and	  mutilation	  
that	  offers	  no	  glimmer	  of	  hope	  or	  recourse	  for	  the	   inherent	  violence	  of	  mankind.	  D.	  W.	  
Griffith’s	  The	  Birth	  of	  a	  Nation	  can	  conversely	  be	  held	  to	  misunderstand	  this	  same	  notion	  
of	   horror,	   as	   the	   object	   it	   presents	   as	   being	   abject	   is	   merely	   mixed	   race	   marriage;	  
something	  that	  should	  not	  square	  with	  our	  own	  notion	  of	  ‘horror’.	  Furthermore,	  Griffith’s	  
portrayal	  of	  the	  Klu	  Klux	  Klan	  as	  ‘heroic’	  surely	  rests	  on	  a	  cognitive	  misunderstanding	  of	  
the	   concept,	   as	   does	   the	   gross	   characterization	   of	   African	   Americans	   as	   being	   simple-­‐
minded	  and	  overtly	  sexualized.	  	  	  
	  
Moral	   value	   as	   construed	   by	   moralism	   is	   measured	   by	   the	   praiseworthiness	   or	  
blameworthiness	  of	  the	  moral	  perspectives	  manifested	  by	  works	  of	  art.	  For	  example,	  the	  
moral	   perspectives	   prescribed	   in	   de	   Sade’s	   Justine	   —	   especially	   the	   inverted	   value	   of	  
virtue	   and	   vice	  —	  would	   often	   be	   taken	   as	   being	  morally	   blameworthy,	   and	   therefore	  
lacking	  moral	  value;	  while	  conversely	  the	  attitudes	  prescribed	  in	  Hamlet	  or	  Macbeth	  are	  
likely	  to	  taken	  as	  morally	  praiseworthy,	  and	  therefore	  morally	  valuable.	  
	  
3.1. The ‘Concept Claim’ 
	  
There	   is	   little	  disagreement	  surrounding	  the	   idea	  that	  cognitive	  concepts	  and	  terms	  are	  
utilized	  in	  many	  works	  of	  art,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  vocabulary	  that	  we	  use	  to	  evaluate	  them.	  
 17 
As	   Kieran	   points	   out,	   “[…]	   we	   often	   praise	   works	   as	   being	   profound,	   subtle,	   nuanced,	  
insightful	   and	   true	   to	   life	   or	   condemn	   them	   as	   being	   shallow,	   superficial,	   banal,	  
sentimental,	   unintelligible	   or	   false”	   (2006b,	   p.	   62).	   Furthermore,	   to	   recall	   a	   claim	  
presented	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  Carroll	  has	  written	  that	  audiences	  must	  “mobilize	  their	  
cognitive	  stock”	  in	  order	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  artworks	  (1998,	  p.	  420).	  The	  idea	  here	  is	  that	  
to	  grasp	  the	  content	  of	  many	  artworks,	  especially	  narratives,	  we	  must	  apply	  our	  existing	  
knowledge	   in	  order	  to	  properly	  comprehend	  them.	  For	  example,	   it	  would	  seem	  unlikely	  
that	   someone	   could	   properly	   grasp	   Shakespeare’s	   Othello	   without	   understanding	   the	  
concept	  of	  jealousy,	  or	  fully	  appreciate	  Tarantino’s	  Kill	  Bill	  without	  some	  prior	  knowledge	  
of	  betrayal,	  grief,	  and	  revenge.	  These	  claims	  have	  been	  taken	  by	  cognitive	  moralists	  to	  be	  
evidence	   that	   the	  cognitive	  value	  of	  art	   is	  at	   the	  very	   least	  an	  appropriate	  object	  of	   its	  
evaluation.	   However	   their	   aims	   extend	   further,	   and	   they	   wish	   to	   show	   that	   cognitive	  
value	   is	   under	   certain	   conditions	   aesthetically	   relevant.	   Berys	   Gaut	   (2007),	   like	   Kieran,	  
argues	  that	  our	  vocabulary	  of	  critical	  evaluation	  is	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  cognitivist.	  He	  writes	  
that:	  	  
	  
Much	  of	  the	  vocabulary	  of	  critical	  appraisal	  and	   its	  applications	  seems	  to	  
show	  that	  the	  practice	  of	  literary	  evaluation	  is	  cognitivist:	  we	  praise	  works	  
for	   their	   profundity,	   for	   being	   psychologically	   penetrating,	   for	   giving	   an	  
insightful	   perspective	   on	   the	   world.	   We	   decry	   them	   for	   being	   shallow,	  
distorted,	  inane	  or	  full	  of	  worn	  clichés	  (2007,	  p.	  167).	  
	  
Furthermore,	  he	  makes	  a	   leap	   from	   this	   claim	   that	   ‘the	  description	  of	  art	  has	   cognitive	  
concepts’,	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  ‘description	  is	  cognitivist’.	  He	  asserts	  that	  an	  “[…]	  appeal	  
to	   some	   of	   the	   vocabulary	   of	   critical	   appraisal	   shows	   that	   our	   aesthetic	   evaluative	  
practices	   are	   cognitivist;	   so	   cognitive	   values	   are,	   when	   employed	   in	   these	   kinds	   of	  
evaluations,	  aesthetically	  relevant”	  (Gaut,	  2007,	  p.	  168).	  	  
	  
Yet	  at	   this	  point	   the	  autonomist	  might	   interject.	  They	  could	  accept,	  as	  Kieran	  and	  Gaut	  
have	   rightly	   pointed	   out,	   that	  we	   do	   often	   both	   employ	   cognitive	   terms	   and	   attend	   to	  
cognitive	   concepts	  when	  we	   evaluate	  works	   of	   art.	   However,	  while	   accepting	   this	   they	  
might	  still	  argue	  that	  in	  maintaining	  the	  distinction	  between	  ‘artistic’	  and	  ‘aesthetic’	  value	  
the	  cognitive	  value	  of	  an	  artwork	  can	  be	  artistically,	  but	  not	  aesthetically	  relevant.	  As	  they	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do	   with	   moral	   value,	   the	   moderate	   autonomist	   may	   claim	   that	   cognitive	   value	   is	  
appropriate	   when	   evaluating	   the	   overall	   artistic	   value	   of	   an	   artwork,	   but	   not	   when	  
evaluating	  the	  sub-­‐category	  of	  aesthetic	  value.	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	  they	  might	  object	  that	   in	  claiming	  cognitive	  value	  is	  aesthetically	  relevant,	  
and	  therefore	  sometimes	  aesthetically	  defective	  or	  meritorious,	  Gaut	  has	  simply	  begged	  
the	   question	   against	  moderate	   autonomism.	  Whether	   or	   not	   this	   is	   the	   case	  will	   be	   a	  
matter	  of	  how	  aesthetic	  value	  is	  defined,	  and	  yet	  a	  quick	  look	  at	  Gaut’s	  account	  of	  what	  
he	  takes	  aesthetic	  value	  to	  consist	  of	  will	  show	  that	  the	  moderate	  autonomist	  is	  certainly	  
justified	  to	  object	  on	  these	  grounds.	  	  
	  
Indeed,	  Gaut	  has	  attempted	  to	  broaden	  the	  definition	  of	  aesthetic	  value	  to	  include	  many	  
of	   the	   values	   that	   the	   moderate	   autonomist	   would	   likely	   classify	   as	   being	   ‘artistically	  
valuable’.	   His	   account	   holds	   that,	   “[…]	   the	   (wide)	   aesthetic	   value	   of	   an	   artwork	  W	   is	  
simply	   the	   value	   of	  W	   qua	   work	   of	   art	   […]	   the	   notions	   of	   (wide)	   aesthetic	   value	   and	  
artistic	  value	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  one	  and	  the	  same”	  (2007,	  p.	  34).	  Here	  Gaut	  is	  attempting	  to	  
assert	  an	  account	  of	  aesthetic	  value	  that	  exceeds	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  “narrow	  sense”	  of	  the	  
term,	   by	   which	   aesthetic	   value	   is	   simply	   measured	   in	   relation	   to	   particular	   species	   of	  
‘beauty’	  or	  ‘ugliness’	  (2007,	  pp.	  26-­‐7).	  He	  wishes	  instead	  to	  include	  in	  his	  broad	  account	  
all	   terms,	   which	   are	   both	   “evaluative”	   and	   relevant	   to	   “art-­‐critical	   practice”,	   making	  
special	  mention	  of	  Frank	  Sibley’s	  list	  of	  aesthetic	  properties	  (2007,	  p.	  34).	  However,	  even	  
if	  we	  do	  agree	  that	  this	  “narrow	  sense”	  of	  aesthetic	  value	  is	  too	  restrictive	  we	  might	  still	  
reject	  Gaut’s	   “wide”	  account	   in	   favour	  of	   some	  middling,	  or	  alternative	  position.	  Again,	  
the	   moderate	   autonomist	   would	   surely	   reject	   Gaut’s	   account	   of	   aesthetic	   value	   as	  
begging	   the	   question,	   as	   whether	   ‘artistically’	   valuable	   aspects	   of	   artworks	   can	   be	  
‘aesthetically’	   relevant,	   or	   whether	   they	   remain	   conceptually	   distinct	   is	   exactly	   the	  
question	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  argument	  between	  autonomism	  and	  moralism.	  	  
	  
Therefore,	  although	  we	  may	  employ	  cognitive	   language	  to	  evaluate	  artworks	  and	  utilize	  
our	  existing	  knowledge	  to	  aid	  in	  our	  comprehension,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  this	  is	  sufficient	  to	  




3.2. The ‘Understanding Claim’ 
	  
As	   well	   as	   claiming	   that	   “we	   are	   naturally	   inclined	   to	   speak	   of	   [art]	   in	   moral	   terms”	  
(Carroll,	   2003,	   p.	   270)	   and	   that	   many	   artworks	   contain	   content	   that	   requires	   prior	  
cognitive	  knowledge	  in	  order	  for	  us	  to	  comprehend	  them,	  moralists	  who	  are	  pursuing	  a	  
cognitive	   approach	   to	   aesthetic	   value	   often	   claim	   that	   artworks	   can	   manifest	   moral	  
understanding	   and	   other	   cognitive	   insights.	   Matthew	   Kieran	   for	   example	   answers	   the	  
question	  of	  “What	  is	  art	  particularly	  good	  at?”	  by	  claiming	  that:	  “It	  uses	  artistic	  means	  to	  
engage	  the	  imagination	  and	  thereby	  see	  things	   in	  a	  new	  light,	  make	  connections,	   	  [and]	  
convey	  insights	  […]”	  (2006a,	  p.	  132).	  Similarly,	  Berys	  Gaut	  claims	  that	  artworks	  are	  able	  to	  
manifest	   “understanding”,	   which	   he	   takes	   to	   include	   knowledge	   concerning	   morality,	  
psychological	   claims,	  and	  values	   in	  general	   (2007,	  p.	  138).	  And	   to	   the	   same	  end	  Carroll	  
writes:	  
	  
Providing	  genuine,	  eye-­‐opening	  moral	  insight;	  exercising	  and	  enlarging	  the	  
audience’s	   legitimate	   moral	   powers	   of	   perception,	   emotion,	   and	  
reflection;	   challenging	   complacent	   moral	   doxa;	   provoking	   and/or	  
expanding	   the	   moral	   understanding;	   calling	   forth	   educative	   moral	  
judgments;	   encouraging	   the	   tracing	   out	   of	   moral	   implications	   or	   the	  
unravelling	   of	   morally	   significant	   metaphors	   that	   have	   import	   for	   the	  
audience’s	  lives	  can	  all	  contribute	  to	  making	  an	  artwork	  absorbing	  (2000a,	  
p.	  378)	  
	  
Cognitive	  moralism	  holds	  that	  this	  manifestation	  of	  cognitive	  or	  moral	  understanding	  will	  
be,	  under	  certain	  circumstances,	  aesthetically	  relevant.	  Nevertheless,	  accounts	  of	  exactly	  
how	   and	   why	   this	   moral	   understanding	   is	   relevant	   to	   the	   aesthetic	   value	   of	   artworks	  
differ	  between	  positions	  and	  philosophers.	  Gaut’s	  wide	  definition	  of	  aesthetic	  value	  leads	  
him	  to	  claim	  that	  moral	  understanding	  is	  aesthetically	  relevant	  when	  it	   is	  “expressed	  by	  
artistic	  means”	  (2007,	  p.	  170);	  a	  process	  that	  he	  does	  not	  explain	  in	  any	  detail	  other	  than	  
suggesting	   that	   it	   has	   something	   to	   do	   with	   getting	   us	   to	   “feel	   the	   force”	   of	   certain	  
insights	  (2007,	  p.	  85).	  Kieran	  argues,	  “[the]	  value	  of	  engaging	  with	  many	  artworks	  derives	  
from	   the	   particularly	   powerful	   ways	   in	   which	   they	   can	   get	   us	   to	   imaginatively	   explore	  
different	   possible	   attitudes”	   (2006b,	   p.	   71).	   In	   addition,	   he	   holds	   that	   an	   artwork’s	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aesthetic	   value	  can	  be	  enhanced	   in	  virtue	  of	   its	  ability	   to	   “deepen	  one’s	  understanding	  
and	   appreciation”	  where	  moral	   perspectives	   are	   concerned	   (2006b,	   p.	   72).	   Carroll	   also	  
argues	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   idea	   that	   artworks	   can	   “clarify”	   and	   “deepen”	   our	   moral	  
understanding,	  although	  he	  explicitly	  avoids	  the	  claim	  that	  we	  can	  gain	  “interesting,	  new	  
propositional	  knowledge”	  through	  such	  an	  experience	  (2003,	  p.	  283).	  However,	  as	  Carroll	  
is	  concerned	  primarily	  with	  arguing	  that	  the	  moral	  understanding	  manifested	  by	  artworks	  
can	   be	   an	   appropriate	   aspect	   of	   our	   evaluation,	   a	   point	   which	  moderate	   autonomism	  
already	   accepts3,	   it	   is	   unclear	  whether	   he	   further	   holds	   that	   this	   understanding	   can	   be	  
aesthetically	  rather	  than	  only	  artistically	  valuable.	  	  
	  
Importantly,	  there	  are	  two	  distinct	  claims	  present	  in	  the	  above	  line	  of	  argument	  that	  need	  
to	   be	   clearly	   distinguished.	   First	   there	   is	   the	   claim	   that	   artworks	   can	   ‘manifest’	   moral	  
understanding	  or	  present	  moral	  perspectives	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  insightful.	  We	  should	  take	  
this	  first	  claim	  as	  focusing	  on	  the	  understanding	  presented	  in	  the	  artwork	  itself.	  Second	  is	  
the	   claim	   that	   in	  manifesting	  or	  presenting	   such	  an	  understanding	  artworks	   can	   clarify,	  
increase,	  or	  enhance	   the	  moral	  understanding	  of	   those	  who	  engage	  with	   them;	  a	  claim	  
that	   focuses	   on	   the	   audience	   rather	   than	   the	   work.	   It	   should	   be	   clear	   that	   these	   two	  
claims	  are	  quite	  different;	  while	  the	  first	  has	  to	  do	  only	  with	  the	  artwork,	  the	  second	   is	  
focused	  upon	  the	  effect	  the	  artwork	  has	  on	  its	  audience.	  	  
	  
Against	  both	  claims	  it	  may	  be	  objected	  that	  any	  moral	  understanding	  present	  in	  works	  of	  
art	  can	  be	  reduced	  to	  mere	  truisms.	  Objecting	  in	  this	  way	  would	  be	  to	  hold	  that	  the	  moral	  
perspectives	   manifested	   by	   artworks	   are	   not	   interesting,	   new,	   or	   insightful,	   but	   are	  
instead	  simply	  perspectives	  that	  we	  are	  already	  familiar	  with.	  Someone	  objecting	  in	  this	  
way	  might	  for	  example	  argue	  that	  the	  moral	  understanding	  manifested	  in	  Lee’s	  To	  Kill	  a	  
Mockingbird	  can	  be	  reduced	  to	  “racism	  is	  bad”,	  or	  that	  “women’s	  rights	  are	  important”	  is	  
all	  that	  can	  be	  taken	  from	  Atwood’s	  The	  Handmaid’s	  Tale.	  If	  this	  were	  truly	  the	  case,	  then	  
the	  cognitivists’	  claim	  that	  artworks	  are	  able	  to	  manifest	  moral	  understanding	  would	  still	  
persist,	  but	  the	  value	  of	  this	  understanding	  would	  be	  greatly	  diminished.	  In	  such	  cases	  we	  
might	  also	  reasonably	  expect	  that	  the	  ‘aesthetic	  value’	  of	  these	  moral	  understandings	  will	  
be	  diminished	  along	  with	  the	  understanding	  itself.	  
                                                
3	  Carroll’s	  quarrel	  in	  “Art	  Narrative	  and	  Moral	  Understanding”	  (2003)	  looks	  to	  be	  with	  radical	  autonomism,	  
and	  as	  a	  result	  he	  focuses	  his	  efforts	  toward	  arguing	  that	  the	  moral	  evaluation	  of	  art	  is	  sometimes	  
appropriate.	  Of	  course,	  moderate	  autonomism	  readily	  allows	  this.	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Furthermore,	  one	  could	  object	  that	  if,	  as	  some	  cognitivists	  explicitly	  state	  (Carroll,	  1998,	  
2003),	  (Kieran,	  2006a,	  2006b),	  (Gaut,	  2007),	  we	  must	  utilize	  our	  existing	  moral	  knowledge	  
to	   attend	   to	   the	   morally	   relevant	   content	   of	   some	   artworks,	   then	   the	   understanding	  
manifested	  by	  the	  work	  must	  be	  one	  that	  we	  are	  already	  familiar	  with,	  given	  that	  we	  are	  
to	   be	   able	   to	   grasp	   it.	   If	   we	   were	   to	   accept	   such	   an	   objection	   then	   we	   might	   also	  
therefore	   hold	   that	   art	   could	   not	   manifest	   any	   significant	   or	   valuable	   moral	  
understanding,	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  would	  also	  be	  unable	  to	  ‘deepen’	  or	  ‘enhance’	  our	  moral	  
understanding.	  However,	  here	  the	  moralist	  might	  reply	  that	  such	  an	  objection	  surely	  rests	  
on	   an	   unacceptably	   simplified	   account	   of	   how	   artworks	   go	   about	   manifesting	   and	  
promoting	  their	  moral	  perspectives.	  The	  moralist	  might	  argue	  that	  although	  many	  works	  
of	  art	  likely	  deal	  with	  moral	  concepts	  and	  perspectives	  of	  which	  we	  have	  at	  the	  very	  least	  
a	  basic	  understanding,	  some	  works	  of	  art	  aim	  to	  explore	  these	  in	  greater	  depth.	  As	  such	  
the	   moralist	   could	   claim	   that	   the	   two	   examples	   offered	   above	   admit	   only	   an	  
impoverished	  account	  of	   the	  understanding	  manifested	   in	  those	  works;	  and	  they	  would	  
be	  right.	  The	  respective	  claims	  of	  “racism	  is	  bad”	  and	  “women’s	  rights	  are	  important”	  are	  
surely	   trivial,	   but	   the	   way	   in	   which	   these	   artworks	   go	   about	   exploring	   and	   presenting	  
these	  perspectives	  is	  not.	  As	  Lamarque	  writes,	  “[it]	  is	  not	  the	  theme	  itself	  that	  gives	  the	  
interest	  but	  the	  way	  the	  peculiarities	  of	  the	  subject	  give	  life	  to	  the	  theme”	  (2007,	  p.	  137).	  
Therefore,	  although	   it	  may	  be	   the	  case	   that	  works	  of	  art	  utilize	  moral	  perspectives	  and	  
content	   that	   we	   are	   already	   familiar	   with,	   the	   moralist	   can	   argue	   that	   the	   moral	  
understanding	  in	  such	  cases	  is	  located	  not	  with	  the	  general	  moral	  proposition	  manifested	  
by	  the	  artwork,	  but	  rather	  with	  the	  specific	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  artwork	  explores,	  presents,	  
and	  communicates	  these	  perspectives.	  
	  
Even	  if	  one	  is	  willing	  to	  accept	  that	  art	  can	  manifest	  non-­‐trivial	  moral	  understanding,	  one	  
might	  still	  then	  deny	  both	  the	  claim	  that	  such	  understanding	  is	  able	  to	  clarify,	  increase,	  or	  
enhance	  our	  moral	  knowledge,	  as	  well	  as	   the	   further	  claim	  that	   this	  boon	  to	  our	  moral	  
understanding	  would	  be	  aesthetically	  valuable.	  In	  regards	  to	  the	  thought	  that	  art	  can	  be	  
morally	  edifying	  Christopher	  Hamilton	  notes	  that,	  “What	  one	  makes	  of	  art	  and	  whether	  it	  
is	  relevant	  to	  one’s	  moral	  experience	  and,	  if	  so,	  in	  what	  way,	  depends	  a	  great	  deal	  upon	  
the	   kind	  of	   person	  one	   is”	   (2006,	   p.	   42).	   For	  Hamilton	  what	  we	   take	   from	  art	   depends	  
largely	  on	  how	  we	  approach	  it.	  Where	  some	  might	  treat	  art	  as	  an	  occasion	  for	  reflection	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with	   the	   possibility	   of	   self-­‐improvement,	   others	   may	   treat	   it	   as	   a	   purely	   pleasurable	  
pastime.	  Hamilton	  warily	  concedes	  that	  “[...]	  some	  works	  of	  art	  (or	  some	  novels)	  can,	  for	  
some	  people	  some	  of	   the	   time,	   contribute	   to	   their	  moral	  education	   [...]”;	  but	  he	  warns	  
that	  while	  we	  might	   sometimes	   feel	   that	   art	   contributes	   to	   our	  moral	   improvement,	   it	  
may	   in	  fact	  simply	  be	  contributing	  to	  something	  else4.	   (2006,	  p.	  43,	  his	  emphasis).	  Even	  
Kieran,	   who	   endorses	   the	   claim	   that	   “[…]	   imaginatively	   experiencing	  morally	   defective	  
cognitive-­‐affective	   responses	   and	   attitudes	   in	   ways	   that	   are	   morally	   problematic	   can	  
deepen	  one’s	  understanding	  and	  appreciation”	   (2006b,	  p.	  72)	   limits	   this	  by	  adding	   that	  
“[what]	  one	   is	   capable	  of	   learning	   from	  experience	  depends	   in	  a	  part	  upon	   the	   level	  of	  
moral	  understanding	  one	  is	  already	  at”	  (2006b,	  p.	  73).	  The	  problem	  for	  cognitivism	  is	  that	  
it	  must	  not	  only	  show	  that	  our	  engagement	  with	  certain	  works	  of	  art	  is	  able	  to	  increase	  or	  
deepen	  our	  moral	  understanding,	  which	  is	  a	  contentious	  issue	  in	  itself,	  but	  must	  further	  
show	  that	  such	  artworks	  are	  aesthetically	  valuable	  for	  providing	  such	  edification.	  
	  
Given	  that	  we	  have	  very	  little	  by	  the	  way	  of	  conclusive	  empirical	  evidence	  regarding	  art’s	  
ability	  to	  educate	  us	  on	  moral	  matters	  (Hakemulder,	  2000),	  we	  may	  have	  at	  least	  a	  prima	  
facie	  reason	  to	  be	  wary	  of	  the	  conclusion	  that	  art’s	  ability	  to	  convey	  moral	  understanding	  
is	  aesthetically	  valuable.	  Furthermore,	  this	  of	  course	  does	  not	  deny	  that	  art	  may	  be	  able	  
to	  educate	  us	  on	  moral	  matters	  —	  where	  “educate”	   is	   construed	  broadly	  —	  but	   rather	  
suggests	   that	   if	   this	   process	   of	   edification	   is	   hinged	   heavily	   upon	   the	   individual	   rather	  
than	  the	  work,	  then	  we	  should	  be	  cautious	  of	  the	  cognitivist	  claim	  that	  it	  is	  an	  aesthetic	  
value	   of	   the	   latter.	   Of	   course,	   an	   objection	   grounded	   on	   an	   account	   of	   individual	  
responses	   could	   also	   extend	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   aesthetic	   value	   in	   that	  we	   are	   prone	   to	  
disagreement	  regarding	  which	  works	  possess	  this	  value,	  as	  well	  as	  where,	  and	  why	  they	  
possess	   it.	   Yet,	   given	   that	   cognitive	   moralism	   is	   attempting	   to	   advance	   their	   position	  
through	  a	  general	  claim	  concerning	  art’s	  ability	  to	  enhance	  or	  deepen	  our	  understanding,	  
such	  an	  objection	  should	  at	  least	  be	  seen	  as	  limiting	  the	  strength	  of	  their	  claim.	  
	  
                                                
4	  Hamilton	  continues,	  “Art	  can	  make	  one’s	  life	  more	  interesting;	  can	  make	  one	  a	  more	  interesting	  person	  to	  
talk	  to;	  can	  deepen	  one’s	  sense	  of	  life	  in	  various	  ways,	  for	  example,	  by	  helping	  one	  to	  understand	  one’s	  
own	  and	  others’	  motives;	  can	  provide	  so	  much	  pleasure	  that	  one	  feels	  light	  of	  spirit;	  can	  give	  one	  a	  
sense	  of	  being	  in	  touch	  with	  people	  more	  interesting	  than	  those	  one	  happens	  to	  find	  around	  one;	  can	  
help	  one	  become	  wittier,	  or	  more	  outrageous	  or	  self-­‐assertive,	  or	  quirkier	  or	  more	  uninhibited;	  can	  
deepen	  and	  expand	  one’s	  sense	  of	  order	  and	  thus	  feeling	  of	  freedom;	  and	  much	  else	  besides.	  But	  it	  is	  
very	  easy	  to	  confuse	  these	  with	  becoming	  more	  virtuous”	  (2006,	  p.	  43).	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In	   addition,	   if	   we	   accept	   that	   art	   is	   able	   to	   clarify,	   increase,	   or	   enhance	   our	   moral	  
understanding,	   one	  might	   then	   object	   that	   the	   value	   in	   such	   cases	   has	   to	   do	  with	   our	  
‘having	   learned	   something’,	   and	   is	   therefore	   purely	   instrumental.	   One	   could	   argue	   for	  
example	  that	  the	  value	  of	  art	  qua	  art	  is	  intrinsic,	  and	  therefore	  that	  any	  attempts	  to	  value	  
art	   for	   its	   educative	  purposes	   is	   only	   extrinsically	   valuable.	   Yet	  here	   the	  moralist	  might	  
reply	   that	   the	   process	   of	   clarifying	   or	   enhancing	   our	   moral	   knowledge	   through	   our	  
engagement	  with	  art	   is	  not	  well	   served	  by	   invoking	   the	   terms	   ‘learning’,	   ‘educating’,	  or	  
any	  other	  term	  that	  describes	  this	  process	  as	  “consequence”	  of	  our	  engagement	  with	  art	  
(Carroll,	   2003,	   p.	   285).	   Rather,	   they	   might	   argue	   that	   the	   edification	   provided	   by	   art	  
comes	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  “comprehension”	  of	  the	  moral	  perspectives	  that	  it	  explores	  (2003,	  
p.	   285).	   Indeed,	   Carroll	   asserts	   that	   “[it]	   is	   not	   the	   function	   of	   art	   to	   provide	   moral	  
education”	   (2003,	  p.	  276),	  and	   in	   turn	  he	  argues	   for	  an	  account	  of	  moral	   “clarification”	  
which	  holds	  that	  the	  process	  of	  deepening	  our	  moral	  understanding	  is	  “part	  and	  parcel”	  
of	   the	   process	   of	   “comprehending	   and	   following	   the	   narrative”	   (2003,	   p.	   285).	   What	  
Carroll	  looks	  to	  be	  suggesting	  here	  is	  that	  while	  artworks	  do	  not	  directly	  aim	  to	  increase	  
our	  moral	  understanding,	   the	  process	  of	  engaging	  with	  artworks	  and	  seeing	  their	  moral	  
perspectives	  as	  an	  example	  of	  how	  morality	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  specific	  cases	  can	  increase	  
our	   “familiarity”	  with	   concepts,	   as	  well	   as	   allowing	  us	   to	   “draw”	  or	   alter	   “connections”	  
between	  these	  concepts	  (2003,	  p.	  284).	  	  
	  
However,	  even	  if	  this	  process	  is	  a	  part	  of	  the	  comprehension	  of	  the	  work	  it	  may	  be	  that	  
we	  should	  still	  only	  then	  value	  the	  understanding	  manifested	  in	  the	  work	  itself,	  and	  not	  
whether	   it	   contributes	   to	   the	   deepening,	   or	   enhancement	   of	   our	   own	   moral	  
understanding.	   Many	   works	   of	   art	   arguably	   do	   not	   set	   out	   specifically	   to	   educate	   or	  
impart	  knowledge	  even	  when	  they	  may	  manifest	  moral	  understanding.	  On	  these	  grounds	  
one	   might	   object,	   particularly	   if	   their	   conception	   of	   aesthetic	   value	   is	   of	   a	   formalist	  
persuasion,	  that	  to	  value	  such	  works	  for	  their	  contribution	  to	  our	  moral	  understanding	  is	  
to	  value	  them	  for	  their	  instrumental	  value,	  that	  is,	  to	  value	  them	  not	  as	  works	  of	  art	  but	  
instead	  as	  vehicles	  for	  education.	  	  
	  
We	   might	   by	   this	   view	   differentiate	   between	   an	   artwork’s	   ‘manifestation’	   of	   moral	  
understanding	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  our	   ‘uptake’	  of	   this	  understanding	  on	  the	  other.	  Here,	  
the	  manifestation	  might	  be	   taken	   to	  be	  an	  aesthetic	   value	  of	   the	  work	   itself,	  while	   the	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matter	   of	   ‘uptake’	   is	   instead	   related	   to	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   individual	   engages	   and	  
reflects	  upon	  the	  moral	  perspectives	  and	  understanding	  manifested	  by	  the	  work.	  
	  
Thus,	  it	  seems	  that	  even	  if	  we	  accept	  that	  art	  is	  able	  to	  edify	  we	  might	  still	  reject	  the	  claim	  
that	  its	  doing	  so	  constitutes	  an	  aesthetic	  merit.	  Instead,	  the	  moralist	  should	  accept	  that	  if	  
artworks	   are	   indeed	   able	   to	   manifest	   moral	   understanding	   their	   cognitive	   value	   is	  
situated	  with	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  work	  goes	  about	  manifesting	  this	  understanding,	  and	  
not	  with	  the	  ‘uptake’	  or	  educative	  outcomes	  themselves.	  
	  
3.3. The ‘Prescribed Response Claim’ 
	  
Arguably	  the	  strongest	  claim	  developed	  in	  favour	  of	  cognitivism	  holds	  that	  artworks	  often	  
aim	   at	   eliciting	   responses	   that	   depend	   upon	   cognitive	   and/or	  moral	   assumptions.	   This	  
claim	  maintains	   that	   when	   artworks	   prescribe	   responses	   in	   this	   way	   the	   cognitive	   and	  
moral	   content	   of	   the	   prescription	   is	   relevant	   in	   assessing	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   work	  
succeeds	   in	   ‘securing’	   the	   responses	   it	   aims	   for.	   Consequently	   cognitivism	   commonly	  
holds	  that	  artworks	  manifesting	  cognitive	  and	  moral	  understanding	  are	  able	  to	  secure	  the	  
responses	  they	  prescribe	  and	  are	  aesthetically	  valuable	  to	  that	  extent,	  while	  conversely,	  
works	  that	  are	  prey	  to	  cognitive	  and	  moral	  misunderstanding	  fail	  to	  secure	  the	  responses	  
they	   aim	   for	   and	   are	   aesthetically	   defective	   to	   that	   extent	   (Carroll,	   1998,	   2000a,	   2006,	  
2008),	  (Kieran,	  2006a,	  2006b,	  2009),	  (Jacobson,	  1997),	  (Gaut,	  1998,	  2007).	  
	  
This	   claim	   holds	   that	   an	   artwork	   prescribing	   an	   angry	   response	   towards	   a	   particular	  
character	  must	  provide	  cognitive	  and	  moral	  reasons	  for	  us	  to	  respond	  as	  such;	  otherwise	  
it	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  failing	  to	  provoke	  our	  anger,	  and	  therefore	  failing	  to	  secure	  an	  aim	  of	  
the	  work.	   For	   example,	   an	   artwork	   in	   which	  we	   are	   prescribed	   to	   respond	  with	   anger	  
towards	   a	   character	   who	   commits	   some	   transgression	   could	   be	   seen	   as	   providing	  
sufficient	  grounds	  for	  such	  a	  response,	  and	  may	  therefore	  be	  held	  by	  cognitivists	  as	  being	  
aesthetically	   valuable	   for	   doing	   so;	   alternatively	   an	   artwork	  which	   prescribes	   the	   same	  
response	   towards	   a	   character	   who	   has	   done	   nothing	   wrong	   whatsoever	   may	   fail	   to	  
provoke	   our	   anger,	   and	   would	   therefore	   be	   taken	   by	   cognitivists	   to	   be	   aesthetically	  
defective.	   In	  cases	  where	  artworks	   fail	   in	   this	  way,	   cognitivists	  generally	  agree	   that	   this	  
constitutes	   an	   aesthetic	   defect	   as	   the	   work	   has	   failed	   to	   secure	   an	   aim	   internal	   to	   its	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success	   (Carroll,	   1998,	   2000a,	   2006,	   2008),	   (Gaut,	   1998,	   2007),	   (Kieran,	   2006a,	   2006b,	  
2009).	  Daniel	   Jacobson	  describes	   this	   interaction	  between	  aesthetic	  and	  moral	  value	  as	  
occurring	  when,	  “[…]	  artworks	  are	  morally	  and	  aesthetically	  flawed	  for	  the	  same	  reason”	  
(2007,	  p.	  348,	  my	  emphasis).	  	  
	  
The	  thought	  that	  the	  responses	  mandated	  by	  artworks	  are	  to	  some	  extent	  reliant	  on	  their	  
moral	  assumptions	  is	  not	  a	  new	  one,	  and	  its	  genesis	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  writings	  of	  
Aristotle	  and	  Hume.	  Hume’s	  influence	  is	  particularly	  clear	  in	  contemporary	  arguments	  for	  
moralism,	  many	  of	  which	  defend	  some	  form	  of	   the	  claim	   laid	  out	   in	  Of	  the	  Standard	  of	  
Taste	  (1757)	  where	  Hume	  wrote:	  	  
	  
[…]	   where	   the	   ideas	   of	   morality	   and	   decency	   alter	   from	   one	   age	   to	  
another,	  and	  where	  vicious	  manners	  are	  described,	  without	  being	  marked	  
with	   the	   proper	   characters	   of	   blame	   and	   disapprobation;	   this	   must	   be	  
allowed	  disfigure	  the	  poem,	  and	  to	  be	  a	  real	  deformity.	  I	  cannot,	  nor	  is	  it	  
proper	  I	  should,	  enter	  into	  such	  sentiments;	  and	  however	  I	  may	  excuse	  the	  
poet,	   on	   account	   of	   the	   manners	   of	   his	   age,	   I	   never	   can	   relish	   the	  
composition	  (2008,	  p.	  111).	  
	  
Aristotle’s	  views	  on	  tragedy	  are	  also	  influential	  where	  the	  securing	  of	  specific	  responses	  is	  
concerned.	  In	  his	  Poetics	  he	  wrote	  that	  characters	  should	  be	  “good”,	  “suitable”,	  “lifelike”,	  
and	  “consistent”	  in	  their	  actions	  if	  we	  are	  to	  respond	  with	  the	  emotions	  of	  fear	  and	  pity	  
that	  are	  proper	  for	  tragedy	  (15:	  1454a).	  Characters	  that	  fail	  to	  adhere	  to	  this	  schema,	  for	  
example	   by	   being	   evil	   or	   unrealistic,	   will	   fail	   to	   provoke	   the	   proper	   emotions	   and	   will	  
thereby	  thwart	  the	  responses	  aimed	  for	  by	  the	  work.	  We	  should	  not	  expect	  to	  feel	  pity	  
for	  a	  mass-­‐murderer,	  or	  feel	   fear	  when	  they	  are	  finally	  brought	  to	   justice;	   in	  such	  cases	  
we	  would	  instead	  likely	  hold	  that	  the	  work	  in	  question	  has	  made	  some	  kind	  of	  moral	  error	  
in	  expecting	  us	  to	  respond	  as	  such.	  	  
	  
Both	  Carroll	  and	  Gaut	  hold	  that	  where	  works	  of	  art	  manifest	  moral	  misunderstanding	  in	  
this	  way	   they	  are	  aesthetically	  defective.	  However,	   their	   reasons	   regarding	  exactly	  why	  
this	   constitutes	   such	   a	   defect	   are	   quite	   different.	   For	   example	   Carroll’s	   argument	  
concerning	   the	   aesthetic	   defectiveness	   of	   moral	   misunderstanding	   is	   empirically	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grounded	  and	  holds	  that	  when	  artworks	  attempt	  to	  prescribe	  responses	  based	  on	  moral	  
misunderstandings	   the	   audience	  will	   simply	   ‘fail’	   or	   be	   ‘unable’	   to	   respond	   in	   the	  way	  
prescribed	   (1998,	   2000a,	   2006,	   2008).	   Gaut	   (1998,	   2007)	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   defends	   a	  
normative	   argument,	   claiming	   that	   we	   have	   a	   moral	   obligation	   not	   to	   respond	   as	  
prescribed	  when	  the	  response	  in	  question	  is	  grounded	  on	  a	  moral	  error.	  For	  both	  of	  these	  
accounts,	  whether	  a	  work’s	  prescribed	  responses	  are	  founded	  on	  moral	  understanding	  or	  
moral	   misunderstanding	   can	   be	   translated	   into	   whether	   or	   not	   these	   responses	   are	  
respectively	  morally	   ‘praiseworthy’	  or	   ‘blameworthy’.	  Therefore	  by	   these	   two	  accounts,	  
artworks	   that	   prescribe	   immoral	   responses	   (blameworthy)	   will	   always	   be	   aesthetically	  
defective,	   while	   artworks	   prescribing	   responses	   that	   are	   morally	   praiseworthy	   will	   be	  
aesthetically	  meritorious	  (to	  that	  extent).	  	  
	  
In	   this	   respect	   Kieran’s	   account	   of	   cognitivism	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   deviation	   from	   those	  
defended	   by	   Carroll	   and	   Gaut.	   Kieran	   fills	   his	   cognitive	   account	   out	   in	   terms	   of	  
“intelligibility”	  and	  “psychological	  closeness”	  (2006a,	  p.	  135),	  allowing	  him	  to	  argue	  that	  
artworks	   prescribing	   immoral	   responses	   are	   still	   able	   to	   be	   both	   cognitively	   and	  
aesthetically	  valuable.	  Kieran	  writes	  that	  a	  work’s	  moral	  perspective	  being	  “intelligible”	  is	  
a	  matter	  of	  “[…]	  how	  plausible	  or	  psychologically	  probable,	   informative,	  explanatory,	  or	  
insightful	   the	  understanding	  afforded	  through	  the	   imaginative	  experience	   is	  held	  to	  be”	  
(2001,	  p.	  35);	  while	  “psychological	  closeness”	  pertains	   to	   the	  manifested	  perspective	  of	  
an	  artwork	  being	  able	  to	  “connect	  up	  with	  enough	  of	  our	  own	  attitudes	  and	  desires	  […]	  
such	  that	  we	  are	  able	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  works	  as	  solicited”	  (2006a,	  p.	  135).	  Here	  what	  is	  
of	   importance	   is	   not	   whether	   the	   moral	   understanding	   manifested	   by	   an	   artwork	   is	  
morally	   praiseworthy	  or	   blameworthy,	   but	   rather	   that	  we	   are	   able	   to	  make	   sense	  of	   it	  
(something	  that	  Carroll	  explicitly	  denies	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  latter).	  To	  offer	  one	  of	  Kieran’s	  
own	  examples:	  works	  like	  Greene’s	  The	  Destructors	  may	  prescribe	  that	  we	  respond	  with	  
glee	  and	  admiration	  towards	  the	  wanton	  destruction	  of	  an	  innocent	  man’s	  property,	  and	  
even	   though	   this	  prescribed	   response	   is	   immoral	  Kieran	  holds	   that	   it	   is	  manifested	   in	  a	  
way	   that	   is	   “psychologically-­‐close”	   to	  us	   (2006b,	  p69)5.	  Yet,	  although	  Kieran	  allows	   that	  
morally	  defective	  perspectives	  can	  be	  aesthetically	  valuable,	  his	  argument	  for	   ‘cognitive	  
immoralism’	   maintains	   that	   here	   aesthetic	   value	   is	   constituted	   by	   the	   meritorious	  
understanding	   that	   these	   perspectives	   are	   able	   to	   provide	   (2006a,	   2006b).	   If	   Greene’s	  
                                                
5	  My	  treatment	  here	  of	  Kieran’s	  example	  is	  purposefully	  brief,	  as	  I	  will	  return	  to	  it	  in	  chapter	  5.	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story	   had	   instead	  presented	   an	  unrealistic	   or	   incoherent	   account	  of	   how	  one	  might	   be	  
persuaded	   to	   act	   in	   such	   a	   way,	   or	   why	   one	   might	   take	   pleasure	   in	   such	   destructive	  
behaviour	  —	  perhaps	  by	  misrepresenting	  the	  psychology	  of	  the	  social	  ‘clique’	  —	  then	  by	  
Kieran’s	   account	   it	   would	   manifest	   a	   cognitively	   defective,	   and	   therefore	   aesthetically	  
defective,	  understanding.	   In	   fact	  Kieran	  states	   this	  explicitly,	  writing,	   “[…]	  a	  work	  which	  
promotes	  a	  false	  imaginative	  understanding	  of	  others	  and	  the	  world	  is	  disvaluable	  as	  art”	  
(1996,	  p.	  349).	  Consequently,	  Kieran’s	  account	  of	  cognitive	   immoralism	  should	  be	  taken	  
to	   hold	   that	   artworks	   could	   be	   aesthetically	   valuable	   on	   account	   of	   their	   immoral	  
perspectives,	  only	  if	  those	  perspectives	  are	  themselves	  ‘cognitively	  valuable’.	  
	  
This	   is	   important	  as	   it	  shows	  that	  although	  cognitivists	  disagree	   in	  regard	  to	  whether	  or	  
not	   moral	   defects	   or	   merits	   are	   always	   respectively	   aesthetic	   defects	   or	   merits,	   their	  
arguments	   all	   share	   common	   ground	   in	   claiming	   that	   cognitive	   and	   moral	  
misunderstanding	   is,	   when	   aesthetically	   relevant,	   always	   aesthetically	   defective,	   and	  
similarly	   cognitive	   and	   moral	   understanding	   is	   under	   the	   same	   circumstances	   always	  
aesthetically	  valuable.	  They	  can	  then	  be	  seen	  to	  hold	  that	  the	  moral	  value	  of	  an	  artwork	  is	  
aesthetically	   relevant	   where	   this	   value	   is	   cast	   in	   terms	   of	   moral	   understanding	   or	  
misunderstanding.	  
	  
3.4. Moral Value and the ‘Moral Significance Thesis’ 
 
Although	   cognitivists	   make	   a	   strong	   case	   against	   moderate	   autonomism	   regarding	   the	  
aesthetic	  relevance	  of	  cognitive	  and	  moral	  value,	  one	  need	  not	  accept	  that	  their	  account	  
exhausts	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  values	  might	  interact.	  An	  alternative	  position	  has	  been	  
advanced	  (Mullin,	  2002,	  2004)	  in	  which,	  the	  ‘moral	  value’	  of	  art	  does	  not	  constitute	  any	  
part	  of	  its	  aesthetic	  value.	  Instead,	  this	  position	  argues	  that	  the	  moral	  significance	  of	  the	  
attitudes	   and	   perspectives	   manifested	   by	   works	   of	   art	   is	   the	   important	   factor	   in	  
determining	   the	   relationship	   between	   these	   two	   values.	   This	   section	   will	   begin	   by	  
outlining	   the	   distinction	   that	   Mullin	   makes	   between	   ‘moral	   value’	   and	   ‘moral	  
significance’,	   before	   moving	   on	   to	   examine	   and	   offer	   some	   criticisms	   of	   the	   moral	  
significance	  thesis	  (as	  it	  will	  be	  referred	  to).	  	  
	  
The	   distinction	   between	   “moral	   value”	   and	   “moral	   significance”	   has	   been	   explicitly	  
 28 
defended	   over	   two	   papers	   by	   Amy	  Mullin	   (2002,	   2004).	  Mullin	   acknowledges	   that	   the	  
disagreement	   between	   moderate	   autonomism	   and	   moralism	   rests	   firmly	   upon	   the	  
concept	  of	  moral	  value	  and	  the	  contentious	  issue	  of	  its	  aesthetic	  relevance.	  Furthermore	  
she	  claims	  that	  this	  disagreement	  rests	  upon	  a	  conflation	  of	  the	  value	  and	  significance	  of	  
the	  moral	  perspectives	  and	  attitudes	  of	  artworks	  and	  as	  such	  she	  seeks	  to	  untangle	  the	  
two	  (2002,	  p.	  137).	  Mullin	  explicitly	  denies	  the	  claims	  of	  the	  moralists	  who	  in	  adherence	  
to	  the	  valence	  constraint	  claim	  that	  moral	  value	  is	  aesthetically	  valuable,	  and	  that	  moral	  
defectiveness	   (being	  morally	   blameworthy)	   is	   an	   aesthetic	   defect.	   ‘Moral	   value’,	   as	   the	  
term	  will	  be	  used	  henceforth	  involves	  our	  evaluations	  regarding	  the	  praiseworthiness	  or	  
blameworthiness	  of	  the	  moral	  perspectives	  and	  ideas	  that	  are	  often	  manifested	  in	  works	  
of	  art.	  For	  example,	  cognitive	  moralism	  would	  likely	  hold	  that	  certain	  moral	  perspectives	  
said	  to	  be	  advocated	  for	  within	  Harron’s	  film	  American	  Psycho	  —	  such	  as	  finding	  murder	  
and	   dismemberment	   amusing	   —	   are,	   to	   put	   it	   simply,	   morally	   blameworthy	   (and	  
therefore	   lacking	   moral	   value).	   Conversely,	   the	   moral	   messages	   and	   anti-­‐slavery	  
sentiments	  present	  in	  Stowe's	  Uncle	  Tom's	  Cabin	  are	  widely	  accepted	  as	  being	  exemplary	  
ones	   (morally	   valuable).	   Again,	   in	   both	   examples	   the	   evaluation	   of	   the	  moral	   attitudes	  
informs	   whether	   they	   are	   ‘valuable’	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   their	   being	   either	   morally	  
praiseworthy	  or	  blameworthy.	  
	  
‘Moral	  significance’,	  however,	  disregards	  the	  ‘value’	  of	  moral	  content	  focusing	  instead	  on	  
the	   complexity,	   depth,	   and	   richness	   of	   the	   exploration	   and	   shaping	   of	  moral	   attitudes,	  
ideas,	   and	   themes	   that	   artworks	  manifest.	   By	   this	   view	   it	   is	   possible	   for	   an	   artwork	   to	  
advocate	  ideas	  that	  are	  morally	  valuable	  yet	  of	  no	  moral	  significance;	  ideas	  that	  are	  not	  
morally	   valuable	   yet	   morally	   significant;	   or	   to	   explore	   ideas	   in	   a	   morally	   significant	  
manner	  without	  advocating	  for	  any	  particular	  position.	  Returning	  to	  an	  example	  offered	  
above;	   while	   Uncle	   Tom’s	   Cabin	   can	   be	   reasonably	   interpreted	   to	   manifest	   moral	  
attitudes	   that	   are	   praiseworthy	   and	   which	   also	   undoubtedly	   had	   both	   a	   tangible	   and	  
positive	  impact	  on	  the	  anti-­‐slavery	  movement,	  some	  have	  criticised	  the	  moral	  significance	  
of	  the	  work.	  Richard	  Posner	  argues,	  “Uncle	  Tom’s	  Cabin	  has	  not	  survived	  as	   literature	  –	  
the	  only	  interest	  that	  it	  holds	  for	  us	  is	  historical	  –	  even	  though	  its	  author’s	  opposition	  to	  
slavery	  now	  commands	  universal	  assent.”	  (1997,	  p.	  7)6.	  Likewise,	  Gaut	  writes,	  “[…]	  there	  
                                                
6	  Posner	  specifically	  argues	  against	  “ethical	  criticism”,	  holding	  that	  the	  ‘moral	  value’	  of	  an	  artwork	  never	  
affects	  its	  aesthetic	  value.	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are	  works	  such	  as	  Harriet	  Beecher	  Stowe’s	  Uncle	  Tom’s	  Cabin	  which,	  though	  the	  ethical	  
attitudes	   they	   display	   are	   admirable,	   are	   in	   many	   ways	   uninspired	   and	   disappointing”	  
(1998,	  p.	  182-­‐3).	  It	  may	  strike	  some	  as	  intuitively	  strange	  to	  argue	  that	  an	  artwork,	  which	  
had	  such	  a	  significant	  social	   impact	  by	  virtue	  of	   its	  moral	  message,	  could	  be	  accused	  of	  
lacking	   moral	   significance.	   Yet,	   the	   idea	   of	   moral	   significance	   that	   Mullin	   advances	   is	  
neither	  measured	   in	  terms	  of	  moral	  value	  or	  social	   impact,	   the	   latter	  being	  regarded	  as	  
purely	   instrumental	   to	   the	   works	   value	   qua	   art.	   Instead,	   the	   criticisms	   of	  Uncle	   Tom’s	  
Cabin	  rest	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  work’s	  moral	  message	  is	  explored	  in	  a	  banal	  and	  shallow	  
fashion.	  
	  
One	   question	   that	   needs	   to	   be	   examined	   here	   is	   whether	   or	   not	   we	   require	   a	   new	  
concept	   such	   as	   ‘moral	   significance’	   to	   properly	   capture	   the	   differences	   stated	   above.	  
One	  might	  point	  out	  instead	  that	  the	  major	  difference	  between	  ‘moral	  value’	  and	  ‘moral	  
significance’	  is	  not	  one	  of	  concepts,	  but	  merely	  one	  of	  objects;	  that	  is,	  in	  the	  former	  case	  
the	  object	  of	  our	  appreciation	  is	  the	  moral	  ‘idea’	  or	  ‘perspective’;	  while	  in	  the	  latter	  case	  
our	  appreciation	  is	  instead	  focused	  on	  the	  ‘shape’,	  ‘exploration’,	  or	  ‘presentation’	  of	  this	  
idea	   or	   perspective.	   If	   one	   were	   willing	   to	   accept	   that	   the	   fundamental	   difference	  
between	   moral	   ‘value’	   and	   moral	   ‘significance’	   boils	   down	   to	   the	   object	   of	   our	  
appreciation,	   then	   we	   might	   take	  Mullin’s	   claim	   as	   being	   better	   expressed	   by	   holding	  
that:	  the	  moral	  idea	  or	  perspective	  of	  an	  artwork	  is	  never	  aesthetically	  relevant,	  instead,	  
it	  is	  the	  shaping,	  exploration,	  and	  presentation	  of	  these	  moral	  ideas	  and	  perspectives	  that	  
links	   the	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  categories	   together.	  Yet	   if	  one	  of	  Mullin’s	  aims	   is	   to	  deny	  
that	   aesthetic	   value	   is	   only	   enhanced	   by	  morally	   valuable	   exploration,	   then	   she	  might	  
want	   to	   reject	   this	   object	   directed	   approach.	   This	   is	   because	   there	   are	   some	   (Stecker,	  
2005b),	  (Harold,	  2006,	  2008)	  who	  argue	  that	  the	  exploration	  of	  morally	  defective	  ‘ideas’	  
in	   ways	   that	   are	   “imaginatively	   or	   cognitively	   rich”	   is	   always	   morally	   valuable	   (Harold,	  
2006,	  p.	  267)7.	  Therefore,	  Mullin’s	  introduction	  of	  moral	  ‘significance’	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  
attempt	   to	   keep	   the	   aesthetic	   relevance	   of	   an	   artwork’s	   exploration,	   shaping,	   and	  
presentation	   of	   moral	   ideas,	   and	   the	   possible	   moral	   value	   of	   this	   kind	   of	   exploration	  
apart.	  If	  we	  were	  to	  argue,	  as	  Mullin	  does,	  that	  moral	  significance	  is	  aesthetically	  relevant	  
while	  moral	  value	  is	  not,	  then	  it	  would	  suit	  our	  purposes	  to	  distinguish	  sharply	  between	  
the	  two	  in	  a	  way	  that	  the	  object	  directed	  approach	  fails	  to	  do.	  
                                                
7	  This	  will	  examined	  further	  in	  chapter	  5.	  
 30 
	  
Mullin’s	  view,	  which	  I	  will	  call	  the	  ‘moral	  significance	  thesis’	  can	  be	  understood	  to	  defend	  
the	  following	  claims:	  (1)	  the	  moral	  value	  of	  an	  artwork	  never	  directly	  affects	  its	  aesthetic	  
value	  or	  constitutes	  an	  aesthetic	  defect	  or	  merit	   in	   the	  work	   (2002,	  p.	  137-­‐9),	   (2004,	  p.	  
255);	  (2)	  the	  moral	  significance	  of	  an	  artwork	  can	  affect	  its	  aesthetic	  value	  (2002,	  p.	  137);	  
(3)	  moral	   significance	   is	   aesthetically	   relevant	   by	   virtue	   of	   its	   ability	   to	   be	   new,	   novel,	  
interesting,	   exploratory,	   or	   otherwise	   imaginatively	   engaging	   (2002,	   p.	   140,	   p.	   143),	  
(2004,	  p.	  255-­‐6);	  (4)	  moral	  significance	  is	  distinct	  from	  questions	  regarding	  the	  ‘value’	  of	  
the	  moral	  or	  cognitive	  understanding	  that	  art	  manifests	  (2002,	  p.	  137),	  (2004,	  p.	  255).	  The	  
aim	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  examine	  the	  moral	  significance	  thesis	  in	  light	  of	  these	  claims,	  as	  
well	   as	   to	   investigate	   both:	   whether	   or	   not	   there	   is	   a	   need	   for	   the	   concept	   of	   moral	  
significance,	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  can,	  as	  Mullin	  suggests,	  completely	  separate	  moral	  
‘value’	  from	  moral	  ‘significance’.	  This	  will	  then	  provide	  a	  basis	  to	  explore	  whether	  or	  not	  
the	   moral	   significance	   thesis	   provides	   a	   more	   plausible	   account	   of	   the	   interaction	  
between	  the	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  categories,	  than	  do	  the	  value	  based	  accounts	  defended	  
by	   the	   major	   moralist	   positions	   (ethicism,	   moderate	   moralism,	   and	   cognitive	  
immoralism).	  We	  will	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  claims	  that	  constitute	  the	  moral	  significance	  thesis.	  	  
	  
Mullin’s	  reason	  for	  holding	  (1)	  looks	  to	  be	  an	  endorsement	  of	  Anderson	  and	  Dean’s	  claim	  
that	   it	   is	   never	   the	   “moral	   component	   of	   the	   criticism	   as	   such	   that	   diminishes	   or	  
strengthens	  the	  value	  of	  an	  artwork	  qua	  artwork”	  (1998,	  p.	  153).	  However	  she	  explicitly	  
denies	   their	  conclusion	  that	  as	   result	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  criticism	  are	  “entirely	  distinct	  
activities”,	   holding	   instead	   that	   these	   kinds	   of	   evaluations	   can	   “overlap”.	   Importantly,	  
Mullin	   also	   denies	   the	  moralist	   claim	   that	  moral	   defects	   or	  merits	   constitute	   aesthetic	  
defects	  or	  merits	  (Mullin,	  2002,	  p.	  139).	  Mullin	  should	  therefore	  be	  taken	  to	  be	  defending	  
a	  position	   located	  somewhere	  between	  moderate	  autonomism,	  and	  moralism,	  whereby	  
moral	   value	   does	   not	   directly	   affect	   or	   constitute	   an	   aesthetic	   defect	   or	   merit	   in	   an	  
artwork,	   yet	   where	   as	   she	   writes,	   “intrinsic	   features	   of	   artworks	   that	   are	   morally	  
significant	  are	  also	  aesthetically	  relevant”	  (2002,	  p.	  137).	  
	  
The	  strength	  of	  (2)	  inevitably	  relies	  on	  Mullin’s	  ability	  to	  argue	  for	  claims	  (3)	  and	  (4),	  but	  
in	  short	  it	  holds	  that	  the	  moral	  significance	  of	  an	  artwork	  can	  affect	  its	  aesthetic	  value.	  As	  
she	  has	  already	  denied	  that	  moral	  value	  constitutes	  an	  aesthetic	  merit	  or	  defect	  her	  claim	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might	  instead	  be	  taken	  to	  argue	  for	  some	  alternative	  relationship	  between	  aesthetic	  and	  
moral	   value.	   She	   claims	   that	   “[…]	   a	   work	   may	   be	   morally	   significant	   because	   of	   its	  
imaginative	  exploration	  of	  various	  moral	   ideas,	  emotions,	  and	  values”	  and	  further	  holds	  
that	  “the	  work’s	   imaginative	  exploration	  of	   its	  moral	  subject	  matter	  should	  count	  as	  an	  
aesthetic	  merit”	  (2002,	  p.	  140).	  Moderate	  autonomism	  could	  at	  this	  point	  accept	  Mullin’s	  
claim	  by	  arguing	  that	  the	  moral	  significance	  of	  artworks	  is	  aesthetically	  valuable	  by	  virtue	  
of	   the	  eloquence	  of	   its	   expression,	   or	   the	  unity	  which	   the	  perspective	  provides	   for	   the	  
work	   overall.	   They	   may	   argue	   that	   contrary	   to	   moralism	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   moral	  
perspectives	  of	  artworks	  are	  morally	  valuable	   they	  may	  be	  both	  morally	   significant	  and	  
aesthetically	  valuable	  for	  their	  contribution	  to	  these	  formal	  elements.	  However,	  Mullin	  is	  
not	  solely	  concerned	  with	  formal	  aesthetic	  virtues	  of	  this	  kind	  but	  also	  with	  how	  the	  work	  
addresses	  us	  as	  “moral	  agents”	  (2002,	  p.	  144).	  Thus	  she	  claims	  the	  way	  in	  which	  artworks	  
explore,	   present	   and	   ‘lay-­‐out’	   moral	   perspectives	   and	   ideas	   will	   play	   a	   role	   in	   our	  
aesthetic	  evaluation	  of	  such	  works.	  For	  example,	  Mullin	  writes:	  
	  
To	   succeed	   aesthetically,	   works	   that	   involve	   morally	   relevant	   subject	  
matter	   need	   to	  manifest	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   range	   of	   moral	   views	  
people	   find	   familiar	   an	   easily	   accessible,	   and	  need	   to	   find	  ways	   to	  make	  
less-­‐familiar	  moral	  views	  also	  accessible	  to	  us	  so	  that	  we	  can	  adopt	  those	  
points	   of	   view	   (whether	   immoral,	   amoral,	   or	   hypermoral)	   temporarily	  
(2004,	  p.	  255)	  	  
	  
Here	   Mullin	   looks	   to	   be	   in	   accord	   with	   Kieran’s	   claim	   that	   the	   moral	   perspectives	  
prescribed	  by	  works	  of	  art	  must	  be	  “intelligible”	  or	  ‘psychologically	  close’	  (2006a,	  p.	  135)	  
if	  we	  are	  to	  respond	  as	  required,	  and	  indeed	  Mullin’s	  mention	  of	  ‘adopting	  points	  of	  view’	  
looks	   to	  be	  an	  endorsement	  of	   the	  earlier	   thought	   that	  a	  works	  success	   relies	  on	  some	  
part	  with	  its	  ability	  to	  secure	  the	  responses	  it	  prescribes.	  In	  light	  of	  this	  Mullin	  can,	  to	  a	  
certain	   extent,	   be	   seen	   as	   sympathetic	   to	   the	   cognitivist	   views	   outlined	   earlier	   in	   this	  
chapter.	  However	  she	  departs	  from	  those	  accounts	  offered	  by	  Carroll,	  Gaut,	  and	  Kieran	  in	  
that	  she	  does	  not	  necessarily	  hold	  cognitive	  flaws	  to	  be	  aesthetic	  flaws.	  Instead	  she	  claims	  
that	   artworks	   that	   are	   cognitively	   flawed	   can	   still	   be	   aesthetically	   valuable	  when	   those	  
cognitive	  flaws	  are	  either	  explored	  by	  the	  work	  in	  a	  complex	  and	  interesting	  way,	  or	  are	  
themselves	   part	   of	   such	   exploration.	   Her	   suggestion	   here	   is	   that	   artworks	   can	   by	   their	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very	  nature	  “circumvent	  certain	  demands	  of	  our	  intellect	  while	  engaging	  other	  aspects	  of	  
it	  along	  with	  our	  emotions”	  (2004,	  p.	  256).	  
	  
Of	   course	   if	   the	   moral	   significance	   thesis	   is	   to	   hold	   Mullin	   needs	   to	   show	   that	   moral	  
significance	   is	   at	   least	   sometimes	   aesthetically	   relevant.	   It	   is	   difficult	   to	   discern	   exactly	  
where	  Mullin	  thinks	  such	  aesthetic	  relevance	  lies,	  as	  although	  she	  claims	  works	  that	  are	  
“morally	  imaginative”	  (2002,	  p.	  137)	  are	  to	  that	  extent	  aesthetically	  valuable,	  the	  details	  
of	   how	   this	   relationship	   pertains	   are	   never	   explicitly	   stated.	   Her	   argument	   could	   be	  
understood	  to	  follow	  a	   line	  similar	  to	  Gaut’s	  by	  which	  moral	  significance	   is	  aesthetically	  
relevant	   when	   it	   is	   manifested	   through	   the	   artistry	   of	   the	   work	   (Gaut,	   2007,	   p.	   170).	  
However,	   since	   such	   an	   approach	   is	   vague	   it	   tends	   to	   raise	   more	   questions	   than	   it	  
answers.	  	  
	  
More	   plausibly,	   Mullin	   could	   be	   taken	   to	   defend	   a	   complex	   relationship	   between	  
aesthetic	  value	  and	  moral	  significance	  whereby	  the	  appraisal	  of	  one	  kind	  of	  value	  (moral)	  
cannot	   then	   be	   imposed	   upon	   the	   other	   value	   (aesthetic).	   Rather,	   by	   this	   complex	  
account,	  aesthetic	  value	  and	  moral	  significance	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  being	  to	  some	  extent	  co-­‐
dependent	   with	   the	   aesthetic	   value	   and	   moral	   significance	   of	   the	   work	   resisting	  
separation.	  Such	  an	  account	  seems	  to	  fit	  nicely	  with	  a	  number	  of	  Mullin’s	  claims,	  such	  as	  
that	   artworks	   like	   Riefenstahl’s	   The	   Triumph	   of	   the	   Will	   can	   be	   morally	   imaginative	  
through	   their	   contrast	   of	   formal	   (aesthetic)	   elements	   and	   morally	   problematic	  
perspectives	  (2004,	  p.	  256);	  as	  well	  as	  her	  claim	  that	  the	  aesthetic	  value	  of	  some	  artworks	  
lies	   to	  an	  extent	  with	   their	  ability	   to	   imaginatively	  explore	  moral	  perspectives	   (2002,	  p.	  
143,	  2004,	  p.	  255).	  Although	  Mullin	  does	  not	  explicitly	  endorse	  this	  complex	  view,	  others	  
such	   as	   James	   Harold	   (2006)	   and	   Eileen	   John	   (2010)	   have	   suggested	   that	   this	   kind	   of	  
account	  might	  best	  explain	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  features	  of	  
artworks.	  Harold	  claims	  that	  “Aesthetic	  judgements	  and	  moral	  judgements	  each	  take	  into	  
account	  a	  set	  of	  considerations	  that	  overlap”,	  and	  continues	  to	  write:	  “Rather	  than	  saying	  
that	  we	  make	  a	  moral	  judgement	  and	  then,	  on	  that	  basis,	  make	  an	  aesthetic	  judgement,	  
or	   vice	  versa,	   it	   is	  more	  plausible	   to	   suppose	   that	  aesthetic	   judgements	  overlap	   in	   that	  
they	  invoke	  some	  of	  the	  same	  considerations	  by	  appealing	  to	  some	  of	  the	  same	  qualities”	  
(2006,	  p.	  268).	  Similarly,	  Eileen	  John	  argues,	  “morality	  in	  literature	  may	  sometimes	  need	  
to	  be	  acknowledged	  as	  morality-­‐serving-­‐the-­‐needs-­‐of-­‐literature”	  (2010,	  p.	  285).	  By	  John’s	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view	  literature	  can	  sometimes	  be	  seen	  as	  ‘manipulating’	  moral	  values	  or	  perspectives	  for	  
the	   purpose	   of	   advancing	   the	   literary	   or	   aesthetic	   value	   of	   the	   work.	   John’s	   claim	  
regarding	  the	  relationship	  between	  morality	  and	  literature	  has	  an	  important	  consequence	  
for	  cognitive	  approaches	  that	  rely	  upon	  the	  ‘moral	  understanding’	  of	  artworks	  to	  ground	  
an	  aesthetic	  value;	  this	  will	  be	  addressed	  in	  the	  final	  chapter.	  
	  
Importantly,	   both	   of	   these	   views	   posit	   a	   complex	   relationship	   between	   the	  moral	   and	  
aesthetic	  contributions	  of	  the	  work,	  making	  it	  less	  plausible	  for	  us	  to	  think	  that	  we	  might	  
be	   able	   to	   clearly	   separate	   the	   two.	   Furthermore	  while	   Harold’s	   argument	   is	   primarily	  
concerned	   with	   the	   ‘moral	   value’	   of	   the	   work,	   his	   discussion	   of	   the	   “morally	   salient”	  
features	  of	  artworks	  which,	  he	  claims,	  are	  so	  “by	  virtue	  of	  [their]	  facilitating	  more	  or	  less	  
sophisticated	  and	  reflective	  moral	  responses”	  (2006,	  p.	  263),	  has	  much	  in	  common	  with	  
Mullin’s	   notion	   of	   moral	   significance.	   For	   example,	   Harold	   and	  Mullin	   both	   agree	   that	  
works	   which	   present	   us	   with	   moral	   perspectives	   (praiseworthy	   or	   blameworthy),	   yet	  
which	  fail	  to	  explore	  these	  perspectives	  in	  any	  depth,	  will	  be	  neither	  morally	  ‘salient’	  nor	  
‘significant’	   (respectively).	  However,	  Mullin	   does	   not	   argue,	   as	  Harold	   does,	   that	  works	  
offering	  a	   “complex”	  and	  “reflective”	   imaginative	  account	  of	   immoral	  perspectives	  may	  
be,	  to	  that	  extent,	  morally	  praiseworthy	  (Harold,	  2006,	  p.	  266).	  Rather,	  Mullin	  claims	  only	  
that	  these	  works	  will	  be	  both	  morally	  significant	  and	  to	  that	  extent	  aesthetically	  valuable.	  
Simply	   put,	   moral	   significance	   is	   aesthetically	   relevant	   insofar	   as	   it	   is	   to	   some	   extent	  
dependent	  on	  aesthetic	  value	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  
	  
As	  noted	  earlier,	  Mullin	  seeks	  to	  make	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	  moral	  value	  and	  moral	  
significance	  (2002,	  p.	  137).	  However	  it	  is	  not	  obvious	  that	  such	  a	  distinction,	  whereby	  the	  
two	  concepts	  remain	  clearly	  separate,	  can	  be	  made.	  If	  moral	  significance	  rests,	  as	  Mullin	  
claims,	  upon	  the	  way	  in	  which	  artworks	  are	  able	  to	  imaginatively	  explore	  particular	  moral	  
perspectives,	   then	   surely	   the	  moral	   value	   of	   those	   perspectives	  must,	   at	   least	   in	   some	  
cases,	  factor	  towards	  their	  moral	  significance	  —	  or	  lack	  thereof.	  The	  thought	  here	  is	  that	  
it	   may	   just	   be	   that	   certain	   moral	   perspectives	   are	   simply	   too	   egregiously	   evil	   to	   be	  
explored	   in	   any	   kind	   of	   intelligible	   or	   interesting	  way.	   For	   example,	   a	   novel	   advocating	  
genocide,	  slavery,	  or	  rape	  might	  fail	  to	  explore	  its	  moral	  perspectives	  in	  a	  way	  that	  Mullin	  
would	   take	   to	   be	   morally	   significant,	   just	   because	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   work	   is	  
irredeemably	   immoral;	  that	   is,	  there	  may	  be	  no	  intelligible	  or	  coherent	  way	  in	  which	  an	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author	  might	  go	  about	  defending	  such	  practices.	  In	  such	  cases	  it	  seems	  plausible	  to	  hold	  
that	   the	  moral	   value	   (or	  disvalue	   in	   this	   instance)	  of	   the	  work	  must	   contribute	   to	   their	  
lack	  of	  moral	  significance.	  Mullin	  might	  of	  course	  object	   that	  such	  examples	  are	  merely	  
philosophical	   constructs,	   and	   as	   such	   the	   likelihood	   of	   someone	   actually	   writing	   or	  
publishing	  a	  novel	  of	  this	  persuasion,	  let	  alone	  its	  being	  taken	  seriously	  as	  a	  work	  of	  art,	  is	  
effectively	  nil.	  Yet	  one	  need	  only	  look	  at	  works	  such	  as	  Griffith’s	  Birth	  of	  a	  Nation	  to	  see	  
that	  artworks	  defending	  perspectives	  that	  we	  take	  to	  be	  deeply	  immoral	  both	  exist,	  and	  
can	   be	   plausibly	   evaluated,	   as	   lacking	   any	   kind	   of	   complex	   or	   imaginative	   moral	  
exploration	  on	  account	  of	  their	  inherent	  immorality.	  	  
	  
Of	  course,	  with	  works	  such	  as	  Birth	  of	  a	  Nation	  or	  Triumph	  of	  the	  Will,	  Mullin	  might	  also	  
reply	  that	  their	  moral	  significance	  lies	  with	  the	  uneasy	  tension	  between	  their	  immorality	  
and	  their	  other	  aesthetic	  features	  (2004,	  p.	  256).	  However	  this	  seems	  to	  be	  less	  a	  reply	  to	  
the	   above	   objection,	   and	   more	   an	   admission	   that	   the	   moral	   value	   of	   artworks	   can	  
sometimes	  affect	  their	  moral	  significance.	  Indeed,	  if	  one	  defends	  the	  above	  view	  that	  the	  
moral	  significance	  of	  such	  works	  lies	  with	  their	  interplay	  between	  aesthetic	  features	  and	  
immoral	   perspectives,	   then	   it	   looks	   to	   follow	   that	   their	  moral	   value	  must	   form	   part	   of	  
their	  moral	  significance.	  Therefore,	  while,	  in	  keeping	  with	  (1),	  Mullin	  might	  maintain	  that	  
moral	  value	  does	  not	  constitute	  an	  aesthetic	  merit	  or	  defect	  within	  an	  artwork	  she	  may	  
be	  forced	  to	  accept	  that	  moral	  significance	   is	   in	  some	  cases	  partly	  constituted	  by	  moral	  
value.	   Furthermore,	   in	   keeping	  with	   (2),	   it	  might	   then	   be	   the	   case	   that	  moral	   value	   to	  
some	  extent	  does	  have	  an	  effect	  upon	  the	  aesthetic	  value	  of	  artworks.	  Of	  course,	  if	  Mullin	  
wishes	   only	   to	   deny	   that	   moral	   value	   alone	   constitutes	   an	   aesthetic	   defect	   then	   her	  
overall	   argument	   remains	   for	   the	  most	  part	  unaffected.	  Rather,	   she	   should	  accept	   that	  
moral	  value	  can	  at	  times	  limit	  or	  contribute	  to	  moral	  significance,	  while	  maintaining	  that	  
as	   such,	  moral	   value	  will	   only	   contribute	   to	   the	   aesthetic	   value	   of	   an	   artwork	  when	   it	  
either	  constitutes	  a	  part	  of	  its	  moral	  significance,	  or	  is	  a	  factor	  in	  denying	  the	  work	  of	  any	  
interesting	  or	  intelligible	  morally	  significant	  exploration.	  
	  
To	  conclude,	  while	  moralists	  attempt	  to	  advance	  their	  various	  positions	  by	  arguing	  that	  
the	  moral	  value	  of	  artworks	  can	  directly	  affect	  or	  constitute	  part	  of	  their	  aesthetic	  value,	  
on	   the	   grounds	   that	   the	   cognitive	   value	   —	   and	   especially	   the	   moral	   understanding	  
manifested	  by	  certain	  works	  —	   is	  both	  aesthetically	   relevant	  and	  aesthetically	  valuable,	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their	   arguments	   only	   find	   valuable,	   moral	   understanding	   that	   they	   take	   to	   be	   both	  
cognitively	   meritorious	   and	   morally	   praiseworthy	   (or	   only	   the	   former	   in	   the	   case	   of	  
cognitive	   immoralism).	   Conversely,	   the	  moral	   significance	   thesis	   holds	   that	  moral	   value	  
never	  directly	  affects	  or	  constitutes	  an	  aesthetic	  defect	  or	  merit	  in	  an	  artwork.	  Rather,	  it	  
holds	   that	  moral	   significance	  —	  which	   should	   be	   understood	   as	   being	   both	   limited,	   or	  
partly	  constituted	  by	  moral	  value	  —	  best	  accounts	  for	  the	  complex	  relationship	  between	  
the	   aesthetic	   and	  moral	   components	   of	   artworks.	   Furthermore,	   the	  moral	   significance	  
thesis	  is	  not	  limited	  only	  to	  meritorious	  moral	  understanding,	  holding	  instead	  that	  where	  
moral	  perspectives	  may	  be	  in	  the	  grip	  of	  some	  cognitive	  error,	  yet	  are	  explored	  in	  ways	  
that	   are	   interesting,	   complex,	   and	   coherent,	   they	   will	   be	   to	   that	   extent	   aesthetically	  
valuable.	  	  
	  
In	   the	   following	  chapters	   three	  moralist	  positions	  will	  be	  outlined,	  and	   their	  arguments	  
regarding	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   moral	   value	   might	   directly	   affect	   or	   constitute	   aesthetic	  
value	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  depth.	  The	  aim	  will	  be	  to	  both:	  analyze	  the	  various	  ‘value	  based’	  
approaches	  and	  see	  whether	  they	  succeed	  or	  fail	  in	  establishing	  their	  claims;	  as	  well	  as	  to	  
explore	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   moral	   significance	   thesis	   might	   offer	   a	   plausible,	   and	  
alternative,	  account	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  moral	  content	  of	  an	  artwork	  and	  its	  






According	  to	  Berys	  Gaut	  ethicism	  is	  the	  thesis	  that	  an	  artwork	  is:	  “[…]	  aesthetically	  flawed	  
in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  possess	  an	  aesthetically	  relevant	  ethical	  flaw	  and	  aesthetically	  meritorious	  in	  
so	  far	  as	  it	  possess	  an	  aesthetically	  relevant	  ethical	  merit.”	  (2007,	  p.	  229).	  Thus,	  ethicism	  
emerges	  as	  the	  most	  far-­‐reaching	  of	  the	  moralist	  positions	  (except	  for	  of	  course	  ‘radical	  
moralism’)	  inasmuch	  as	  it	  maintains	  that	  when	  aesthetically	  relevant,	  ethical	  flaws/merits	  
are	  always	  aesthetic	  flaws/merits	  respectively.	  Bontekoe	  and	  Crooks	  elsewhere	  defend	  a	  
similar	   position	   in	   regard	   to	  moral	   flaws,	   claiming:	   “[…]	   the	   expression	   of	   a	   bad	  moral	  
vision	  does	   indeed	  constitute	  an	  aesthetic	  defect	   in	  a	  work	  of	  art,	   and	   that	   it	   is	   always	  
necessary	   to	   judge	   a	   film,	   a	   novel,	   a	   painting	   or	   a	   poem	   to	   be	   flawed	   as	   an	   art	   work	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because	   of	   its	   mishandling	   of	   moral	   themes.”	   (1992,	   p.	   210).	   This	   strong	   view	  
distinguishes	   ethicism	   from	   the	   allegedly	  weaker	   position	   of	   ‘moderate	  moralism’,	   (the	  
focus	   of	   the	   next	   chapter)	   which	   claims	   only	   that	   aesthetically	   relevant	   ethical	   flaws	  
sometimes	  constitute	  aesthetic	  flaws.	  
	  
Ethicism	  maintains	   that	  although	  an	  artwork	  might	  be	   flawed	  or	  enhanced	  aesthetically	  
on	  account	  of	   its	  ethical	  content,	   this	  does	  not	   imply	  that	  an	  artwork	  containing	  ethical	  
defects	  will	  be	  ‘bad’,	  or	  that,	  conversely,	  an	  artwork	  which	  contains	  ethical	  merits	  will	  be	  
‘good’	   (aesthetically	   speaking).	   Ethicism	   of	   the	   form	   advanced	   by	   Gaut	   is	   a	   pro	   tanto	  
theory:	  moral	  defects	  are	  to	  that	  extent	  aesthetically	  defective	  and	  vice	  versa	  for	  moral	  
merits	   (2007,	   pp.	   63-­‐4).	   It	   follows	   from	   being	   a	   pro	   tanto	   position	   that	   a	   work	   that	   is	  
morally	  defective	  can	  still	  be	  aesthetically	  powerful,	  while	  works	  that	  we	  might	  evaluate	  
as	  being	  morally	  praiseworthy	  can	  be	  aesthetically	  poor,	  overall.	  
	  
Ethical	   defects	   and	  merits	   are	   considered	   by	   ethicism	   to	   be	   perspectives	   that	   are	   not	  
merely	  represented	  within	  an	  artwork,	  but	  are	  rather	  endorsed	  or	  advocated	  by	  the	  work.	  
In	  reference	  to	  Milton's	  Paradise	  Lost,	  Gaut	  writes:	  “It	  is	  important	  to	  distinguish	  between	  
the	   evil	   or	   insensitive	   characters	   represented	   by	   a	   work	   and	   the	   attitude	   the	   work	  
displays	  toward	  those	  characters.	  Only	  the	  latter	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  ethical	  thesis.”	  (1998,	  
p.	   188).	   Gaut’s	   point	   here	   is	   that	   although	  Milton	   shows	   Satan	   as	   being	   powerful	   and	  
fascinating	   the	  attitude	  of	   the	  work	  condemns	  his	  actions	  as	  being	  evil,	  and	  because	  of	  
this,	   ethicism	   holds	   that	   the	   work	   contains	   no	   moral	   defect.	   Of	   course,	   if	   Milton	   had	  
instead	  failed	  to	  condemn	  Satan's	  actions,	  or	  had	   in	  some	  way	  advocated	  for	  them,	  the	  
ethicist	  would	   likely	  be	  quick	  to	  point	  out	  a	  moral	  defect.	   Indeed,	  Bontekoe	  and	  Crooks	  
remark:	  “Evil,	  accurately	  described,	  may	  disturb	  us	  intensely	  with	  its	  unmistakably	  human	  
face,	  but	  it	  never	  recommends	  itself	  as	  something	  to	  be	  embraced.”	  (1992,	  p.	  217).	  
	  
Yet	  in	  light	  of	  the	  ethicist’s	  claims,	  let	  us	  consider	  an	  alternative	  example.	  While	  Margaret	  
Atwood's	  The	  Handmaid's	  Tale	  depicts	  a	  society	  in	  which	  women	  are	  valued	  only	  for	  their	  
reproductive	  capacities	  —	  a	  view	  which	  most	  of	  us	  would	  find	  reprehensible	  —	  the	  work	  
does	  not	   in	  any	  way	  endorse	   such	  a	  view,	  and	   therefore	  ethicism	  would	  not	   (by	  Gaut’s	  
account)	   consider	   the	  work	   to	   possess	   an	   ethical	   defect.	   Furthermore,	  The	  Handmaid's	  
Tale	   could	   be	   plausibly	   interpreted	   as	   condemning	   the	   ethical	   perspective	   which	   it	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explores,	  a	  point	  which	  would	  likely	  lead	  ethicism	  to	  evaluate	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  work	  as	  
being	  one	  which	  is,	  instead,	  morally	  meritorious.	  However,	  because	  ethicism	  applies	  only	  
to	  works	  of	  art	  that	  exhibit	  moral	  defects	  —	  or	  merits	  —	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  such	  attitudes	  
are	  endorsed	  or	  advocated	  by	  the	  work,	  it	  is	  therefore	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  evaluate	  works	  
which	  simply	  explore,	  remain	  ambiguous,	  or	  refuse	  to	  either	  advocate	  for	  or	  condemn	  the	  
ethical	  content	  they	  represent.	  This	  could	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  limitation	  of	  the	  ethicist	  position,	  
as	   it	  simply	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  works	  of	  art	   that	  explore,	  or	  develop,	  moral	  perspectives	  
without	  endorsing	  or	  advocating	  that	  we	  respond	  in	  a	  specific	  way.	  For	  ethicism	  to	  apply,	  
a	  moral	   defect	   or	  merit	   arising	   from	   the	  manifestation	   or	   endorsement	   of	   a	   particular	  
moral	  attitude	  must	  be	  present.	  	  
	  
Recently,	   Berys	   Gaut	   has	   developed	   and	   defended	   ethicism	   in	   great	   detail,	   and	   so	   the	  
following	  examination	  of	   this	  position	  will	   focus	  primarily	  on	  his	  account.	   In	  arguing	   for	  
the	   establishment	   of	   the	   ethicist	   thesis	   Gaut	   has	   put	   forward	   three	   distinct	   arguments	  
that	   together	   constitute	   his	   version	   of	   the	   position.	   These	   will	   be	   referred	   to	   as:	   the	  
‘moral	  beauty	  argument’,	  the	  ‘cognitive	  argument’,	  and	  the	  ‘merited	  response	  argument’.	  
Of	   these	   three,	   the	  merited	   response	  argument	   is	   the	  most	   complex	  and	  controversial,	  
and	  for	  that	  reason	  it	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  depth	  further	  on	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  
	  
4.1. The ‘Moral Beauty Argument’ 
	  
Gaut’s	  moral	  beauty	  argument	  unites	  two	  claims	  regarding	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  evaluate	  
artworks.	  First,	  Gaut	  claims	  that	  the	  attitudes	  of	  an	  artwork	  constitute	  the	  psychological	  
and	   moral	   “character”	   of	   a	   “manifested	   artist”.	   (2007,	   p.	   107)	   He	   writes:	   “We	   can	  
smoothly	   substitute,	   for	   talk	   of	   a	  work	   manifesting	   or	   expressing	   certain	   attitudes	   or	  
views,	  talk	  of	  the	  artist	  manifesting	  or	  expressing	  certain	  attitudes	  or	  views.”	  (2007,	  p.	  72,	  
my	  emphasis).	  This	  manifested	  author	  is	  posited	  as	  being	  distinct	  from	  the	  ‘actual’	  author	  
of	  the	  work,	  with	  Gaut	  claiming	  that	  the	  attitudes	  intended	  by	  the	  actual	  artist,	  and	  those	  
that	   are	  actually	   present	   are	   not	   always	   identical	   or	   compatible	   (2007,	   p.	   108).	   For	   an	  
artist	   might	   intend	   to	   offer	   an	   open-­‐minded	   and	   sympathetic	   account	   of	   a	   character	  
affected	  by	  a	  pressing	  social	   issue,	  but	  instead	  produce	  one	  that	  is	  biased	  and	  belittling.	  
For	  example,	  by	  intending	  to	  produce	  a	  work	  addressing	  the	  prevalence	  of	  racism	  in	  the	  
southern	  states	  of	  America,	  yet	  in	  doing	  so	  haplessly	  and	  unintentionally	  utilizing	  various	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racial	   stereotypes	   in	   the	   crafting	   of	   characters	   and	   their	   actions.	   Gaut's	   version	   of	  
ethicism	   maintains	   that	   this	   ‘manifested	   artist’	   is	   the	   “core	   object”	   of	   our	   ethical	  
encounters	  with,	  and	  subsequent	  evaluation	  of	  such	  works	  (2007,	  p.	  107).	  Gaut	  writes:	  	  
	  
[…]	   it	   is	   the	   artist's	   attitudes	   manifested	   in	   the	   work	   that	   are	   a	   central	  
object	  of	  ethical	  assessment.	  And	  we	  can	  recast	  this	  statement	  in	  terms	  of	  
assessing	   the	   character	   of	   the	   manifested	   artist.	   The	   manifested	   artist	  
simply	   is	   the	   set	   of	   characteristics	  we	  would	   ascribe	   to	   the	   artist	   on	   the	  
basis	   of	   the	   attitudes	   that	   he	   manifests	   in	   the	   work.	   If,	   for	   instance,	   he	  
manifests	  sympathy	  and	  shows	   insight,	   then	  we	  can	  talk	  of	  a	  sympathetic	  
and	  insightful	  manifested	  artist.	  And	  this	  way	  of	  putting	  the	  matter	  shows	  
that	  a	  core	  object	  of	  ethical	  assessment	  of	  artworks	  is	  the	  character	  of	  the	  
manifested	  artist.	  (2007,	  p.	  108)	  
	  
Gaut’s	  notion	  of	  ‘manifested	  attitudes’	  should,	  by	  his	  account,	  be	  understood	  broadly	  to	  
cover	  “[…]	  characteristically	  affective	  states,	  such	  as	  showing	  disgust	  towards	  or	  approval	  
of	  the	  characters,	  [and]	  also	  to	  cover	  the	  more	  purely	  cognitive	  states,	  such	  as	  presenting	  
characters	   in	   such	  a	  way	  as	   to	   imply	   judgements	  about	   their	  being	  evil,	   good,	   inspiring	  
and	   so	   on.”	   (2007,	   p.	   9).	   Gaut	   looks	   to	   be	   correct	   here,	   for	   in	   art	  —	   and	   especially	   in	  
literature	  —	  discerning	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  work	  plays	  a	  distinctive	  and	  fundamental	  role	  
in	   how	   we	   will	   respond.	   Let	   us	   consider	   an	   example:	   novels	   often	   manifest	   different	  
attitudes	  towards	  their	  villains	  and	  heroes	  in	  order	  to	  guide	  and	  often	  prescribe	  particular	  
responses	  towards	  them;	  the	  former	  are	  often	  (but	  not	  always)	  presented	  in	  ways	  which	  
invite	  us	  to	  view	  them	  as	  cruel,	  untrustworthy,	  or	  capable	  of	  evil	  (think	  Darth	  Vader,	  Bill	  
Sikes,	  Nurse	  Ratched,	  Moriarty,	  Satan,	  and	  so	  on);	  while,	  heroes	  are	  more	  often	   (again,	  
not	   always)	   presented	   as	   kind,	   amicable	   and	   worthy	   of	   our	   care	   and	   good-­‐will	   (think	  
Atticus	  Finch,	  Robin	  Hood,	  Superman,	  and	  Forrest	  Gump).	  When	  a	  work	  manifests	  certain	  
attitudes	  Gaut	  holds	  this	  as	  being	  tantamount	  to	  the	  ‘artist’	  manifesting	  those	  attitudes.	  
	  
There	   are,	   however,	  many	   artworks	  whose	   characters,	   and	   their	   actions,	   refuse	   to	   fall	  
squarely	   into	   pre-­‐defined	   categories	   like	   those	   of	   ‘good’	   and	   ‘evil’.	   These	   are	  works	   in	  
which	  the	  manifested	  artist	  refuses	  either	  to	  endorse	  or	  condemn	  the	  actions	  and	  nature	  
of	  her	  characters,	  or	  alternatively,	  artworks	  in	  which	  the	  attitudes	  of	  the	  manifested	  artist	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remain	   ambiguous.	   Consider	   characters	   such	   as	   Tom	   Ripley	   (The	   Talented	  Mr.	   Ripley),	  
Patrick	   Bateman	   (American	   Psycho),	   Tyler	   Durden	   (Fight	   Club),	   or	   Humbert	   Humbert	  
(Lolita).	  In	  cases	  such	  as	  these	  it	  is	  often	  difficult	  to	  discern	  the	  intended	  response	  of	  the	  
manifested	  artist;	  we	  are	  unsure	  whether	  we	  are	  asked	  to	  condemn	  these	  characters	  for	  
their	   immoral	  actions,	  applaud	  their	  knavery,	  or	  be	  amused	  by	  what	   is	  described.	  All	  of	  
these	   seem	   to	   be	   live	   options,	   yet	   arguably,	   none	   of	   them	   seem	   to	   be	   explicitly	  
manifested	   by	   the	   attitude	   of	   the	   work.	   Consequently,	   cases	   of	   this	   kind	   prove	   to	   be	  
problematic	  for	  ethicism,	  for	  if	  one	  cannot	  interpret	  the	  manifested	  attitude	  of	  the	  work	  
then	  one	  cannot	  properly	  evaluate	  the	  moral	  value	  of	  the	  work.	  In	  fact,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
ethicism	   defines	   moral	   ‘defects’	   and	   ‘merits’	   precludes	   the	   evaluation	   of	   works	   which	  
refuse	  to	  endorse	  or	  condemn	  that	  which	  they	  represent,	  as	  the	  manifestation	  of	  a	  pro	  or	  
con	   attitude	   is,	   according	   to	   ethicism,	   necessary	   for	   the	   existence	  of	   a	  moral	   defect	   or	  
merit.	  In	  such	  cases	  ethicism	  refuses	  to	  offer	  any	  kind	  of	  evaluation.	  	  
	  
Works	  that	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  remain	  ‘morally	  ambiguous’,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  are	  able	  
to	  plausibly	  interpret	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  attitudes	  that	  could	  each	  be	  manifested	  by	  the	  
author,	   must	   be	   dealt	   with	   by	   ethicism	   through	   either:	   claiming	   that	   they	   manifest	   a	  
single,	  correct	   interpretation	  (critical	  monism),	  or	  allowing	  that	  they	  manifest	  a	  plurality	  
of	   acceptable	   interpretations	   (critical	   pluralism).	   In	   the	   latter	   case,	   ethicism	   would	   be	  
forced	   to	   relativise	   its	   evaluations	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   various	   interpretations.	   For	  
example,	   ethicism	  would	   be	   forced	   to	   argue	   that	   The	   Talented	  Mr.	   Ripley	  was	  morally	  
defective	  and	  to	  that	  extent	  aesthetically	  defective,	  according	  to	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  
novel	   that	   held	   the	   manifested	   attitude	   as	   being	   one	   of	   ‘admiration	   and	   support’	   for	  
Tom’s	   actions.	   Conversely,	   ethicism	   would	   hold	   that	   the	   work	   was	   both	   morally	   and	  
aesthetically	  meritorious,	   given	   an	   interpretation	   of	   the	  work	   that	   viewed	   the	   attitude	  
manifested	   as	   being	   one	   of	   condemnation	   and	   disapproval	   where	   these	   same	   actions	  
were	   concerned.	   And,	   of	   course	   were	   an	   interpretation	   to	   hold	   that	   the	   manifested	  
author	  neither	  approved	  of,	  nor	  condemned	  Tom’s	  actions,	  ethicism	  would	  withhold	  any	  
kind	  of	  moral	  evaluation.	  Although	  the	  ethicist	  thesis	  can	  survive	  this	  kind	  of	  plurality,	  it	  
certainly	  narrows	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  thesis	  and	  renders	  it,	  as	  Raja	  Halwani	  points	  out,	  less	  
significant	  as	  a	   theory	   that	  aims	   to	  help	   in	   the	  evaluation	  of	  art	   (2009,	  p.	  85).	   Ethicism	  
might	   of	   course	   align	   itself	   with	   the	   former	   position	   and	   argue,	   in	   favour	   of	   critical	  
monism,	   that	   there	   is	   only	   a	   single	   correct	   interpretation	   regarding	   the	   manifested	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attitude	   of	   an	   artwork.	   However,	   as	   Gaut	   has	   elsewhere	   defended	   a	   form	   of	   critical	  
pluralism	   (1993)	   we	   should	   assume	   that	   this	   is	   not	   the	   path	   taken	   by	   his	   account	   of	  
ethicism.	   Instead,	   we	   should	   take	   both	   the	   problem	   of	   ethicism’s	   relative	   stance	  
concerning	  artworks	  that	  yield	  multiple	  interpretations,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  silence	  in	  regard	  to	  
works	  that	  remain	  ambiguous,	  or	  fail	  to	  endorse	  or	  condemn	  their	  moral	  perspectives,	  as	  
being	  indicative	  of	  a	  possible	  weakness	  in	  the	  ethicist	  thesis.	  	  
	  
Gaut’s	   second	   claim	   for	   the	   moral	   beauty	   argument	   states:	   “[…]	   moral	   virtues	   are	  
beautiful	   [and]	  moral	   vices	   are	   ugly.”	   (2007,	   p.	   115).	   In	   combining	   this	   claim	   with	   the	  
attitude	   of	   the	   manifested	   author	   as	   previously	   introduced,	   Gaut	   puts	   forward	   an	  
argument	   for	   ethicism	   which	   holds	   that	   we	   can	   evaluate	   the	   character	   of	   such	   a	  
manifested	  author	  to	  be	  either	  virtuous	  and	  therefore	  beautiful,	  or	  vicious	  and	  therefore	  
ugly.	  Furthermore,	  because	  he	  holds	  that	  beauty	  is	  most	  certainly	  an	  aesthetic	  value,	  the	  
first	  case	  constitutes	  an	  aesthetic	  merit,	  while	  the	  second	  constitutes	  an	  aesthetic	  defect.	  
The	   claim	   that	   the	   artist’s	   manifestation	   of	   a	   virtuous	   moral	   character	   is	   a	   ‘beautiful’	  
aspect	  of	  an	  artwork	  is	  crucial	  to	  the	  moral	  beauty	  argument.	  Gaut	  writes:	  
	  
[…]	  a	  manifested	  artist	  with	  a	  morally	  good	  character	  has	  to	  that	  extent	  a	  
beautiful	  character,	  and	  since	  his	  or	  her	  character	  is	  by	  definition	  manifest	  
in	  the	  work,	  the	  work	  has	  to	  that	  extent	  a	  beautiful	  feature,	  and	  hence	  an	  
aesthetic	  value.	  (2007,	  p.	  115).	  
	  
His	  basis	  for	  holding	  that	  a	  ‘morally	  good	  character’	  can	  be	  assessed	  on	  aesthetic	  grounds	  
comes	   via	   an	   observation	   regarding	   our	   everyday	   practice	   of	   using	   aesthetically	  
evaluative	  terms	  in	  just	  this	  way8.	  Gaut	  begins	  by	  stating:	  “Talk	  of	  moral	  beauty	  and	  moral	  
ugliness	  has	  been	  widespread	  in	  a	  heterogeneous	  variety	  of	  philosophical	  traditions,	  and	  
that	   talk	  has	  not	  been	  meant	  metaphorically.”	   (2007,	  p.	   116).	  After	   calling	  attention	   to	  
the	   tradition	   of	   equating	   the	   good	   and	   the	   beautiful	   that	   has	   often	   been	   patronized	  
within	   philosophy,	   he	   intends	   to	   draw	   our	   attention	   toward	   common	   language.	   He	  
suggests:	  	  
	  
                                                
8	   	  Colin	  McGinn	  establishes	  a	  similar	  moral	  beauty	  argument	  on	  these	  same	  grounds.	  See,	  Ethics,	  Evil	  and	  
Fiction,	  (1997).	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[…]	   the	   philosophical	   attraction	   finds	   an	   echo	   within	   common	   modes	   of	  
speech.	  We	  may	  call	  someone	  who	  exhibits	  many	  moral	  virtues	  a	  beautiful	  
person;	  we	  may	  say	  of	  a	  kind	  and	  generous	  action	   that	   it	  was	  a	  beautiful	  
action;	  we	  may	   say	   of	   someone	  who	   has	   done	   something	  wicked	   that	   it	  
was	   an	   ugly	   action;	   and	   so	   on	   […]	   So	   within	   common	   speech	   and	  
experience	   and	   also	   within	   the	   philosophical	   tradition	   there	   is	   much	  
support	  for	  the	  idea	  of	  moral	  beauty.	  (2007,	  p.	  117)	  
	  
Colin	  McGinn,	  who	  defended	  an	  earlier	  thesis	  regarding	  the	  beauty	  of	  virtuous	  character,	  
also	  made	  use	  of	   the	   common	   language	  example.	  His	   claim,	   compatible	  with	  Gaut’s,	   is	  
that	  when	  we	  utilize	   our	   aesthetic	   vocabulary	   to	   describe	   a	   virtuous	   character,	   “It	   can	  
hardly	   be	   that	   whenever	   we	   say	   such	   things	   we	   are	   uttering	   outright	   falsehoods	   or	  
making	  silly	  category	  mistakes.”	  (1997,	  p.	  99).	  
	  
In	   assuming	   that	   we	   commonly	   talk	   of	   people	   as	   being	   ‘beautiful’	   by	   virtue	   of	   their	  
character,	   or	   consider	   a	   certain	   choice	   or	   action	   to	   be	   ‘ugly’,	   Gaut	   maintains	   that	   his	  
moral	  beauty	  claim	  is	  —	  at	  least	  from	  the	  outset	  —	  intuitively	  plausible.	  However,	  some	  
(Burke,	  2008),	  (Stecker,	  2008b),	  (Carroll,	  2010)	  have	  questioned	  our	  tendency	  to	  employ	  
aesthetic	   terms	   in	   our	   evaluation	   of	   character	   traits.	  Where	   Gaut	   sees	   these	   as	   being	  
applied	  literally,	  some	  question	  whether	  their	  use	  might	  instead	  be	  metaphorical,	  or	  even	  
misplaced.	  Burke	  asserted	  that	  the	  (metaphorical)	  application	  of	  beauty	  to	  virtue	  tended	  
to	   “confound	   our	   idea	   of	   things”.	   He	   continued:	   “This	   loose	   and	   inaccurate	  manner	   of	  
speaking,	  has	  therefore	  misled	  us	  both	  in	  the	  theory	  of	  taste	  and	  of	  morals	  [...]”	  (2008,	  p.	  
111).	   Similarly,	   Stecker	   objects	   that	   our	   ascription	   of	   aesthetic	   properties	   to	   character	  
traits	   could	   be	   either	   literal,	  metaphorical,	   or	   simply	   just	   “loose”,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	  we	  
may	  use	   such	   language	   to	  praise	   them	  “without	  a	   commitment	   to	   their	  possessing	  any	  
further	   qualities	   [...]”	   	   (2008b,	   p.	   200).	   Simply	   put,	   we	  might	   call	   people	   ‘beautiful’	   or	  
describe	   them	   as	   such	   without	   a	   commitment	   to	   the	   claim	   that	   they	   possess	   any	  
particular	  aesthetic	  qualities.	  Furthermore,	  Stecker	  objects	  that	  Gaut	  both	  misinterprets	  
the	  ways	   in	  which	  we	  may	   utilize	   our	   aesthetic	   vocabulary	   (creating	   a	   false	   dichotomy	  
between	  ‘literal’	  and	  ‘metaphorical’	  usage),	  and	  that	  he	  also	  fails	  to	  provide	  an	  adequate	  
argument	  defending	  his	  claim	  that	  virtuous	  character	  traits	  are	  ‘beautiful’	  in	  an	  aesthetic	  
sense	  (2008b,	  p	  200).	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Carroll	  (2010)	  offers	  a	  succinct	  way	  of	  expressing	  this	  particular	  objection,	  in	  arguing	  that	  
Gaut’s	  moral	  beauty	  argument	  engenders	  an	  equivocation.	  Carroll	  accepts	  that	  the	  term	  
‘beautiful’	   can	   be	   used	   to	   demarcate	   an	   aesthetic	   property,	   but	   also	   suggests	   that	   the	  
term	  can	  be	  used	  correctly	  in	  a	  manner	  equivalent	  to	  “fine”	  or	  “excellent”	  (2010,	  p.	  252)9.	  
Carroll’s	  objection	  is	  therefore	  that	  Gaut	  invokes	  one	  specific	  sense	  of	  the	  term	  when	  he	  
claims	  that	  character	  traits	  may	  be	  ‘beautiful’	  (they	  may	  be	  fine	  or	  excellent),	  and	  another	  
when	  he	  goes	  on	   to	  claim	   that	   character	   traits	  are	   therefore	  aesthetically	   relevant	   (the	  
aesthetic	  sense)	  (2010,	  p.	  252).	  
	  
Gaut	  might	   be	   seen	   as	   providing	   a	   reply	   to	   this	   kind	   of	   objection,	   in	  writing:	   “[...]	   one	  
should	   first	   note	   that	   the	   application	   of	   a	   term	   in	   a	   context	   is	   prima	   facie	   evidence	   of	  
literal	  usage.	  Metaphorical	  employment	  is	  established	  typically	  by	  the	  evident	  falsehood	  
of	   the	  phrase.”	   (2007,	   p.	   124).	   That	   is,	   unless	   our	   attribution	  of	   the	   term	   ‘beautiful’	   is,	  
when	  referring	  to	  a	  persons	  virtuous-­‐character,	  evidently	  false,	  we	  should	  accept	  that	  our	  
use	  of	  the	  term	  is	  literal	  or	  meant	  in	  an	  aesthetic	  sense.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  problem	  with	  
Gaut’s	   claim	   here	   is	   that	   while	   we	   possess	   widely	   accepted	   definitions	   where	   other	  
common	  metaphors	  are	  concerned	  (such	  as	  that	  we	  can	  know	  a	  person	  is	  not	   literally	  a	  
pig,	   although	   he	   may	   be	   one	   metaphorically),	   aesthetic	   terms	   such	   as	   ‘beautiful’	   and	  
‘ugly’	  are	  more	  difficult	  to	  pin-­‐down.	  If	  I	  am	  to	  understand	  whether	  my	  calling	  someone’s	  
character	  “beautiful”	  is	  literal	  or	  metaphorical,	  I	  must	  first	  understand	  what	  kind	  of	  thing	  
beauty	  is,	  and	  what	  it	  should	  properly	  refer	  to.	  It	  may	  therefore	  simply	  be	  the	  case	  that	  
‘aesthetic	   beauty’	   does	   not	   apply	   to	   character	   traits	   and	   that	   our	   utterances	   in	   such	  
contexts	  are	  purely	  metaphorical,	  yet	  without	  a	  clear	  definition	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  
concept	  of	  beauty	  itself	  the	  truth	  or	  falsehood	  of	  such	  utterances	  must	  remain	  a	  point	  of	  
contention.	  	  
	  
Ethicism	   further	   attempts	   to	   pump	   our	   intuition	   by	   drawing	   an	   analogy	   between	   our	  
evaluation	   of	   virtuous	   character	   traits,	   and	   our	   evaluation	   of	   other	   non-­‐perceivable	  
entities	   such	   as	   theories,	   arguments,	   proofs,	   or	   ideas.	   It	   seems	   plausible	   that	   we	   can	  
evaluate	  the	  latter	  list	  of	  entities	  as	  being	  ‘beautiful’	  in	  an	  aesthetic	  sense,	  so	  why	  might	  
we	  deny	  the	  aesthetic	  value	  of	  the	  former?	  Yet,	  it	  may	  be	  objected	  that	  the	  latter	  entities	  
                                                
9	  Carroll	  refers	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  kalon	  that	  Socrates	  seeks	  in	  the	  Plato's	  Hippias	  Major.	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all	   possess	   some	   other	   kinds	   of	   aesthetic	   qualities	   (Stecker	   calls	   these	   “lower-­‐level	  
aesthetic	  qualities	  (2008b,	  p.	  200))	  that	  can	  be	  offered	  as	  evidence	  —	  or	  at	  least	  support	  
—	  for	  our	  calling	  them	  beautiful.	  For	  example,	  upon	  analyzing	  our	  attribution	  of	  ‘beauty’	  
to	  an	  idea	  or	  argument,	  we	  might	  point	  to	  other	  qualities	  such	  as	  ‘simplicity’,	  ‘clarity’,	  or	  
‘unity’	  on	  which	  this	  attribution	  can	  be	  said	  to	  rest.	  Yet	  in	  the	  case	  of	  virtuous	  character,	  it	  
becomes	  unclear	  as	  to	  whether	  such	  “lower-­‐level”	  qualities	  can	  be	  found.	  If	  one	  accepts	  
this	   objection	   then	   the	   analogy	   between	   virtuous	   character	   traits	   and	   other	   non-­‐
perceivable	   entities	   which,	   we	   accept	   as	   having	   aesthetic	   value,	   breaks	   down.	   If	   Gaut	  
wishes	   to	   further	   defend	   this	   analogy,	   he	   must	   either	   deny	   that	   these	   lower-­‐level	  
aesthetic	   qualities	   are	   necessary,	   or	   offer	   an	   account	   of	   where	   they	   can	   be	   found	   in	  
regards	  to	  morally	  virtuous	  character.	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  objections	  outlined	  above	  suggest	  that	  Gaut’s	  moral	  beauty	  argument	   falls	  short	  of	  
securing	   its	   conclusion.	   First,	   ethicism	   faces	   problems	   in	   discerning	   whether	   the	  
‘manifested	   artist’	   of	   an	   artwork	   possesses	   a	   morally	   virtuous	   or	   defective	   character.	  
These	  problems	  are	  especially	  clear	  in	  regards	  to	  artworks	  that	  remain	  ambiguous	  in	  their	  
moral	   stance,	   as	   well	   as	   with	   artworks	   that	   can	   offer	   up	   a	   plurality	   of	   plausible	  
interpretations.	   Second,	   Gaut’s	   argument	   regarding	   our	   common	   use	   of	   the	   terms	  
‘beautiful’	   and	   ‘ugly’	   fails	   to	   provide	   convincing	   reasons	   for	   why	   we	   should	   hold	   such	  
utterances	  as	  being	  an	  attribution	  of	  aesthetic	  value	  rather	  than	  meaning	  simply	  excellent	  
or	   fine	   as	   Carroll	   suggests.	   Finally,	   the	   analogy	   between	   virtuous	   character-­‐traits	   and	  
other	  kinds	  of	  non-­‐perceivable	  entities	  requires	  that	  Gaut	  either	  give	  an	  account	  of	  how	  
the	  former	  can	  possess	  lower-­‐level	  aesthetic	  qualities,	  or	  provide	  reasons	  for	  why	  these	  
lower-­‐level	  qualities	  are	  not	  necessary.	  
	  
4.2. The ‘Cognitive Argument’ 
	  
As	  noted	   in	   the	   third	   chapter	   ethicism	   is	   defended,	   in	  part,	   through	   the	   claim	   that	   the	  
cognitive	   value	   of	   artworks	   is	   under	   certain	   circumstances	   aesthetically	   relevant.	  With	  
specific	  regard	  to	  the	  ethicist	  thesis	  Gaut	  formulates	  this	  cognitive	  claim	  as	  follows:	  
	  
[…]	  an	  artwork	   is	  aesthetically	  good	   in	  so	   far	  as	   it	  manifests	  aesthetically	  
relevant	  moral	   understanding	   (and	   conversely	   for	   aesthetic	   badness	   and	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moral	  misunderstanding	  or	  failures	  to	  understand)	  (2007,	  p.	  138).	  
	  
Two	   arguments	   specific	   to	   ethicism	   are	   developed	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   establishing	   the	  
aesthetic	  relevance	  of	  this	  cognitive	  claim.	  These	  are	  the	  ‘cognitive	  vocabulary	  argument’	  
(examined	   in	   the	   third	   chapter)	   and	   the	   ‘replacement	   argument’.	   If	   we	   recall,	   the	  
common	   language	   argument	   faced	   the	   objection	   that	   it	   begged	   the	   question	   against	  
moderate	   autonomism,	   and	   should	   thus	   be	   not	   taken	   as	   sufficient	   for	   establishing	   the	  
relationship	  between	  cognitive	  and	  aesthetic	  value.	  
	  
Gaut’s	  ‘replacement	  argument’	  holds	  that	  when	  engaging	  with	  artworks,	  we	  consider	  the	  
cognitive	  and	  moral	  understanding	  provided	  by	  the	  manifested	  artist	  to	  be	  an	  important	  
aspect	   of	   our	   overall	   evaluation:	   furthermore,	   where	   this	   understanding	   is	   lacking	   or	  
deficient	  we	  will	  consider	   the	  manifested	  artist	   to	  “lack	  a	  core	   literary	   [or	  artistic]	  skill”	  
(2007,	  p.	  166).	  His	  attempts	  to	  defend	  this	  claim	  focus	  on	  the	  intuition	  that	  if	  we	  were	  to	  
‘replace’	   this	   understanding	   as	   it	   is	   manifested	   in	   the	   work	   with	   an	   account	   prone	   to	  
misunderstanding,	  then	  we	  would	  inevitably	  evaluate	  the	  work	  as	  being	  aesthetically	  less	  
valuable.	  Hence,	  the	  claim	  is	  that	  the	  manifestation	  of	  cognitive	  or	  moral	  understanding	  
constitutes	   an	   aesthetic	   merit,	   while	   the	   manifestation	   of	   a	   moral	   perspective	   that	   is	  
confused	  or	  incoherent	  will	  conversely	  constitute	  an	  aesthetic	  defect	  in	  the	  work.	  
	  
Gaut	   asserts	   that	   we	   should	   accept	   that	   an	   artwork’s	   ability	   to	   convey	   cognitive	   and	  
ethical	  understanding	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  “considerable	  aesthetic	  importance.”	  (2007,	  p.	  166).	  
To	  qualify	  this	  assertion	  he	  offers	  a	  literary	  example	  in	  William	  Styron's	  Sophie’s	  Choice;	  a	  
novel	  which	  reaches	  its	  moral	  and	  psychological	  climax	  when	  the	  reader	   learns	  that	  the	  
main	   protagonist	   Sophie,	   was	   forced,	   on	   her	   arrival	   at	   a	   Nazi	   death-­‐camp,	   to	   choose	  
which	  one	  of	  her	  two	  children	  would	  be	  sent	  directly	  to	  the	  gas	  chamber.	  Furthermore,	  
we	  learn	  that	  if	  she	  hesitated	  in	  making	  this	  decision	  both	  would	  be	  condemned	  to	  die.	  
Styron	   presents	   this	  moral	   dilemma	   as	   being	   terrifyingly	   real,	   and	   its	   consequences	   as	  
inescapable;	  eventually	   Sophie	   is	  utterly	   consumed	  by	  her	  decision	   (she	  chose	  her	   son,	  
condemning	   her	   daughter	   to	   death)	   and	   takes	   her	   own	   life.	  Gaut	   argues	   that	   if	   Styron	  
were	  to	  ‘replace’	  the	  psychological	  and	  moral	  understanding	  manifested	  in	  the	  novel	  with	  
some	  lesser	  account	  —	  for	  example,	  by	  showing	  Sophie	  as	  being	  indifferent	  or	  flippant	  in	  
deciding	  which	   child	   she	   saves,	   treating	   it	   instead	   as	   a	  matter	   of	  mere	   triviality	  —	   the	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novel	  as	  a	  whole	  would	  be	  aesthetically	  worse	  off	  for	  doing	  so	  (2007,	  p.	  166).	  Gaut’s	  point	  
here	  is	  that,	  if	  by	  undermining	  the	  moral	  understanding	  manifested	  in	  Sophie’s	  Choice	  we	  
come	  to	  evaluate	  the	  novel	  as	  being	  aesthetically	  worse	  qua	  art,	  then	  we	  have	  a	  reason	  
to	  accept	  the	  connection	  between	  aesthetic	  value	  and	  moral	  understanding.	  Yet	  exactly	  
where	  this	  connection	  exists,	  and	  how	  it	  should	  be	  understood,	  remains	  open	  to	  debate.	  
	  
Consequently,	   his	   argument	   seems	   to	   hold	   that	   if	   in	   undermining	   the	   moral	  
understanding	  manifested	  in	  an	  artwork	  —	  through	  the	  replacement	  of	  some	  key	  feature	  
of	  that	  work	  —	  we	  evaluate	  its	  overall	  aesthetic	  value	  to	  be	  diminished,	  then	  we	  should	  
accept	   that	   the	  manifestation	  of	  moral	  understanding	   is	  aesthetically	   relevant	   (2007,	  p.	  
166).	  
	  
One	   line	  of	  objection	  might	  proceed	  as	   follows:	   it	   is	  not	  so	  obvious	  that	  we	  are	  able	  to	  
justify	   the	   comparison	  of	   an	  original	  work	   that	   proceeds	  with	   its	   perceived	  manifested	  
understanding	   intact,	   to	   an	   exact	   replica	   of	   that	   work	   that	   is	   postulated	   minus	   this	  
understanding	   (or	  with	   this	   understanding	   significantly	   sabotaged).	   This	   is	   because	   it	   is	  
not	  obvious	   that	  we	  can	  accurately	  declare	   that	   these	   two	  works	  are	   the	  same	  work10;	  
and	   in	   light	   of	   this,	   it	   could	   be	   objected	   that	   the	   initial	   appeal	   of	   Gaut’s	   example	   is	  
weakened.	   As	   Stecker	   writes,	   this	   kind	   of	   argument	   fails	   to	   show	   that	   a	   work	   will	   be	  
improved	  or	  weakened	  by	  such	  alterations	  due	  to	  the	  simple	  fact	  that	  the	  ‘work’	  “[will]	  
not	   survive	   them”	   (2008a,	   p.	   149).	   However,	   because	   the	   example	   offered	   above	   only	  
intends	   to	  alter	  a	   single,	  albeit	   crucial,	  event	  outlining	   the	  major	  moral	  dilemma	  of	   the	  
novel	  we	  might	  accept	  that	  it	  still	  maintains	  a	  modicum	  of	  intuitive	  appeal.	  Granted	  that,	  
what	  Gaut	  is	  aiming	  for	  is	  the	  intuition	  that	  by	  replacing	  a	  ‘real’	  and	  well-­‐explored	  moral	  
dilemma	  with	  a	  simple,	   indifferent,	  and	  altogether	  unexplained	  choice,	  the	  work	  will	  be	  
aesthetically	  worse	  off	  through	  either	  its	  lack	  of	  moral	  understanding,	  or	  its	  reliance	  on	  a	  
moral	  perspective	  that	  he	  regards	  as	  being	  incoherent.	  	  
	  
However,	  a	  more	  promising	  line	  of	  objection	  could	  proceed	  by	  arguing	  that	  this	  alternate	  
version	   of	   Sophie’s	   Choice	   in	   which	   Sophie	   is	   either	   oblivious	   or	   cares	   little	   about	   the	  
moral	  implications	  of	  her	  decision,	  is	  not	  aesthetically	  worse	  off	  due	  its	  apparent	  lack	  of	  
psychological	  or	  moral	  understanding;	   rather,	   the	  work	   is	   aesthetically	  defective	   to	   the	  
                                                
10	  Robert	  Stecker	  defends	  a	  similar	  claim	  in,	  Immoralism	  and	  the	  Anti-­‐Theoretical	  View,	  (2008),	  p.	  149.	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extent	   that	   it	   fails	   to	  explore	   Sophie’s	   ultimate	  decision	   in	   any	   complex	  or	   ‘interesting’	  
way.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  objection	  is	  that	  what	  Gaut	  has	  removed	  from	  the	  original	  work	  
is	   not	   its	   ability	   to	   convey	   moral	   understanding,	   but	   rather	   its	   ability	   to	   explore	   the	  
decision	   in	   an	   interesting	   or	   valuable	  way.	   It	   is	   specifically	   his	   stipulation	   that	   Sophie’s	  
decision	   in	   this	   alternative	   account	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   “[...]	   comparative	   indifference,	   like	  
choosing	  between	  which	  particular	  item	  on	  the	  menu	  one	  wanted	  for	  dessert	  [...]”	  (2007,	  
p.	   166)	  —	   coupled	   with	   the	   fact	   that	   this	   alteration	   is	   forcefully	   inserted	   into	   a	   work	  
which	   is	  not	   specifically	  written	  with	   the	  aim	  of	  exploring	   this	  particular	   choice	  —	   that	  
strips	  the	  work	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  moral	  interest	  or	  complexity.	  	  
	  
This	   line	   of	   objection	   maintains	   that	   it	   is	   not	   the	   cognitive	   value	   that	   is	   aesthetically	  
valuable	  within	  works	  of	  art,	  but	  is	  instead	  the	  way	  in	  which	  moral	  and	  cognitive	  content	  
is	  shaped	  and	  explored.	  Gaut	  might	  have	  instead	  claimed	  that	  his	  alternate	  version	  of	  the	  
novel	   possesses	   a	   different	   level	   of	   cognitive	   or	  moral	   understanding:	   one	   that	   is	   less	  
plausible	  or	  valuable	  than	  the	  original	  work.	  However	  this	  avenue	  seems	  unavailable	  to	  
him	  as	  he	  denounces	  the	  altered	  version	  in	  which	  Sophie’s	  choice	  is	  postulated	  as	  being	  
free	   from	  moral	   deliberation	   as	   follows:	   “To	   treat	   [the	   choice]	   thus	  would	   represent	   a	  
profound	  failure	  to	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  moral	  choice,	  and	  would	  thereby	  wreck	  the	  
novel,	   depriving	   it	   of	   its	   power	   to	   display	   and	   explore	   a	   devastating	   moral	   dilemma”	  
(2007,	  p.	  166).	  Gaut	   shows	  here	   that	  he	  considers	   this	  alternative	  novel	   to	   represent	  a	  
cognitive	   and	  moral	   failure	   to	   understand,	   rather	   than	  one	   that	   instead	  explores	   other	  
moral	   or	   cognitive	   avenues.	   	  What	   comes	   to	   light	   here	   is	   that	   the	   ethicist	   approach	  of	  
arguing	   that	   cognitive	   and	   moral	   value	   constitutes	   aesthetic	   value	   lacks	   the	   kind	   of	  
explanatory	   power	   that	   is	   offered	   by	   the	   moral	   significance	   thesis.	   The	   latter	   better	  
accounts	   for	   why	   we	  might	   agree	   that	   Gaut’s	   alternative	   version	   of	   Sophie’s	   Choice	   is	  
aesthetically	   worse	   off	   than	   the	   original;	   not	   because	   it	   involves	   a	   case	   of	   serious	  
cognitive	  or	  moral	  misunderstanding,	  but	  rather	  because	  this	  alternative	  version	  fails	  to	  
shape	  or	  explore	  the	  psychology	  that	  Gaut	  forces	  upon	  it.	  
	  
Furthermore,	  one	  could	  maintain	  that	  if	  Sophie	  had	  instead	  chosen	  which	  child	  to	  save	  in	  
this	   blasé	   fashion	   it	   would	   still	   be	  possible	   for	   the	   novel	   to	   explore,	   in	   a	   complex	   and	  
imaginative	  way,	  her	  psychological	  reasons	  for	  doing	  so,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  moral	  implications	  
and	   consequences	   of	   her	   choice.	   Sophie’s	   detached	   and	   cool	  manner	   in	   choosing	  may	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have,	  for	  example,	  been	  explored	  in	  a	  way	  that	  painted	  this	  method	  as	  being	  the	  only	  one	  
available	   to	   a	   loving	   parent	   faced	   with	   such	   a	   situation:	   a	   situation	   in	   which	   a	   more	  
reasoned	  or	  emotional	  decision	  might	  have	   simply	  been	   impossible,	   and	  on	  account	  of	  
this	   impossibility,	   likely	   to	   doom	   both	   of	   her	   children.	   As	   such,	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   this	  
alternate	  novel	  could	  be	  both	  aesthetically	  valuable	  and	  morally	  significant	   in	  regard	  to	  
the	   way	   in	   which	   it	   explores	   a	   particular	   moral	   avenue,	   even	   if	   in	   the	   end	   we	   take	  
Sophie’s	  method	  of	  deciding	  to	  be	  misguided	  or	  morally	  flawed.	  	  
	  
Consequently,	   all	   that	   Gaut’s	   replacement	   argument	   is	   able	   to	   show	   is	   that	   the	  
substitution	   of	   a	   complex	   and	   well-­‐considered	   exploration	   of	   moral	   and	   psychological	  
matters	  with	  an	  account	  —	  which	  due	  to	  its	  lack	  of	  exploration	  strikes	  us	  as	  incoherent	  —	  
is	   likely	   to	   count	   as	   an	   aesthetic	   defect.	   It	   fails	   to	   show	   that	   cognitive	   or	   moral	  
misunderstanding	   therefore	   constitutes	   an	   aesthetic	   defect.	   Cases	   like	   the	   alternative	  
offered	  above,	  in	  which	  we	  are	  able	  to	  explore	  Sophie’s	  indifference	  in	  deciding	  between	  
the	   lives	   of	   her	   two	   children,	  may	   be	   rendered	   coherent	   and	   aesthetically	  meritorious	  
even	  if	  we	  decide	  that	  we	  ourselves	  would	  have	  acted	  differently.	  
	  
4.3. The ‘Merited Response Argument’ 
	  
Gaut’s	   third	   argument	   in	   favour	   of	   ethicism,	   which	   he	   calls	   the	   ‘merited	   response	  
argument’	   (2007,	   p.	   227)	   (referred	   to	   hence	   forth	   as	   the	   MRA),	   holds	   that	   artworks	  
prescribe	  certain	  responses	  towards	  the	  moral	  content	  they	  represent,	  and	  furthermore,	  
that	  these	  responses	  are	  ‘unmerited’	  when	  they	  are	  judged	  to	  be	  ‘unethical’.	  That	  is,	  we	  
ought	   not	   to	   respond	   in	   the	   way	   prescribed	   by	   an	   artwork	   (more	   accurately,	   by	   the	  
manifested	  artist)	  if	  doing	  so	  has	  us	  responding	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  unethical.	  The	  MRA	  claims	  
that	   in	   cases	   where	   an	   artwork	   prescribes	   us	   to	   respond	   in	   a	   particular	   way	   this	   is	   of	  
aesthetic	   relevance;	   and	   furthermore,	   when	   these	   responses	   are	   ‘unmerited’	   they	  
constitute	   an	  aesthetic	   flaw	   in	   the	  work	   (they	   conversely	   constitute	   an	   aesthetic	  merit	  
when	  they	  are	  ‘merited’).	  Gaut	  lays	  out	  the	  basic	  tenets	  of	  the	  MRA	  as	  follows:	  
	  
A	  work's	  attitude	  is	  standardly	  manifested	  in	  prescribing	  certain	  responses	  
towards	   the	   events	   it	   describes.	   Prescribed	   responses	   are	   not	   always	  
merited.	  One	  way	   in	  which	  they	  can	  be	  unmerited	   is	   in	  being	  unethical.	   If	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the	  prescribed	  responses	  are	  unmerited,	  that	  is	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  work;	  so,	  if	  
the	   prescribed	   responses	   are	   unmerited	   because	   unethical,	   that	   is	   an	  
aesthetic	  failure	  of	  the	  work	  –	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  is	  an	  aesthetic	  defect	  in	  it.	  So	  a	  
work's	  manifestation	  of	  ethically	  bad	  attitudes	  in	  its	  prescribed	  responses	  is	  
an	  aesthetic	  defect	  in	  it.	  Mutatis	  mutandis,	  a	  parallel	  argument	  shows	  that	  
a	  work's	  manifestation	  of	  ethically	  commendable	  attitudes	  in	  its	  prescribed	  
responses	  is	  an	  aesthetic	  merit	  in	  it	  (2007,	  p.	  233,	  my	  emphasis).	  	  
	  
As	  a	  basic	  example	  of	  how	  the	  MRA	  works,	  Gaut	  offers	  the	  following:	  
	  
	   […]	   a	   comedy	   presents	   certain	   events	   as	   funny	   (prescribes	   a	   humorous	  
	   response	  to	  	   them),	  but,	  if	  this	  involves	  being	  amused	  at	  heartless	  cruelty,	  
	   then	  the	  work	  is	  not	  	   funny	  or	  at	  least	  its	  humour	  is	  flawed,	  and	  that	  is	  an	  
	   aesthetic	  defect	  in	  it.	  (2007,	  p.	  233).	  
	  
The	   basic	   claim	  of	   the	  MRA	   is	   a	   normative	   one,	   and	  Gaut	   points	   out	   that	  whether	  we	  
ought	   or	   ought	   not	   to	   respond	   in	   the	   way	   prescribed	   by	   an	   artwork	   is	   a	   matter	   of	  
whether	  it	  is	  “appropriate	  or	  inappropriate”	  to	  do	  so	  (2007,	  p.	  231).	  Gaut	  takes	  this	  claim	  
to	  be	  trivially	  true	  in	  cases	  where	  ethical	  criteria	  might	  be	  absent;	  he	  points	  out	  that,	  “[...]	  
horror	  fictions	  may	  be	  unfrightening,	  comedies	  unamusing,	  thrillers	  unthrilling.”	  (2007,	  p.	  
231).	   In	   such	   cases	   the	   MRA	   will	   maintain	   that	   the	   respective	   fear,	   amusement,	   and	  
suspense	   prescribed	   by	   the	  manifested	   artist	   are,	   due	   to	   some	   aesthetic	   failure	   of	   the	  
work,	  unmerited.	  Ethical	  cases,	  however,	  are	  more	  complex,	  and	  if	  the	  MRA	  is	  to	  succeed	  
it	  must	  show	  two	  things:	  first,	  it	  must	  show	  that	  the	  defectiveness	  of	  an	  ethical	  response	  
means	   that	   it	   is	  always	  unmerited;	  and	  secondly,	   to	  do	   this	   it	  must	  also	  show	  that	  our	  
responses	  to	  fiction	  are	  morally	  evaluable	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  
	  
It	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  analogy	  Gaut	  draws	  between	  the	  above	  moral	  and	  non-­‐
moral	  cases	  of	  merited	  responses	  is	  not	  as	  strong	  as	  it	  may	  first	  appear.	  In	  the	  moral	  case	  
Gaut	  seems	  to	  be	  claiming	   that	   responding	  as	  prescribed	   is	   ‘impermissible’,	  whereas	   in	  
the	  non-­‐moral	  case	  the	  method	  of	  securing	  our	  responses	  is	  merely	  ‘ineffective’.	  Hence,	  
while	  Gaut	  might	  be	   correct	   in	  his	   analysis	  of	   artworks	   that	   fail	   to	   secure	   responses	  of	  
horror,	  amusement,	  or	  suspense,	  there	  remains	  a	  conceptual	  gap	  between	  these	  notions	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of	  ‘ineffective’	  and	  ‘impermissible’	  that	  he	  fails	  to	  bridge.	  
	  
This	  section	  will	  begin	  by	  outlining	  a	  crucial	  objection	  made	  by	  Daniel	   Jacobson	  against	  
the	  MRA,	   followed	   by	  Gaut’s	   attempt	   to	   deal	  with	   this	   objection.	  Whether	   or	   not	   this	  
reply	   is	   sufficient	   in	   deflecting	   the	   Jacobson’s	   objection	   will	   be	   considered.	   Then	   an	  
argument	  developed	  by	  Alan	  Hazlett	  defending	  a	   form	  of	   ‘response	  moralism’,	  which	   is	  
implicitly	   endorsed	   by	   Gaut’s	   MRA,	   will	   be	   examined.	   It	   will	   be	   argued	   that	   Hazlett’s	  
defence	   of	   response	  moralism	   is	   unconvincing	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   it	   fails	   to	   provide	   any	  
convincing	  reasons	  for	  why	  we	  might	  accept	  that	  our	  responses	  towards	  works	  of	  art	  are	  
morally	  culpable.	  
	  
To	   establish	   that	   ethical	   defects	   are	   always	   unmerited,	   Gaut	   must	   respond	   to	   an	  
objection	  offered	  by	  Jacobson.	  Jacobson	  has	  objected	  that	  although	  we	  may	  withhold	  a	  
response	  prescribed	  by	  an	  artwork	  on	  account	  of	  its	  defective	  ethical	  perspective,	  it	  does	  
not	  follow	  that	  the	  work	  fails	  to	  warrant	  such	  a	  response.	  For	  example,	  we	  may	  decide	  
against	   responding	   with	   amusement	   to	   a	   comedy	   which	   engages	   in	   racist	   or	   sexist	  
stereotypes	   (we	  may	  even	  say	  that	   to	  respond	   in	  such	  a	  way	  would	  be	  “inappropriate”	  
(Gaut,	  2007,	  p.	  231)),	  however;	  withholding	  our	  amusement,	   Jacobson	  claims,	  does	  not	  
settle	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  comedy	  is	  funny	  —	  that	  is,	  whether	  or	  not	  our	  
amusement	  is	  warranted	  (1997,	  p.	  172).	  This	  objection	  stems	  from	  Jacobson’s	  claim	  that:	  
“[...]	   moral	   considerations	   –	   such	   as	   that	   the	   [attitude]	   is	   racist	   –	   show	   us	   when	   an	  
emotion	   is	   and	   isn’t	  appropriate	   to	   feel,	   and	   inappropriate	   emotions	  do	  not	   accurately	  
track	   the	   evaluative	   properties	   of	   which	   they	   purport	   to	   be	   perceptions,	   such	   as	   the	  
funny.”	   (1997,	   p.	   172,	   my	   emphasis).	   Furthermore,	   if	   Jacobson	   is	   correct	   then	   Gaut’s	  
original	   formulation	   of	   the	   MRA	   will	   fall	   short	   of	   securing	   its	   claim	   that	   unethical	  
responses	  are	  always	  aesthetic	  defects.	  
	  
Jacobson	  claims	  that	  judging	  a	  response	  (such	  as	  amusement	  or	  fear)	  to	  be	  warranted	  is	  a	  
case	  of	  establishing	  what	  there	  is	  “most	  evidence	  to	  feel,	  desire	  or	  believe”,	  and	  as	  such	  
he	  asserts	  that	  these	  judgments	  are	  based	  on	  “epistemic,	  rather	  than	  moral	  or	  prudential	  
reasons.”	   (1997,	   p.	   173).	   Jacobson’s	   argument	   holds	   that	   although	   a	   comedy	   might	  
warrant	   our	   amusement	   by	   presenting	   certain	   situations	   in	   a	   farcical	   or	   incongruous	  
fashion	  we	  may	  withhold	  our	  amusement;	  that	  is,	  choose	  not	  to	  respond,	  due	  to	  ethical	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reasons.	  Yet,	  he	  further	  holds	  that	  a	  refusal	  to	  respond	  on	  our	  part	  does	  not	  weigh	  in	  on	  
whether	  or	  not	  the	  comedy	  is	  actually	  funny;	  that	  is,	  whether	  it	  warrants	  our	  amusement.	  
	  
Instead,	   Jacobson	  proposes	   that	   there	  are	   three	  distinct	   kinds	  of	   reasons	   for	  having	  or	  
withholding	  a	  response:	  these	  can	  be	  described	  as	  ‘strategic	  reasons’,	   ‘intrinsic	  reasons’	  
and	   ‘reasons	   of	   warrant’.	   Strategic	   reasons,	   he	   claims,	   are	   those	   that	   weigh	   upon	  
whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  respond	  in	  a	  given	  situation:	  for	  example,	  if	  the	  butt	  of	  
a	   joke	   is	   present	   I	   might	   withhold	   my	   amusement	   in	   order	   not	   to	   hurt	   their	   feelings	  
(1997,	  p.	  174).	  Intrinsic	  reasons	  are	  of	  the	  kind	  that	  we	  might	  hold	  that	  it	  is	  simply	  wrong	  
to	   respond	   in	   the	   manner	   prescribed	   by	   certain	   artworks;	   responding	   in	   a	   way	   that	  
requires	  us	  to	  adopt	  a	  sexist	  or	  racist	  attitude	  can	  stand	  as	  examples	  of	  intrinsic	  reasons	  
for	   withholding	   such	   a	   response.	   However	   Jacobson	   argues	   that	   neither	   strategic	   nor	  
intrinsic	  reasons	  are	  sufficient	  to	  constitute	  an	  aesthetic	  defect	  where	  art	   is	  concerned.	  
This	   is	   because	   he	   holds	   that	   while	   they	   both	   offer	   us	   reasons	   to	   withhold	   or	   refuse	  
certain	   responses	   that	   artworks	   prescribe,	   neither	   kind	   of	   reason	   concerns	   the	   actual	  
evaluative	  properties	  of	  the	  artwork.	  While	  we	  might	  withhold	  our	  amusement	  towards	  a	  
comedy	   for	   strategic	   or	   intrinsic	   reasons,	   neither	   of	   these	   is	   sufficient	   to	   establish	  
whether	   or	   not	   the	   work	   is	   actually	   funny;	   only	   the	   third	   kind	   of	   reason,	   reasons	   of	  
warrant,	  he	  claims,	  are	  able	   to	  determine	   this.	  Consequently,	   Jacobson	  argues	   that	   the	  
MRA	   must	   show	   that	   unethical	   responses	   are	   unwarranted	   (rather	   than	   simply	  
unmerited)	  if	  it	  is	  to	  succeed	  in	  showing	  that	  the	  prescription	  of	  unethical	  responses	  is	  a	  
pro	  tanto	  aesthetic	  defect.	  	  
	  
Gaut’s	   initial	   reply	   to	   this	   objection	   is	   to	   argue	   that	   unethical	   responses	   are,	   simply,	  
always	   unwarranted.	   He	  maintains,	   contrary	   to	   Jacobson,	   that	   intrinsic	   reasons	   (those	  
which	   lead	   us	   to	   evaluate	   certain	   responses	   as	   being	  morally	  wrong)	   are	   sufficient	   for	  
grounding	  an	  aesthetic	  defect	  where	  artworks	  are	  concerned.	  He	  writes:	  	  
	  
What	  is	  wrong	  (rationally	  and	  morally)	  with	  being	  angry	  with	  someone	  who	  
has	   done	   no	   wrong	   is	   that	   the	   formal	   object	   of	   the	   emotion	   of	   anger	  
(someone	   having	   done	   something	   wrong)	   does	   not	   correspond	   to	   the	  
intentional	  content	  of	  the	  thought,	  that	  they	  have	  done	  no	  wrong.	  What	  is	  
wrong	  in	  taking	  pleasure	  in	  others’	  pain	  is	  that	  this	  is	  not	  pleasurable,	  in	  the	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proper,	  normative	  sense	  of	  that	  in	  which	  we	  ought	  to	  take	  pleasure.	  (2007,	  
p.	  239).	  
	  
Gaut’s	  claim	  here	  is	  that	  these	  intrinsic	  moral	  reasons	  for	  withholding	  our	  responses	  do	  
not	  result	  in	  an	  aesthetic	  defect	  only	  because	  they	  reveal	  a	  vicious	  attitude	  on	  our	  part,	  
but	   that	   they	   do	   so	   also	   because	   they	   entail	   a	   failure	   of	   the	   work	   to	   warrant	   such	  
responses.	   He	   claims	   that	   in	   such	   cases:	   “[...]	   the	   response	   prescribed	   does	   not	  
correspond	   to	   the	   evaluative	   properties	   of	   the	   object	   –	   it	   is	   the	   cognitive-­‐evaluative	  
aspect	  of	  rationality	  that	  in	  each	  case	  is	  impugned	  by	  its	  immorality.”	  (2007,	  p.	  239).	  Gaut	  
further	   attempts	   to	   clarify	   this	  with	   an	  example,	   citing	  people	   such	   as	   those	  who	   took	  
pleasure	  in	  watching	  public	  executions	  during	  the	  French	  Revolution:	  he	  writes	  that	  while	  
they	  may	  have	  indeed	  taken	  ‘pleasure’	   in	  such	  events	  their	  doing	  so	  shows	  neither	  that	  
they	  ought	   to	  have	   responded	  with	  pleasure,	   or	   that	   they	  were	  warranted	   in	   doing	   so	  
(2007,	  p.	  239).	  
	  
Yet,	  replying	  to	  the	  warrant	  objection	  in	  this	  way	  forces	  the	  MRA	  to	  hold	  that	  unethical	  
responses	   are	   never	   warranted;	   otherwise	   the	   MRA	   would	   remain	   at	   the	   mercy	   of	  
Jacobson’s	   objection.	   Furthermore,	   it	   also	   seems	   to	   follow	   that	   the	   MRA	   must	   now	  
maintain	   that	   warranted	   responses	   are	   always	   ethical;	   for	   if	   it	   were	   possible	   for	   a	  
warranted	   response	   to	   be	   unethical	   then	   both	   the	   MRA	   and	   by	   extension,	   ethicism,	  
would	   be	   crucially	   flawed.	   Yet,	   this	   looks	   to	   be	   a	   stronger	   commitment	   than	  Gaut	   has	  
previously	  acknowledged.	  
	  
The	   dispute	   between	   Gaut	   and	   Jacobson	   concerning	   whether	   or	   not	   responses	   are	  
warranted	   focuses	   upon	   what	   constitutes	   ‘evidence’	   for	   responding	   as	   such.	   Again,	  
Jacobson	  claims	  that	  warrant	  rests	  upon	  epistemic	  reasons	  regarding	  “what	  there	  is	  the	  
most	  evidence	  to	  feel	  desire	  or	  believe”,	  adding	  that	  such	  evidence	  is	  free	  from	  “moral	  or	  
prudential	  reasons”	  (1997,	  p.	  173);	  while,	  conversely,	  in	  defence	  of	  the	  MRA	  Gaut	  states	  
that	  our	  responses	  have	  “ethical	  criteria	  among	  their	  warrant	  conditions.”	  (2007,	  p.	  239).	  	  
	  
To	   test	   the	   strength	   of	   Gaut’s	   reply	   let	   us	   consider	   an	   example:	   the	   film	  Waking	   Ned	  
Devine	   follows	   the	   exploits	   of	   Tulleymore	   village	   in	   Ireland	   as,	   after	   the	   death	   of	   the	  
titular	   character,	   its	   inhabitants	   pull	   together	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   defraud	   the	   lottery	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commission.	   Lizzie	   Quinn,	   an	   elderly	   and	   reclusive	   resident,	   refuses	   to	   cooperate	   and	  
threatens	   to	   turn	  whistle-­‐blower	  after	   she	   is	   refused	  a	   larger	   share	  of	   the	  winnings.	  As	  
part	   of	   the	   climax	   of	   the	   film	   Lizzie	   reaches	   the	   only	  working	   telephone	   in	   Tulleymore	  
(conveniently	   situated	   on	   the	   precipice	   of	   a	   cliff)	   and	   calls	   the	   lottery	   commission.	  
However,	   before	   she	   is	   able	   to	   expose	   the	   remaining	   villagers	   the	   phone	   booth,	   with	  
Lizzie	  still	  inside,	  is	  accidentally	  struck	  and	  sent	  sailing	  over	  the	  cliff	  by	  the	  van	  of	  the	  local	  
Parish	   Priest.	   Rather	   than	   being	   an	   occasion	   for	   despair	   or	   solemnity	   the	   film	   can	   be	  
plausibly	   interpreted	   as	   prescribing	   that	  we	   respond	   to	   Lizzie’s	   death	  with	   equal	   parts	  
pleasure	  and	  amusement.	  We	  want	  to	  see	  the	  people	  of	  Tulleymore	  succeed	  in	  acquiring	  
the	  fortune	  of	  the	  deceased	  Ned	  Devine.	  However,	  our	  pleasure	  and	  amusement	  at	  the	  
demise	  of	  Lizzie	  Quinn	  must	  be	  unethical	  as	  far	  as	  they	  are	  directed	  toward	  the	  death	  of	  
an	   elderly	   lady	   who	  was,	   all	   things	   considered,	   attempting	   to	   report	   a	   fraudulent	   act.	  	  
What	  we	  have	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Waking	  Ned	  Devine	  is	  an	  artwork	  in	  which	  our	  responses	  of	  
pleasure	  and	  amusement	  at	  the	  death	  of	  an	   innocent	   (although	  obnoxious)	  woman	  are	  
warranted	   in	  the	  sense	  that	  there	  is	  much	  in	  the	  work	  to	  support	  such	  a	  response.	  Yet,	  
while	  our	  response	  may	  be	  warranted	  it	  is	  almost	  certainly	  unethical,	  or	  at	  least	  would	  be	  
evaluated	  as	  being	  so	  given	  Gaut’s	  account	  of	  ethicism.	  	  
	  
With	   consideration	   to	   the	   above	   example	   the	   MRA	   might	   proceed	   in	   one	   of	   three	  
possible	  ways.	  The	  first	  would	  be	  to	  claim	  that	  our	  response	  towards	  the	  death	  of	  Lizzie	  
Quinn	   is	   unethical	   and	   therefore	   unwarranted;	   the	   second	  would	   be	   to	   claim	   that	   our	  
response	   is	   ethical	   and	   therefore	  warranted;	   and	   the	   third	  would	   be	   to	   claim	   that	   the	  
work	   is	   ambiguous	   in	   regards	   to	   the	   responses	   it	   prescribes	   and	   therefore,	   as	   ethicism	  
would	  maintain	  that	   the	  work	  possessed	  neither	  a	  moral	  defect	  or	  moral	  merit	  on	  that	  
account,	  the	  MRA	  would	  not	  apply.	  
	  
As	   Lizzie’s	   trip	   to	   the	  village	  phone	  on	  her	  mobility	   scooter	   stands	  as	   the	  climax	  of	   the	  
film,	  with	  her	  abrupt	  and	  unexpected	  demise	  coming	  as	  a	  sigh	  of	  relief	  for	  the	  audience,	  
we	  might	  rightly	  put	  aside	  this	  third	  way	  of	  responding.	  Yet	  this	  leaves	  the	  two	  previous	  
claims,	  both	  of	  them	  problematic.	  While	  the	  response	  prescribed	   is	  surely	  on	  reflection	  
unethical	   the	  film	  does	  an	  excellent	   job	  of	  making	  sure	  that	  we	  are	   likely	  to	  respond	   in	  
exactly	   this	   way.	   That	   is,	   the	   work	   offers	   us	   plenty	   of	   cognitive-­‐evaluative	   reasons	   to	  
warrant	  such	  a	  response.	  What	  this	  example	  seems	  to	  show	  is	  that	  artworks	  are	  able	  to	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offer	   us	   good	   reasons,	   ‘reasons	  of	  warrant’,	   to	   enter	   into	   the	  unethical	   responses	   that	  
they	  prescribe.	  Or,	  to	  put	  it	  another	  way:	  although	  our	  responses	  to	  certain	  works	  of	  art	  
might	  be	  unethical	  upon	  reflection,	  these	  works	  can	  sometimes	  succeed	  in	  making	  these	  
responses	  warranted	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  the	  fictional	  world,	  or	  context	  in	  which	  they	  
occur.	  If	  this	  is	  indeed	  the	  case,	  as	  the	  above	  example	  would	  suggest,	  then	  the	  MRA	  must	  
be	  false,	  as	  it	  is	  unable	  to	  account	  for	  the	  cognitive-­‐evaluative	  properties	  within	  the	  film	  
that	  secure	  our	  unethical	  response.	  
	  
4.4. Merited Responses and Response Moralism 
	  
As	  noted	  earlier,	  if	  the	  MRA	  is	  to	  be	  successful	  then	  Gaut	  must	  show	  that	  our	  responses	  
to	   fiction	  are	  morally	  evaluable.	   Included	   in	   the	  MRA	   is	  a	  premise	  maintaining	   that	   the	  
prescription	   of	   unethical	   responses	   is	   a	   failure	   of	   the	   work:	   this	   premise	   ultimately	  
assumes	   that	   our	   responses	   towards	   artworks	   in	   general	   are	   open	   to	   ethical	   scrutiny.	  
Such	  a	  claim,	  which	  has	  been	  recently	  defended	  by	  Allan	  Hazlett	  (2009)	  under	  the	  nomen	  
of	  ‘response	  moralism’,	  is	  again	  apparent	  in	  Gaut’s	  following	  statement:	  
	  
I	  can	  criticize	  someone	  for	  taking	  pleasure	  in	  others’	  pain,	  for	  being	  amused	  
by	  sadistic	  cruelty,	  for	  being	  angry	  when	  someone	  has	  done	  no	  wrong,	  for	  
desiring	  the	  bad.	  The	  same	  is	  true	  when	  responses	  are	  directed	  at	  fictional	  
events,	   for	   these	   responses	   are	   actual,	   not	   just	   imagined	   ones.	   (2007,	   p.	  
231).	  
	  
However,	   as	   Hazlett	   correctly	   points	   out,	   Gaut’s	   defence	   of	   response	   moralism	   is	  
insufficient.	  This	  is	  because,	  while	  our	  responses	  towards	  fictional	  characters	  and	  events	  
might	  be	  actual	  rather	  than	  merely	   imagined	   (assuming	  for	  argument’s	  sake	  that	  this	   is	  
the	  case),	   such	   responses	  are	   still	   then	  only	  actual	   responses	   towards	   fictional	  content	  
(2009,	  pp.	  244-­‐245).	  The	  point	  here	  is	  that,	  as	  Hazlett	  puts	  it,	  “[…]	  delight	  at	  the	  suffering	  
of	  a	  merely	   fictional	  person	   is	  not	  delight	  at	   the	  suffering	  of	  another	  person”	   (2009,	  p.	  
248).	  It	  does	  not	  follow	  then	  that	  our	  responses	  towards	  a	  fictional	  character,	  attitude,	  or	  
situation,	   should	   be	   morally	   evaluated.	   One	   could	   protest,	   for	   example,	   that	   such	  
responses	   towards	   fiction	  do	  not	  have	  as	   their	  object	   something	   to	  which	  we	  owe	  any	  
kind	   of	  moral	   consideration.	   This	   concern	   is	   central	   to	   what	   Hazlett	   labels	   the	   ‘reality	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argument’	  (2009,	  p.	  244).	  He	  formulates	  the	  argument	  as	  follows:	  
	  
1. “Morality	  concerns	  how	  we	  think	  about,	  feel	  about	  (i.e.	  emotionally	  respond	  to),	  
and	  treat	  (in	  action)	  other	  people.”	  
2. “A	   person’s	   emotional	   responses	   to	   the	   content	   of	   a	   fiction	   are	   not	   emotional	  
responses	  to	  other	  people.”	  
3. “Therefore,	  a	  person’s	  emotional	  responses	  to	  the	  content	  of	  a	  fiction	  cannot	  be	  
morally	  right	  or	  wrong.”	  (2009,	  p.	  245)	  
	  
First,	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   Hazlett’s	   formulation	   of	   this	   ‘reality	   argument’	   is	  
contentious.	  Hazlett	   intends	  to	  argue	  against	   the	  second	  premise	   in	  order	  to	  show	  that	  
our	  responses	  towards	  fiction	  can	  be	  morally	  evaluated;	  however,	  one	  might	  object	  that	  
the	  first	  premise	   is	  also	  faulty	   in	  that	   it	   is	  too	  narrow	  (morality	  might	  also	  be	  argued	  to	  
matter	   in	   our	   responses	   towards	   other	   things,	   such	   as	   animals,	   religions,	   cultural	  
practices,	  and	  actions).	  Yet,	  it	  should	  at	  least	  be	  clear	  that	  for	  the	  claims	  of	  both	  response	  
moralism	  and	  the	  MRA	  to	  be	  secured	  the	  second	  premise	  of	  the	  reality	  argument	  must	  be	  
rejected.	   If	  our	  unethical	   responses	   towards	   fiction	  are	   to	  be	  considered	   failures	  of	   the	  
artwork	   on	   account	   that	   we	   ought	   not	   to	   respond	   as	   prescribed,	   then	   the	   response	  
moralist	   must	   first	   show	   that	   such	   responses	   can	   be	   unethical.	   In	   order	   to	   reject	   this	  
second	   premise	   Hazlett	   argues	   that	   the	   response	  moralist	   must	   offer	   an	   account	   that	  
extends	   our	   ethical	   responses	   to	   fictional	   content	   to	   their	   non-­‐fictional	   or	   real-­‐world	  
counterparts.	   Gaut	   himself	   presents	   a	   similar	   line	   of	   thought	   although	   he	   does	   not	  
elaborate,	  or	  defend	  his	  claims.	  He	  writes:	  
	  
[…]	  works	  that	  manifest	  certain	  attitudes	  towards	  fictional	  entities	  implicitly	  
manifest	   the	   same	   attitudes	   to	   real	   entities	   of	   that	   kind.	   Reading	   this	   in	  
terms	  of	  prescribed	   imagined	   responses,	   the	   irrealist	   can	  hold	   that	  works	  
prescribing	   an	   imagined	   response	   towards	   fictional	   entities	   implicitly	  
prescribe	  the	  counterpart	  real	  response	  to	  real	  entities	  of	  that	  kind.	  Since	  
no	   one	   denies	   that	   real	   emotional	   responses	   can	   be	   directed	   at	   real	  
entities,	   the	   irrealist	   can	   hold	   that	   artworks	   are	   aesthetically	   flawed	   by	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virtue	  of	  the	  moral	  reprehensibility	  of	  the	  implied	  emotions	  directed	  at	  real	  
states	  of	  affairs.	  (2007,	  p.	  236)11	  
	  
Although	   it	   is	   unclear	   as	   to	   exactly	   what	   is	   entailed	   in	   Gaut’s	   notion	   of	   ‘implicitly	  
manifesting	   attitudes’,	   if	   this	   is	   taken	   to	   mean	   actually	   manifesting	   those	   attitudes	  
towards	  real-­‐world	  content	  then	  an	  argument	  for	  response	  moralism	  can	  be	  formed.	  	  
	  
In	   developing	   the	   claim	   that	   our	   responses	   to	   fictional	   people	   and	   events	   extend	   also	  
toward	  real	  people	  and	  events	   (2009,	  p.	  253),	  Hazlett	  asserts	  that	  our	  engagement	  with	  
fictional	   content	   is	  mediated	   by	   two	   distinct	   principles.	   One	   concerns	   the	   kind	   of	   non-­‐
fictional	  information	  that	  we	  “import”	  into	  fictional	  scenarios,	  and	  the	  other	  concerns	  the	  
content	  we	  “export”	  from	  fiction	  into	  the	  real	  world	  (2009,	  p.	  251).	  	  
	  
As	  we	  have	  already	  established	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters	  the	  notion	  of	  importing	  content	  
to	   ‘fill	   out’	   fictions	   is	   a	  well-­‐patronized	  one	   (Carroll,	   1998,	  2003)	   (Kieran,	  2006a,	  2006b)	  
(Gaut,	   2007).	   For	   example,	   Gregory	   Currie	   claims	   that	   our	   engagement	   with	   a	   work	   of	  
fiction	  proceeds	  as	  a	  game	  of	  “make-­‐believe”,	  in	  which	  “[w]hat	  is	  said	  in	  the	  text,	  together	  
with	  certain	  background	  assumptions,	  generates	  a	  set	  of	  fictional	  truths:	  those	  things	  that	  
are	  true	  in	  the	  fiction”	  (1990,	  p.	  71).	  Hazlett	  himself	  draws	  from	  the	  work	  of	  David	  Lewis	  
(1983),	  who	  points	  out	  that	  when	  reading	  Arthur	  Conan	  Doyle’s	  novels	  we	  assume	  both	  
that	   Sherlock	   Holmes	   wears	   underpants,	   and	   that	   he	   has	   never	   visited	   the	   moons	   of	  
Saturn	   (2009,	   p.	   251).	   Hazlett	   takes	   this	   thought	   as	   showing	   that	   these	   underlying	  
assumptions	  about	  fictional	  characters,	  situations,	  and	  events	  seem	  to	  be	  integral	  to	  our	  
imaginative	  engagement	  with	   fictions12.	  Hazlett’s	  own	   import	  principle	  holds	  that	  where	  
relevant,	  we	  will	  assume	  that	  the	  fictional	  world	  operates	   in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  the	  real	  
world	  does	  —	  unless	  the	  author	  tells	  us	  otherwise13	  (2009,	  p.	  251).	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	  Hazlett	  specifies	  that	  what	  we	  ‘import’	   into	  fiction	  is	  mediated	  by	  what	  he	  
                                                
11	  The	  'irrealists'	  that	  Gaut	  mentions	  here	  object	  along	  similar	  lines	  as	  those	  offered	  in	  Hazlett's	  'reality	  
argument'.	  Here,	  they	  object	  that	  our	  emotional	  responses	  towards	  fiction	  are	  'real',	  rather	  than	  
'imagined'	  or	  even	  'quasi-­‐real'.	  
	  
12	  See	  also,	  Tamar	  Szabo	  Gendler	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  assuming	  background	  propositions	  in,	  “The	  Puzzle	  of	  
Imaginative	  Resistance”,	  (2000),	  pp.	  75-­‐77.	  	  
13	  Hazlett’s	  ‘import	  principle’	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  ‘reality	  principle’	  that	  Walton	  (1994)	  proposes.	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calls	  a	  “similarity	  class”	  (2009,	  p.	  251).	  He	  holds	  that	  this	  similarity	  class	  is	  founded	  upon	  
the	  assumption	  that	  “fictional	  worlds	  are	  similar	   (in	  certain	  respects)	   to	  our	  own	  world”	  
(2009,	  p.	  251).	  As	  such,	  Hazlett	  holds	  that	  this	  similarity	  class	  will	  in	  some	  way	  ‘filter’	  the	  
assumptions	  that	  we	  bring	  to	  certain	  works	  of	  fiction.	  He	  holds,	  for	  example,	  that	  we	  will	  
not	   assume	   that	   the	   characters	   in	   The	   Lord	   of	   the	   Rings	   have	   bank	   accounts,	   yet	   will	  
assume	  that	  like	  us,	  they	  must	  eat	  food	  to	  survive	  (2009,	  p	  251).	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  above	  
example	   Hazlett’s	   “import	   principle”	   operates	   as	   follows:	   “For	   all	   true	   [propositions]	   in	  
[the	  similarity	  class	  of	  The	  Lord	  of	  the	  Rings],	  assume	  [the	  proposition]	  is	  true	  in	  [The	  Lord	  
of	  the	  Rings]	  unless	  you	  already	  know	  [that	  proposition]	  is	  false	  in	  [The	  Lord	  of	  the	  Rings]”	  
(2009,	  p.	  251).	  For	  Hazlett,	   this	  similarity	  class	   is	  a	  crucial	  element	   in	  determining	  which	  
propositions	  we	  import	  (and	  export)	  to	  and	  from	  artworks.	  
	  
Hazlett’s	  second	  and	  crucial	  “export	  principle”	  arises	  from	  his	  assertion	  that	  “similarity	  is	  a	  
symmetric	  relation”;	  hence	  when	  we	  take	  fictional	  worlds	  to	  be	  similar	  in	  certain	  respects	  
to	  the	  real	  world,	  Hazlett	  holds	  that	  this	  relationship	  should	  be	  assumed	  to	  work	  in	  both	  
directions.	  (2009,	  p.	  251).	  Hazlett	  fails	  to	  provide	  any	  further	  reasons	  or	  evidence	  for	  this	  
assertion,	   yet	   he	   proposes	   that	   in	   a	   way	   inverse	   to	   that	   by	   which	   we	   ‘fill	   out’	   fictions	  
through	   importing	   certain	   assumed	   propositions,	   we	   also	   ‘export’	   propositions	   that	   we	  
take	   to	   be	   ‘true’	   in	   the	   fiction	   and	   assume	   their	   truth	   in	   the	   real-­‐world.	   His	   “export	  
principle”	  proceeds	  as	  follows:	  “For	  all	  [propositions]	  in	  [the	  similarity	  class	  of	  the	  fiction]	  
that	  are	   true	   in	   [the	   fiction],	  assume	  [that	  proposition]	   is	   true,	  unless	  you	  already	  know	  
[that	   proposition]	   is	   false”	   (2009,	   p.	   251).	   What	   Hazlett	   has	   in	   mind	   here	   I	   suspect	   is	  
something	   close	   to,	   for	   example,	   the	   way	   one	   might	   export	   ‘fictional	   truths’	   about	  
nineteenth	  century	  whaling	  practices	  from	  Moby	  Dick,	  assuming	  their	  truth	  and	  accuracy	  
until	   they	   are	   either	   confirmed	   or	   denied	   by	   a	   more	   trustworthy	   source.	   Yet,	   there	   is	  
nothing	  by	  the	  way	  of	  evidence	  or	  argument	  offered	  by	  Hazlett	  to	  support	  this	  process	  of	  
‘exportation’,	  or	  recommend	  that	  we	  should	  accept	  his	  claim,	  other	  than	  his	  assertion	  that	  
“[by]	  convention,	  the	  author	  and	  the	  consumer	  will	  both	  assume	  that	  the	  consumer	  will	  
employ	   the	  Export	  principle”	   (2009,	  p.	  252)	   [Is	   there	  not?].	   Furthermore,	  as	  we	  will	   see	  
even	   if	  we	  do	   accept	  Hazlett’s	   formulation	  of	   the	   export	   principle,	   the	   claim	  effectively	  
entails	   that	   our	   responses	   towards	  works	   of	   art	  will	   not	   be	  morally	   culpable	   unless	  we	  
import	  our	  own	  morally	  defective	  beliefs.	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For	  his	  own	  purposes,	  Hazlett	  utilizes	  an	  example	  offered	   in	  a	  previous	  paper	  by	  Tamar	  
Szabo	  Gendler14	  (2000,	  pp.	  73-­‐4).	  This	  brief	  story	  which	  Gendler	  calls	  The	  Mice	  describes	  a	  
society	   in	   which	   the	   well-­‐off	   white	   mice	   who	   are	   described	   as	   “hardworking	   and	  
industrious”	  look	  down	  upon	  —	  and	  to	  an	  extent,	  support	  —	  the	  lower	  class	  black-­‐mice,	  
who	  are	  in	  turn	  described	  as	  “slothful	  and	  shiftless”	  (Gendler,	  2000,	  p.	  73).	  Gendler’s	  story	  
concludes	  with	  the	  white	  mice	  refusing	  to	  support	  the	  poorer	  black	  mice,	  and	  in	  finishing	  
thus	  makes	  the	  manifested	  attitude	  of	  the	  work	  clear:	  “And	  that	  was	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do.	  
For	   the	  distribution	  of	   resources	   in	   the	  mouse	  world	  reflected	  the	  relative	  merits	  of	   the	  
two	  mouse	  groups.	  All	  the	  mice	  got	  what	  they	  deserved.	  The	  end.”	  (Gendler,	  2000,	  p.	  74).	  
Hazlett	  argues	  that	   if	  we	  respond	  to	  The	  Mice	   in	  the	  way	  that	   is	  obviously	  prescribed	   in	  
the	  previous	  passages,	   then	  we	  have	   responded	   in	   a	  way	   that	   is	  morally	  defective.	  Our	  
response	   is	  morally	   defective,	   he	   argues,	   because	   the	   story	   is	   not	   only	   about	  mice,	   but	  
also	  about	  race,	  class,	  and	  most	  importantly,	  people	  (2009,	  p.	  253).	  Given	  that	  Gendler’s	  
brief	  tale	  is	  anthropomorphic	  in	  nature	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  why	  Hazlett	  might	  fill	  his	  ‘similarity	  
class’	   with	   other	   relevant	   assumptions	   imported	   from	   the	   actual	   world.	   Furthermore,	  
upon	   engaging	   with	   the	   fiction	   he	   assumes	   that	   the	   import/export	   principles	   will	   take	  
effect,	  and	  not	  only	  will	  we	  bestow	  upon	  the	  fictional	  mice	  many	  imported	  human	  traits,	  
but	  we	  will	   also	  —	   in	   responding	   as	   the	  work	   clearly	   prescribes	  —	  export	   the	   ‘fictional	  
truth’	  that	  racial	  and	  class	  disparity	  is	  ‘justified’.	  	  
	  
However,	  it	  can	  be	  objected	  that	  even	  if	  we	  accept	  Hazlett’s	  version	  of	  response	  moralism	  
he	  misses	  something	  important	  about	  the	  way	  we	  might	  import	  and	  export	  propositions	  
from	   fiction,	   if	   indeed	   we	   do	   at	   all,	   and	   that	   with	   further	   exploration	   of	   this	   process	  
response	   moralism	   begins	   to	   falter.	   First,	   the	   argument	   for	   response	   moralism	   fails	   to	  
account	  for	  what	  we	  might	  call	  the	  ‘revision’	  of	  the	  propositions	  we	  assume	  to	  be	  true	  in	  
any	  given	  fiction.	  What	  is	  being	  suggested	  here	  is	  that	  when	  we	  engage	  with	  fictions	  we	  
are	   often	   involved	   in	   something	   akin	   to	   ‘trial	   and	   error’	   where	   importing	   the	   correct	  
background	   assumptions	   is	   concerned.	   It	   may	   be	   that	   when	   we	   assume	   certain	  
propositions	  to	  be	  true	  in	  the	  fictional	  world	  that	  are	  later	  explicitly	  denied	  we	  are	  forced	  
to	  ‘revise’	  our	  background	  assumptions.	  For	  example,	  in	  Peter	  Ackroyd's	  The	  Casebook	  of	  
Victor	  Frankenstein	  (2008)	  we	  assume	  throughout	  that	  Victor	  is	  the	  victim	  of	  his	  creation’s	  
                                                
14	  Gendler	  created	  The	  Mice	  example	  with	  the	  explicit	  intention	  of	  showing	  how	  we	  seem	  to	  resist	  
imagining	  certain	  moral	  perspectives.	  Hazlett's	  goal	  is	  to	  show	  that	  we	  have	  a	  normative	  reason	  to	  resist	  
such	  responses,	  rather	  than	  an	  empirical	  one,	  as	  in	  Gendler's	  original	  argument.	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wrath,	  dogged	  and	  haunted	  by	  both	  the	  murder	  of	  those	  close	  to	  him	  and	  his	  own	  guilt	  for	  
the	  actions	  of	   ‘the	   creature’.	  While	  we	  may	  attribute	   some	  small	   amount	  of	  blame	  and	  
moral	  approbation	  towards	  Victor	  as	  the	  work	  progresses,	  it	  is	  not	  until	  the	  final	  pages	  of	  
the	  novel	  that	  we	  are	  forced	  to	  radically	  revise	  these	  assumptions	  when	  it	  is	  revealed	  that	  
there	   is	   in	   fact	  no	   creature,	  only	   a	  deranged	  and	  murderous	  Victor.	   If	  we	  are	  willing	   to	  
accept	   that	   we	   do	   indeed	   make	   these	   kinds	   of	   background	   assumptions	   during	   our	  
engagement	  with	  fiction,	  then	  something	  like	  this	  kind	  of	  ‘revision’	  must	  occur	  if	  we	  are	  to	  
accurately	  track	  the	  content	  and	  propositions	  of	  the	  work.	  
	  
Such	  revisions	  would	  surely	  also	  be	  made	  in	  the	  case	  of	  ‘fictional	  moral	  truths’,	  such	  as	  the	  
one	  that	  we	  find	   in	  Gendler’s	  The	  Mice.	  Although	  Hazlett	   is	  correct	   in	  assuming	  that	  the	  
fiction	   is	  not	  only	  about	  mice	  but	   is	  also	  about	  people	  and	  race	  (as	  Gendler	  created	  the	  
story	   with	   this	   intention),	   his	   account	   holds	   that	   we	   are	   likely	   to	   begin	   by	   importing	  
certain	  moral	   assumptions	   that	  we	   take	   to	   be	   true	   in	   the	   actual	  world.	  Now,	   if	  we	   are	  
ourselves	   non-­‐racist	   we	   should	   assume	   that	   we	   will	   import	   certain	   moral	   attitudes	  
regarding	  what	  is	  ‘fictionally	  true’	  in	  The	  Mice;	  assumptions	  that	  must	  be	  revised	  once	  the	  
fiction	  makes	  clear	  that	  it	  does	  not	  share	  our	  non-­‐racist	  attitudes.	  Therefore,	  there	  is	  now	  
a	  disparity	  between	  what	  we	  the	  reader	  hold	  to	  be	  true	  in	  the	  ‘actual	  world’,	  and	  what	  the	  
fiction	  claims	  is	  true	  in	  the	  ‘fictional	  world’.	  Given	  that	  by	  Hazlett’s	  account,	  we	  begin	  by	  
importing	  our	  non-­‐racist	  attitude	  (which	  we	  hold	  to	  be	  true	  in	  the	  actual	  world)	  into	  the	  
fiction,	  there	  is	  little	  reason	  to	  suggest	  that	  we	  will	  export	  the	  work’s	  racist	  attitude	  into	  
the	   actual	  world	   (unless,	   of	   course	   the	  work	   convinces	   us	   to	   revise	   our	  moral	   attitude,	  
however,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  necessary	  result).	  The	  reasons	  for	  this	  are	  clearly	  stated	  in	  Hazlett’s	  
own	  formulation	  of	  the	  export	  principle;	  we	  will	  not	  export	  the	  racist	  attitude	  of	  the	  work	  
because	  we	   already	   hold	   it	   to	   be	   false	   in	   the	   actual	  world	   (2009,	   p.	   251).	   Under	   these	  
circumstances,	   Hazlett’s	   response	  moralism	   could	   at	   the	   very	  most,	   hold	   only	   that	   our	  
responses	   towards	   fiction	   are	   morally	   culpable,	   when	   they	   square	   with	   our	   responses	  
towards	  the	  real	  world.	  Yet	  even	  this	  is	  contentious.	  
	  
Furthermore,	  the	  argument	  for	  response	  moralism	  ignores	  the	  fact	  that	  we,	  as	  readers	  of	  
fiction	   are	   widely	   regarded	   as	   being	   sophisticated	   enough	   to	   distinguish	   between	  
responses	   to	   fiction	   and	   responses	   to	   the	   actual	   world	   (Dutton,	   2009)	   (Posner,	   1997)	  
(Patridge,	  2008)	   (Stecker,	  2005b)	   (Harold,	  2006).	   It	   is	   intuitively	  plausible	   that	  we	  could,	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for	  example,	  acknowledge	  that	  The	  Mice	  manifests	  an	  attitude	  which,	  if	  held	  in	  the	  actual	  
world,	  would	   be	   grossly	   immoral;	   yet	   that	  we	   could,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   remain	   able	   to	  
respond	  as	  the	  fiction	  asks,	  limiting	  our	  response	  to	  the	  confines	  of	  the	  fiction.	  That	  is,	  we	  
might	  separate	  our	  fictional	  and	  actual	  responses,	  holding	  the	  former	  to	  be	  fictionally	  true	  
(or	   fictionally	   praiseworthy)	   and	   the	   latter	   to	   be	   actually	   blameworthy.	   In	   his	   last	  
publication,	   Dutton	   claimed	   that	   our	   ability	   to	   distinguish	   between	   the	   ‘real’	   and	   the	  
‘imagined’	  is	  an	  undeniably	  important	  aspect	  of	  such	  experiences,	  and	  one	  that	  he	  claims	  
develops	  with	  great	  accuracy	  at	  an	  early	  age	  of	  cognitive	  development.	  He	  writes:	  
	  
[What’s]	   remarkable	   is	   the	   way	   children	   can	   invoke	   consistent	   rules	   and	  
limitations	   within	   freely	   invented	   yet	   coherent	   fantasy	   worlds.	   What’s	  
more,	   children	   are	   also	   able	   with	   remarkable	   accuracy	   to	   keep	   fantasy	  
worlds	   separate	   from	  one	   another,	   and	   to	   quarantine	  multiple	   imaginary	  
worlds	   from	   the	   actual	   life	   of	   the	   real	  world	   […]	   If	   human	  beings	  did	  not	  
possess	  this	  capacity,	  which	  develops	  spontaneously	  in	  very	  young	  children,	  
the	   mind’s	   ability	   to	   process	   information	   about	   reality	   would	   be	  
systematically	   undercut	   and	   confused	   by	   the	   workings	   of	   imaginative	  
fantasy.	  (2009,	  p.	  107)	  
	  
The	   above	   claim	   is	   empirical	   and	   needs	   to	   be	   supported	   by	   proper	   examination	   and	  
evidence	  if	  it	  is	  to	  persist,	  however	  its	  intuitive	  appeal	  is	  strong.	  There	  may	  also,	  of	  course,	  
be	  situations	  in	  which	  our	  responses	  towards	  fiction	  could	  be	  morally	  condemned	  in	  the	  
way	  that	  Hazlett	  claims.	  For	  example,	  if	  one	  were	  to	  mistake	  The	  Mice	  or	  any	  other	  work	  
prescribing	   morally	   defective	   responses	   as	   being	   non-­‐fictional	   or	   ‘real’,	   then	   a	   person	  
responding	  in	  this	  way	  might	  well	  be	  open	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  criticism	  that	  Hazlett	  proposes.	  
However,	  these	  cases	  only	  square	  with	  response	  moralism	  insofar	  as	  such	  a	  person	  would	  
have	  to	  ‘import’	  this	  morally	  defective	  attitude	  in	  the	  first	  place;	  such	  cases	  do	  not	  show	  
that	   we	  will	   necessarily	   ‘export’	   these	  morally	   defective	   attitudes	   if	   we	   do	   not	   already	  
hold	  them	  to	  be	  true	  in	  the	  real	  world.	  
	  
We	   should	   conclude	   that	   ethicism	   fails	   to	   provide	   arguments	   sufficient	   to	   establish	   its	  
claim	   that	   moral	   defects/merits	   constitute	   aesthetic	   defects/merits.	   The	   moral	   beauty	  
claim	  fails	  to	  convince	  us	  that	  our	  talk	  of	   ‘beautiful’	  character	  traits	   is	  meant	   in	  a	  purely	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aesthetic,	   rather	   than	   metaphorical,	   sense.	   The	   cognitive	   argument	   falls	   short	   of	  
establishing	   both,	   that	   moral	   misunderstanding	   is	   aesthetically	   defective,	   while	   moral	  
understanding	  constitutes	  an	  aesthetic	  merit.	  And	  finally,	  the	  MRA	  fails	  to	  show:	  (1)	  that	  
unethical	  responses	  are	  never	  warranted,	  and	  (2),	  that	  we	  have	  a	  normative	  reason	  not	  to	  
respond	   as	   artworks	   prescribe,	   in	   that	   such	   a	   response	   would	   morally	   defective.	  
Furthermore,	  in	  failing	  to	  establish	  its	  claims	  ethicism	  fails	  to	  establish	  that	  ‘moral	  value’	  




5. Moderate Moralism 
	  
Noel	   Carroll	   has	   argued	   over	   a	   series	   of	   papers	   for	   a	   position	   that	   he	   calls	   ‘moderate	  
moralism’	  (1996,	  1998,	  2000a,	  2003,	  2006,	  2010).	  Carroll	  succinctly	  describes	  his	  position	  
as	  holding	  “[…]	  that	   in	  some	  instances	  a	  moral	  defect	   in	  an	  artwork	  can	  be	  an	  aesthetic	  
defect,	   and	   that	   sometimes	   a	  moral	   virtue	   can	   count	   as	   an	   aesthetic	   virtue.”	   (1998,	   p.	  
419).	   He	   intends	   to	   differentiate	   his	   position	   from	   that	   of	   ethicism,	   claiming	   his	   own	  
thesis	  to	  be	  weaker	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  holding	  that	  moral	  defects	  and	  merits	  only	  sometimes	  
constitute	   aesthetic	   defects	   or	  merits.	   This	   is	   intended	   to	   sharply	   distinguish	  moderate	  
moralism	   from	   the	   ethicist’s	   claim	   that	   moral	   defects	   and	   merits	   always	   constitute	  
aesthetic	   defects	   or	   merits	   (2006,	   p.	   82)15.	   This	   chapter	   will	   examine	   Carroll’s	   central	  
argument	   for	  moderate	  moralism,	   and	  argue	   that	  one	  of	   its	   claims	   introduces	   a	   strong	  
normative	  element	  that	  not	  only	  dissolves	  the	  perceived	  difference	  in	  strength	  between	  
moderate	  moralism	   and	   ethicism,	   but	   also	   begs	   the	   question	   for	   the	   former.	   Then	   an	  
account	   of	   ‘imaginative	   resistance’	   —	   which,	   as	   we	   will	   see,	   is	   crucial	   to	   Carroll’s	  
argument	  for	  moderate	  moralism	  —	  will	  be	  analyzed.	  This	  will	  be	  followed	  by	  a	  number	  
of	  criticisms	  and	  objections	  showing	  why	  this	  central	  concept	  of	  imaginative	  resistance	  is	  
unconvincing.	  
	  
Carroll’s	  primary	  argument	  in	  establishing	  moderate	  moralism	  is	  what	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  
as	  the	  ‘uptake	  argument’;	  and	  like	  Gaut’s	  MRA,	  the	  uptake	  argument	  draws	  attention	  to	  
                                                
15	  Of	  course,	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  Gaut	  has	  argued	  that	  only	  aesthetically	  relevant	  moral	  defects	  
or	  merits	  will	  constitute	  an	  aesthetic	  blemish	  or	  boon.	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art’s	   capacity	   to	   elicit	   emotional	   and	  moral	   responses	   from	   an	   audience.	   As	   previously	  
mentioned,	   Carroll	   holds	   that	   artworks	   require	   us	   to	   “fill	   in	   the	   gaps”	   left	   by	   the	   artist	  
(1998,	  p.	  419).	  This	  process	  of	  ‘filling	  in’	  artworks,	  Carroll	  argues,	  is	  not	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  
fleshing	   out	   the	   details	   of	   the	   story,	   but	   also	   a	   matter	   of	   responding	   in	   a	   way	   which	  
“facilitates	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  work”	  (1998,	  p.	  420).	  He	  claims	  further	  that	  such	  responses	  are	  
the	   result	   of	   ‘formal	   choices’	   made	   by	   the	   artist	   with	   the	   intention	   of	   securing	   the	  
‘uptake’	  of	  specific	  emotional	  and	  moral	  responses,	  which	  Carroll	  claims,	  “secure	  a	  point	  
or	   purpose	  of	   the	  work”	   (2006,	   p.	   85).	  As	   such,	   Carroll	  might	   expect	   that	   a	  horror	   film	  
seeking	  to	  elicit	  fear	  from	  its	  audience	  would	  include	  appropriate	  formal	  choices,	  such	  as	  
(but	  of	  course	  not	  limited	  to):	  poorly	  lit	  rooms,	  drawn	  out	  silences	  punctuated	  by	  sudden	  
loud	  noises,	  gruesome	  or	  graphic	  deaths,	  and	  abject,	  alien,	  or	  supernatural	  antagonists.	  
These	   choices,	   he	   argues,	   would	   have	   been	   included	   purposefully	   and	   specifically	   to	  
secure	   a	   fear-­‐response	   from	   the	   audience	   and	   are	   therefore,	   according	   to	   Carroll,	   a	  
formal	  and	  structural	  property	  of	  the	  film	  (1998,	  p.	  420,	  2006,	  p.	  85-­‐6).	  
	  
Carroll	  argues	  that	  when	  these	  formal	  choices	  are	  poorly	  made	  they	  may	  work	  against,	  or	  
thwart	  uptake	  of,	   the	  response	  mandated	  by	   the	  work.	  Offering	  an	  example,	  he	  writes,	  
“[…]	  if	  a	  putative	  thriller	  presents	  an	  invulnerable	  superhero	  who	  is	  cornered	  by	  a	  ninety-­‐
pound	   weakling,	   it	   will	   fail	   to	   engender	   suspense.	   It	   will	   fail	   to	   engender	   suspense	  
because,	  all	  things	  being	  equal,	  its	  design	  is	  flawed.”	  (1998,	  p.	  420).	  For	  Carroll,	  the	  above	  
formal	  choice	  constitutes	  an	  aesthetic	  defect	  in	  the	  artwork.	  He	  holds	  that	  these	  formal	  
choices	  are	  formal	  properties	  of	  the	  artwork,	  and	  as	  such,	  they	  can	  be	  recognized	  also	  as	  
aesthetic	  properties	   (2006,	  p.	  85).	  Where	  a	   formal	   feature	  of	  an	  artwork	   is	  effective,	  or	  
defective,	   by	   virtue	   of	   its	   helping	   to	   realize,	   or	   impede,	   the	   point	   or	   purpose	   of	   the	  
artwork,	   Carroll	   argues	   that	   it	   will	   further	   count	   as	   an	   aesthetic	   merit	   or	   blemish	  
(respectively)	   (2006,	   p.	   85).	   Furthermore,	   he	   claims	   that	   many	   responses	   sought	   by	  
artworks	  are	  “dependent	  on	  moral	  assessments”	  (1996,	  p.	  420).	  In	  order	  to	  be	  angry,	  for	  
example,	   Carroll	   holds	   that	  we	  must	   believe	   that	   some	   form	   of	  wrong-­‐doing	   has	   been	  
committed	  (1996,	  p.	  420)16.	  Consequently,	  he	  claims	  that	  if	  the	  moral	  perspective	  present	  
in	   an	   artwork	   is	   immoral	   or	   “evil”,	   then	   it	   will	   fail	   to	   secure	   the	   required	   moral	  
assessments	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  required	  response	  from	  the	  audience	  (1996,	  p.	  421).	  He	  
                                                
16	  Carroll’s	  claims	  here	  have	  much	  in	  common	  with	  those	  made	  by	  Gaut	  in	  his	  reply	  Jacobson’s	  ‘warrant	  
objection’.	  (See	  chapter	  4)	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writes,	  “an	  artwork	  may	  fail	   to	  secure	  the	  emotional	   responses	   it	  mandates	  because	   its	  
portrayal	   of	   certain	   characters	   or	   situations	   fails	   to	   fit	   the	   moral	   warranting	   criteria	  
appropriate	   to	   the	   mandated	   emotion.	   And	   one	   way	   it	   can	   fail	   to	   do	   this	   is	   by	   being	  
immoral.”	  (2000a,	  p.	  377).	  This	  claim	  is	  strikingly	  similar	  to	  the	  line	  of	  argument	  that	  Gaut	  
takes	  in	  his	  reply	  to	  Jacobson’s	  ‘warrant	  objection’	  (see	  previous	  chapter).	  
	  
However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  where	  Gaut	  formulates	  his	  version	  of	  ethicism	  along	  
normative	  lines	  —	  arguing	  that	  we	  ought	  not	  to	  respond	  as	  an	  artwork	  prescribes	  if	  that	  
response	  is	  immoral	  —	  Carroll’s	  uptake	  argument	  for	  moderate	  moralism	  makes,	  instead,	  
empirical	  claims	  about	  our	  inability	  to	  respond	  in	  this	  way.	  
	  
Carroll	  argues	  that	  when	  a	  moral	  defect	  is	  present	  in	  a	  work	  of	  art,	  that	  defect	  will	  render	  
the	  audience	  unable	   to	   respond	   in	   the	  manner	  prescribed.	   In	   such	  cases,	  Carroll	   claims	  
that	  the	  immorality	  of	  the	  work’s	  perspective	  will	  “block”	  the	  responses	  mandated	  by	  the	  
work,	  and	   furthermore,	   that	   in	   such	  cases	   the	  work’s	   failure	   to	   secure	   these	  emotional	  
responses	   constitutes	   an	   aesthetic	   defect	   (1998,	   p.	   421).	   In	   order	   to	   show	   how	   an	  
immoral	  perspective	  might	   thwart	   the	  very	   response	   that	   it	  aims	   to	  elicit,	  Carroll	  offers	  
the	  following	  example:	  	  
	  
Imagine	  a	  story	  in	  which	  a	  Himmler	  is	  awarded	  the	  Nobel	  Peace	  Prize.	  This	  
is	  not	  a	  comedy,	  but	   is	  meant	  as	  an	  old-­‐fashioned,	  adulatory	  bio-­‐pic,	   like	  
Dr	  Ehrlich's	  Magic	  Bullet.	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  intended	  to	  elicit	  our	  admiration.	  But	  
it	   cannot	  elicit	   the	  admiration	  of	   the	  morally	   sensitive	  audience	  because,	  
all	   things	  being	  equal,	   the	  proposition	  that	  a	  Himmler	  should	  receive	  the	  
Nobel	  Peace	  Prize	  is	  morally	  offensive.	  The	  morally	  sensitive	  viewer	  cannot	  
get	  her	  mind	  around	  the	  idea	  -­‐	  it	  is	  so	  morally	  obnoxious,	  so	  evil.	  (1998,	  p.	  
421,	  my	  emphasis)	  
	  
Importantly,	  Carroll	  does	  not	  appeal	   to	   just	  any	  audience	  but	   specifically	   to	  one	   that	   is	  
“morally	  sensitive”	  (2000a,	  p.	  378).	  Exactly	  what	  this	  morally	  sensitive	  audience	  consists	  
of	   is	   not	   explored	   or	   explicitly	   stated	   by	   Carroll	   other	   than	   his	   mentioning	   that	   its	  
members	   will	   possess	   a	   “healthy	   moral	   sensibility”	   (2006,	   p.	   86).	   He	   assumes	   that	  
“typically	   artists	   intend	   to	   address	   their	   works	   to	  morally	   sensitive	   audiences”,	   yet	   his	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reasons	  for	  making	  such	  an	  assumption	  also	  remain	  unclear	  (2000a,	  p.	  378).	  However,	  his	  
assertion	  of	  a	  morally	  sensitive	  audience	  does	  clearly	  circumvent	  a	  possible	  objection	  to	  
the	   uptake	   argument,	   namely	   that,	   given	   the	   variety	   of	   social,	   cultural,	   political	   and	  
indeed,	  moral	   beliefs	   that	   are	   globally	   present	   at	   any	   one	   time,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   certain	  
audiences	   will	   respond	   as	   prescribed	   to	   immoral	   artworks	   (for	   example,	   one	   might	  
respond	   with	   admiration	   to	   Himmler	   receiving	   the	   Nobel	   Peace	   Prize).	   In	   such	   cases	  
Carroll	  objects	  that	  the	  audience	  is	  “not	  as	  morally	  sensitive	  as	  they	  should	  be”	  (2000a,	  p.	  
378).	   Rather,	   Carroll's	   morally	   sensitive	   audience	   will	   always	   react	   in	   an	   ‘appropriate’	  
manner	  when	  confronted	  with	  moral	  virtues,	  and	  will	  always	  be	  unwilling	  to	  respond	  in	  
any	   immoral	   or	   ‘inappropriate’	   fashion;	   an	   assertion	   which	   effectively	   leaves	   Carroll	  
begging	  the	  question	  for	  moderate	  moralism.	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	   its	   reliance	  on	  a	  morally	   sensitive	  audience,	  Carroll’s	  
‘moderate’	  position	   turns	  out	   to	  be	  no	  more	  moderate	   in	   regards	   to	   the	  strength	  of	   its	  
claims	   than	   Gaut’s	   ethicism.	   All	   moral	   defects	   that	   the	   morally	   sensitive	   audience	  
encounter	   result	   in	   a	   failure	   to	   secure	   emotional	   and	   psychological	   uptake.	   The	   only	  
exception	  for	  Carroll	  comes	  by	  the	  way	  of	  moral	  defects	  so	  subtle	  that	  a	  morally	  sensitive	  
audience	   will	   fail	   to	   identify	   them.	   In	   cases	   where	   these	   subtle	   defects	   exist,	   Carroll	  
argues:	  	  
	  
Morally	   defective	  portrayals	  may	  elude	  even	  morally	   sensitive	   audiences	  
and	  may	  require	  careful	  interpretation	  in	  order	  to	  be	  unearthed.	  Of	  course	  
once	  they	  are	  excavated,	  they	  can	  be	  ethically	  criticized.	  But	  the	  moderate	  
moralist	   will	   not,	   in	   addition,	   criticize	   them	   aesthetically,	   if	   they	   are	   so	  
subtle	   as	   to	   escape	   a	  morally	   sensitive	   audience.	  Moderate	  moralism	   is	  
not,	   then,	   committed	   to	   the	   proposition	   that	   every	   moral	   defect	   in	   an	  
artwork	  is	  an	  aesthetic	  defect.	  (2000a,	  p.	  378)	  
	  
Yet	  moral	  defects	  so	  subtle	  that	  they	  elude	  this	  sensitive	  audience	  are	  not	  aesthetically	  
relevant	   by	  Carroll’s	   account,	   as	   they	  neither	   secure	  nor	   subvert	   the	   aims	  of	   the	  work.	  
Yet,	   all	   other	   moral	   defects	   and	   virtues,	   that	   is,	   those	   that	   are	   ‘detected’	   by	   Carroll’s	  
audience,	  are	  claimed	   to	  be	  aesthetically	   relevant	  by	  means	  of	   their	   role	   in	   securing	  or	  
subverting	   certain	   responses.	   Hence,	   the	   inclusion	   of	   a	   normatively	   specified	   audience	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forces	  moderate	  moralism	  to	  hold	  that	  all	  aesthetically	  relevant	  moral	  defects	  and	  merits	  
constitute	   aesthetic	   defects	   and	   merits,	   respectively.	   Consequently,	   the	   moderate	  
moralist	   thesis	   stands	   alongside	   ethicism	   in	   measure	   of	   the	   scope	   of	   its	   claims.	  
Furthermore,	  it	  looks	  as	  if	  Carroll	  has	  no	  easy	  way	  out	  of	  this	  corner.	  If	  he	  decides	  not	  to	  
rely	   only	   on	   the	   responses	   of	   a	   morally	   sensitive	   audience	   then	   he	   must	   rely	   on	   the	  
responses	  of	  actual	  ones;	  actual	  audiences	  that	  would	  be	  free	  to	  respond	  as	  they	  saw	  fit	  
to	   an	   artwork’s	   immoral	   perspectives,	   and	  whose	   responses	  would	   surely	   at	   times	   run	  
contrary	  to	  the	  claims	  of	  Carroll’s	  uptake	  argument.	  Here,	  Carroll	  must	  choose	  between	  a	  
morally	   sensitive	   audience	   that	   has	   his	   thesis	   begging	   the	   question,	   or	   as	   Conolly	   puts	  
nicely,	  “the	  vista	  of	  an	  objectionable	  relativism”	  that	  opens	  up	  in	  attempting	  to	  account	  
for	  the	  responses	  of	  an	  ‘actual’	  audience	  (2000,	  p.	  307).	  
	  
5.1. Imaginative Resistance 
	  
Although	  Carroll’s	  reliance	  on	  a	  morally	  sensitive	  audience	  shifts	  the	  scope	  of	  his	  position	  
closer	   to	   that	   of	   ethicism,	   the	  method	   by	  which	   Carroll	   argues	   that	  moral	   defects	   and	  
merits	   constitute	  aesthetic	  defects	  and	  merits	  differs	   significantly	   from	  Gaut’s;	   and	   it	   is	  
therefore	   important	   that	   we	   examine	   this.	   As	   established,	   Carroll’s	   uptake	   argument	  
holds	  that	  the	  audience	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  respond	  as	  prescribed	  where	  immoral	  responses	  
are	   called	   for.	   This	   empirical	   claim	   stands	   apart	   from	   those	   claims	   defended	   in	   Gaut’s	  
MRA,	   which	   instead	   has	   as	   its	   focus	   the	   normative	   claim	   that	   audiences	   ought	   not	   to	  
respond	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  immoral.	  Carroll’s	  crucial	  claim	  that	  we	  are	  unable	  to	  respond	  in	  
ways	  that	  are	  morally	  defective	  has	  been	  defended	  by	  Kendall	  Walton	  elsewhere	  (1994),	  
and	   is	   often	   broadly	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘imaginative	   resistance’17.	   If	   Carroll	   is	   correct	   that	  
morally	  defective	  prescriptions	  will	  always	  block	  the	  responses	  that	  they	  seek	  to	  secure,	  
or	   in	   other	   words,	   that	   they	   will	   always	   result	   in	   ‘imaginative	   failure’,	   then	   moderate	  
moralism	  will	  have	  a	  strong	  empirical	  argument	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  moral	  defects	  
constitute	   aesthetic	   defects.	   In	   what	   follows	   the	   general	   problem	   of	   imaginative	  
resistance	  will	  be	  outlined	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  Walton’s	  influential	  account	  of	  the	  matter	  
and	  how	  it	  relates	  to	  Carroll’s	  general	  argument.	  Then,	  a	  number	  of	  concerns	  regarding	  
both	  Walton’s	   account	   and	   the	   phenomenon	   itself	  will	   be	   raised.	   In	   doing	   so	   it	   should	  
                                                
17	  For	  a	  more	  in	  depth	  account	  of	  ‘imaginative	  resistance’	  and	  some	  of	  its	  criticisms,	  see:	  (Walton,	  1994),	  
(Tanner,	  1994),	  (Moran,	  1994),	  (Mothersill,	  2002),	  (Gendler,	  2000),	  (Stock,	  2005),	  (Todd,	  2009),	  and	  
(Weatherston,	  2004).	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become	   clear	   that	   Carroll’s	   claim	   that	   we	   are	   “unable”	   to	   psychologically	   entertain	  
morally	  defective	  imaginings,	  is	  unsubstantiated.	  
	  
First,	   it	   must	   be	   noted	   that	   much	   of	   the	   literature	   concerning	   the	   phenomenon	   of	  
imaginative	   resistance	   tends	   to	  distinguish	  between,	  and	  deal	  with	  both,	  an	   inability	   to	  
imagine	  and	  an	  unwillingness	  to	  imagine.	  Yet,	  Carroll’s	  claim	  entails	  only	  the	  former	  and	  
therefore	  my	   attention	  will	   be	   directed	   primarily	   at	   this	   ‘inability’	   claim.	  Carroll	   clearly	  
states	   that	   he	   sees	   the	   problem	   as	   being	   one	   of	   ‘imaginative	   failure’	   rather	   than	   an	  
unwillingness	  to	  imagine,	  he	  writes;	  “[…]	  the	  reluctance	  that	  the	  moderate	  moralist	  has	  in	  
mind	   is	  not	   that	   the	   ideally	   sensitive	   audience	  member	   voluntarily	  puts	  on	   the	  brakes”	  
(2000a,	   p.	   379,	   my	   emphasis).	   Furthermore,	   this	   weaker	   claim	   regarding	   the	  
‘unwillingness’	   of	   the	   audience	   to	   respond	   in	   a	   morally	   defective	   way	   is	   cut-­‐off	   from	  
Carroll	  by	  means	  of	  a	  possible	  objection.	  The	  complaint	  is,	  that	  an	  audience	  that	  remains	  
unwilling	  to	  even	  attempt	  to	  imagine	  as	  the	  work	  prescribes	  is	  in	  no	  real	  position	  to	  judge	  
the	  aesthetic	  value	  of	  that	  work18	  (Jacobson,	  1997,	  p.	  189).	  Carroll	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  this	  
‘unwillingness’	  is	  not	  what	  he	  intends	  to	  pursue,	  writing:	  
	  
For	   if	   the	  reluctance	  here	   is	  akin	  to	  that	  of	  a	  person	  who	  turns	  off	  when	  
encountering	  a	  racist	  joke	  and	  refuses,	  in	  principle,	  to	  laugh,	  then	  it	  seems	  
that	   that	   person	   has	   simply	   made	   whatever	   the	   work	   has	   to	   offer	  
inaccessible	  to	  himself.	  And	  if	  what	  the	  work	  has	  to	  offer	  is	  inaccessible	  to	  
that	  person,	  he	   is	   in	  no	  position	   to	   judge	   the	  work	  aesthetically	   since	  he	  
has	  not	  experienced	  it	  fully.	  (2000a,	  p.	  379)	  
	  
The	  concern	  here	  is	  that	  Carroll’s	  argument	  considers	  a	  failure	  to	  secure	  ‘emotive	  uptake’	  
as	  an	  aesthetic	  defect,	  based	  on	  the	  failure	  of	  certain	  ‘formal	  choices’	  that	  are	  intended	  
to	  elicit	   specific	   emotional	   responses.	  However,	   someone	  who	   is	   ‘unwilling’	   to	   respond	  
cannot	  stand	  as	  testament	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  these	  formal	  choices,	  as	  they	  have	  ‘opted	  out’	  
of	  the	  emotional	  response,	  rather	  than	  ‘failed’	  to	  experience	  it.	  As	  shown,	  Carroll	  avoids	  
this	   objection	   by	   endorsing	   the	   claim	   that	   when	   faced	   with	   morally	   reprehensible	  
artworks	   the	  audience	  will	   find	   the	  moral	  perspective	   ‘unintelligible’,	  and	  will	   therefore	  
be	  unable	  to	  respond	  in	  the	  manner	  mandated	  by	  the	  work.	  
                                                
18	  This	  objection	  is	  offered	  by	  Jacobson	  (1997,	  p.	  189),	  and	  is	  acknowledged	  by	  Carroll	  (2000,	  p.	  379)	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Walton	  (1994)	  has	  argued	  that	  there	  are	  certain	  fictional	  propositions	  that	  we	  may	  find	  
impossible	  to	   imagine	  as	  being	  fictionally	  true,	  and	  furthermore,	  that	  these	  problematic	  
propositions	  are	  often	  moral	  in	  nature.	  “We	  usually	  don't	  flinch”,	  he	  writes,	  “at	  imagining	  
accepting	   as	   true	   non-­‐moral	   propositions	   that	   we	   firmly	   believe	   to	   be	   false:	   the	  
proposition	  that	  there	  is	  a	  ring	  that	  makes	  its	  wearer	  invisible,	  or	  that	  a	  village	  in	  Scotland	  
appears	   and	   disappears	   every	   hundred	   years”	   (1994,	   p.	   31).	   However	   when	   fictions	  
present	   us	   with	  moral	   propositions	   that	   diverge	   significantly	   from	   our	   own	   real	   world	  
moral	  beliefs,	  Walton	  argues	  that	  unlike	  the	  non-­‐moral,	  case	  we	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  accept	  
these	  principles	  as	  being	  ‘true’	  in	  the	  fiction.	  In	  such	  cases,	  he	  writes:	  
	  
When	  it	  comes	  to	  moral	  matters	  (moral	  principles	  anyway),	  however,	  I	  am	  
more	   inclined	   to	   stick	   to	   my	   guns,	   and	   it	   seems	   to	   me	   that	   most	  
interpreters	   are	   also.	   I	   judge	   characters	   by	   the	  moral	   standards	   I	  myself	  
use	   in	   real	   life.	   I	   condemn	   characters	   who	   abandon	   their	   children	   or	  
engage	  in	  genocide,	  and	  I	  don't	  change	  my	  mind	  if	  I	  learn	  that	  the	  author	  
(and	   the	   society	   he	  was	  writing	   for)	   considered	   genocide	   or	   abandoning	  
one’s	  children	  morally	  acceptable,	  and	  expected	  readers	  to	  think	  this	  is	  so	  
in	   the	  world	   of	   the	   story.	   If	   the	   author	   is	  wrong	   about	   life,	   he	   is	  wrong	  
about	  the	  world	  of	  his	  story	  (1994,	  p.	  37,	  my	  emphasis).	  	  
	  
Thus,	  Walton	  is	  sceptical	  as	  to	  whether	  an	  author	  possesses	  the	  authority	  to	  dictate	  the	  
morality	   of	   their	   fictional	   worlds.	   Of	   course,	   he	   admits,	   they	   may	   create	   a	   world	  
populated	  by	  a	  civilization	  that	  considers	  a	  racial	  caste	  system	  to	  be	  ‘moral’,	  however,	  he	  
doubts	   that	   it	   could	   be	   fictionally	   true	   that	   they	   are	   “right”	   (1994,	   p.	   37).	   This	   point	   is	  
expressed	  more	  clearly	  by	  Todd,	  who	  writes:	  “[…]	  the	  difficulty	  lies	  not	  in	  any	  purported	  
resistance	  to	  imagining	  offensive	  fictional	  moral	  perspectives,	  entertaining	  in	  imagination	  
alien	  moral	   sentiments,	   or	   even	   imagining	  oneself	   holding	  perverted	  moral	   beliefs.	   The	  
problem	   concerns	   our	   imagining	   the	   truth	   of	   certain	   fictional	   moral	   propositions	   […]”	  
(2009,	  p.	  189,	  his	  emphasis).	  	  
	  
With	  an	  example	  intended	  to	  highlight	  this	  problem	  Walton	  claims	  that	  if	  an	  author	  were	  
to	  present	  us	  with	  the	  sentence,	  “In	  killing	  her	  baby,	  Giselda	  did	  the	  right	  thing;	  after	  all,	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it	  was	  a	  girl”	   (1994,	  p.	  37),	  we	  would	  not	  only	  condemn	  the	   immorality	  of	  the	  narrator,	  
but	  also	  find	  ourselves	  completely	  unable	  to	  imagine	  that	  in	  the	  proposed	  fictional	  world	  
the	   moral	   goodness	   of	   infanticide	   is	   fictionally	   true	   (1994,	   p.	   38).	   Likewise,	   Walton	  
believes	  the	  sentence:	  “The	  village	  elders	  did	  their	  duty	  before	  God	  by	  forcing	  the	  widow	  
onto	  her	  husband’s	  funeral	  pyre”,	  will	  result	  in	  imaginative	  failure	  (1994,	  p.	  37).	  
	  
In	  his	  defence	  of	  the	  uptake	  argument	  Carroll	  offers	  similar	  examples	  of	  artworks,	  which	  
he	   argues	  would,	  were	   they	   real,	   result	   in	   imaginative	   failure.	  Unlike	  Walton	   however,	  
Carroll’s	  examples	  do	  not	  consist	  merely	  of	  single	  propositions.	  Instead,	  he	  offers	  us	  short	  
descriptions	  of	  postulated	  artworks	  and	   includes	   some	  of	   their	   ‘formal	   features’	   (which	  
Carroll	  argues	  are	  purposefully	  chosen),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  responses	  that	  they	  seek	  to	  elicit	  
from	  the	  audience.	  We	  have	  already	  encountered	  one	  such	  example,	  (Carroll’s	  ‘Himmler	  
and	  the	  Nobel	  Peace	  Prize’)	  and	  now	  two	  further	  examples	  will	  be	  provided	  so	  that	  we	  
may	  investigate	  whether	  —	  and	  if	  so	  why	  —	  these	  postulated	  works	  of	  art	  might	  result	  in	  
an	  imaginative	  failure.	  
	  
First,	  Carroll	  offers	  an	  alternative	  literary	  example	  that	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  here	  as	  the	  Sadistic	  
colonizer	  example.	  He	  describes	  it	  as	  follows:	  
	  
Imagine	  that	  a	  novel	  calls	  upon	  audiences	  to	  deliver	  the	  moral	  sentiment	  
of	  admiration	  for	  a	  sadistic	  colonizer	  who	  cruelly	  and	  relentlessly	  tortures	  
every	  Indian	  he	  encounters,	  not	  only	  braves	  but	  women	  and	  children.	  He	  
presumes	  the	  moral	  rightness	  of	  his	  actions	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  his	  victims	  
are	  vermin	  and	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  novel	  concurs	  (2000a,	  p.	  377).	  
	  
Second,	  Carroll	  gives	  us	  an	  example	  of	  a	  painting	  that	  he	  refers	  to	  as	  Saviour:	  
	  
[…]	   imagine	  a	  painting	  of	  Hitler’s	  dead	  body	  being	   lowered	  by	  SS	  officers	  
into	  a	  pit	  where	   it	  will	   then	  be	   incinerated	   in	  a	   looming	  fire.	  Suppose,	  as	  
well,	   that	   the	   disposition	   of	   Hitler’s	   limbs	   and	   the	   portrayal	   of	   the	   SS	  
officers	   unmistakably	   allude	   to	   certain	   Renaissance	   paintings	   of	   Christ’s	  
descent	   from	   the	   cross.	   Hitler’s	   arms	   and	   legs	   take	   on	   a	   cruciform	  
configuration	  and	  the	  encroaching	  flames	  remind	  us	  of	  hell,	  one	  of	  Christ’s	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scheduled	   destinations	   after	   shaking	   of	   his	   earthly	   coil.	  Moreover,	   if	   the	  
pictorial	   allusions	   are	   not	   enough,	   the	   title	   clinches	   it	   –	   the	   painting	   is	  
called	  Saviour	  (2006,	  p.	  84).	  
	  
Like	  Walton,	  Carroll	  firmly	  holds	  that	  these	  examples	  will	  result	  in	  the	  audience	  becoming	  
morally	   and	   psychologically	   stranded,	   on	   account	   that	   the	  work	  will	   proceed	   on	  moral	  
ground	  that	  the	  audience	  is	  unable	  to	  tread.	  In	  cases	  such	  as	  this	  Carroll	   insists	  that	  the	  
audience	  will	  be	  rendered,	  “[…]	  unable	  to	  get	  their	  minds	  around	  the	  idea	  –	  it	  will	  strike	  
them	  as	  downright	  morally	  outrageous,	  a	  veritable	  ethical	  category	  error”	  (2006,	  p.	  84).	  
	  	  	  	  	  
Before	  we	   proceed	   it	   should	   be	  made	   clear	   that	   almost	   every	   specimen	   offered	   as	   an	  
example	  of	  a	  fictional	  proposition	  that	  is	  either	  impossible,	  or	  at	  the	  very	  least	  extremely	  
difficult	   to	   imagine,	   are	   creations	   of	   philosophy	   rather	   than	   art	   or	   literature.	   In	   cases	  
where	  actual	  works	  of	  art	  or	  literature	  are	  indeed	  used	  the	  philosopher	  often	  alters	  them	  
in	  one	  way	  or	  another	  in	  order	  to	  provoke	  an	  instance	  of	  such	  resistance.	  Richard	  Moran,	  
for	  example,	  offers	  an	  altered	  account	  of	  Macbeth	  in	  which	  we	  are	  prescribed	  to	  respond	  
with	  “relief”	  at	  the	  murder	  of	  Duncan,	  rather	  than	  with	  the	  usual	  responses	  of	  horror	  or	  
anger	  (1994,	  p.	  95).	  In	  regards	  to	  rarity	  of	  examples	  from	  the	  art	  world	  itself	  both	  Carroll	  
and	  Walton	   offer	   Leni	   Riefenstahl’s	  Triumph	   of	   the	  Will	  as	   an	   existing	   example,	  which,	  
they	  claim,	  will	  render	  the	  audience	  unable	  to	  respond	  with	  the	  admiration	  that	  the	  film	  
mandates.	  However,	   the	   list	  of	  actual	  artistic	  examples	   remains	  surprisingly	  brief	   in	   the	  
literature	  supporting	  imaginative	  resistance19.	  	  
	  
For	   Walton	   our	   inability	   or	   unwillingness	   to	   imagine	   (he	   fails	   to	   clearly	   distinguish	  
between	  the	   two)	  occurs	  when	  we	  are	  unable	   to	  avoid	  application	  of	  what	  he	  calls	   the	  
‘reality	  principle’.	  Succinctly	  described,	  the	  ‘reality	  principle’	  holds	  that	  we	  should	  imagine	  
fictional	  worlds	   to	   be	   as	  much	   like	   the	   real	  world	   as	   possible	   in	   cases	  where	   the	  work	  
does	  not	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly	  make	  things	  otherwise	  (1990,	  p.	  144),	  (1994,	  p.	  36)20.	  This	  
principle	   looks	   to	   have	   inspired	   part	   of	   Hazlett’s	   argument	   for	   response	  moralism	   (see	  
                                                
19	  Other	  examples	  include	  American	  Psycho	  and	  Birth	  of	  a	  Nation,	  The	  Merchant	  of	  Venice,	  120	  Days	  of	  
Sodom,	  and	  Juliette.	  However,	  all	  of	  these	  examples	  rely	  on	  a	  specific	  interpretation	  of	  the	  moral	  
perspectives	  and	  mandates	  present	  in	  the	  works,	  which	  often	  become	  the	  focus	  of	  debate.	  
20For	  my	  purposes	  a	  brief	  account	  of	  Walton’s	  reality	  principle	  is	  sufficient,	  however,	  see	  Walton’s	  Mimesis	  
as	  Make-­‐Believe,	  pp.	  144-­‐150	  for	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  how	  explicit	  fictional	  propositions	  generate	  
other,	  implicit,	  propositions.	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previous	  chapter),	  although	  this	  is	  not	  explicitly	  stated.	  It	  is	  also	  similar	  to	  Carroll’s	  (1998)	  
notion	  of	  ‘filling	  out’	  artworks	  inasmuch	  as	  they	  both	  attempt	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  grey	  area	  
between	  what	  is	  supplied	  by	  the	  author,	  and	  what	  is	  supplied	  instead	  by	  audience,	  when	  
it	   comes	   to	   fictional	   works	   of	   art.	   Walton	   believes	   that	   when	   an	   author	   attempts	   to	  
stipulate	  —	  either	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly	  —	  a	  set	  of	  moral	  principles	  that	  deviate	  from	  our	  
own	  we	  will	  be	  unwilling	  to	  “give	  up”	  the	  reality	  principle,	  and	  will	   instead	  be	  unable	  to	  
imagine	   the	   fictional	   truth	   of	   such	  moral	   principles	   (1994,	   p.	   37).	   This	   notion	   of	   being	  
unable	   to	   ‘override’	   the	   reality	   principle	   is	   analogous	   to	   Carroll’s	   own	   description	   of	  
imaginative	  failure.	  He	  writes,	  
	  
[…]	  the	  reluctance	  that	  the	  moderate	  moralist	  has	  in	  mind	  is	  not	  that	  the	  
ideally	  sensitive	  audience	  member	  voluntarily	  puts	  on	  the	  brakes;	  rather	  it	  
is	  that	  he	  can’t	  depress	  the	  accelerator	  because	  it	  is	  jammed.	  He	  tries,	  but	  
fails.	  And	  he	  fails	  because	  there	  is	  something	  wrong	  with	  the	  structure	  of	  
the	  artwork.	   It	  has	  not	  been	  designed	  properly	  on	  its	  own	  terms.	  (2000a,	  
p.	  379)	  	  
	  
Walton	  suggests	  that	  part	  of	  the	  answer	  as	  to	  why	  we	  are	  unwilling	  to	  set	  aside	  the	  reality	  
principle,	  and	  are	  therefore	  unable	  to	  allow	  the	  fictional	  truth	  of	  certain	  moral	  principles,	  
rests	   with	   the	   idea	   that	   certain	   evaluative	   properties	   —	   such	   as	   ‘funny’	   or	   moral	  
properties	  like	  ‘good’	  and	  ‘bad’	  —	  “depend	  or	  supervene	  on	  ‘natural’	  [properties]”	  (1994,	  
p.	   45).	   These	   natural	   properties	   and	   characteristics	   along	   with	   their	   “relationships	   of	  
dependence”	  cannot,	  he	  suspects,	  “easily	  be	  different	   in	  fictional	  worlds	  and	  in	  the	  real	  
one”	   (1994,	   p.	   44).	   Exactly	  what	   these	   supervenience	   relationships	   consist	   of	   and	  why	  
they	  cannot	  be	  altered	  between	  the	  real,	  and	  fictional	  worlds,	  are	  questions	  that	  Walton	  
takes	  to	  remain	  a	  mystery	  (1994,	  p.	  44).	  	  
	  
It	   might	   be	   objected	   here	   that	   this	   notion	   of	   supervenience,	   as	   Walton	   describes	   it,	  
implies	   that	  we	  would	  be	   left	  unable	   to	  understand	  or	  see	  any	  possible	   justification	   for	  
the	  divergent	  moral	  beliefs	  of	  other	  people.	  Yet	  as	  Gendler	  points	  out	  we	  are	  often	  willing	  
to	  admit	   that	   some	  of	  our	  moral	   judgements	   could	  be	  wrong,	   and	   to	  do	   this,	  we	  must	  
accept	  that	  our	  assessment	  of	  these	  supervenience	  relationships	  is	  fallible	  (2000,	  p.	  65).	  
The	   point	   here	   is	   that	   if	   we	   can	   accept	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   different	   set	   of	   such	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relationships	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  we	  should	  also	  be	  capable	  of	  doing	  so	  in	  fictional	  worlds;	  a	  
point	  that	  runs	  contrary	  to	  Walton’s	  account	  of	  imaginative	  failure.	  
	  
Where	   moral	   properties	   are	   concerned,	   Walton	   seems	   to	   believe	   that	   our	   failure	   to	  
imagine	  when	  confronted	  with	  the	  ‘Giselda’	  or	  ‘Elders’	  cases	  arises	  because	  our	  notion	  of	  
‘evil’	  or	  ‘bad’	  supervenes	  upon	  the	  actions	  that	  constitute	  infanticide,	  genocide,	  slavery,	  
forced	   immolation,	   or	   other	  morally	   despicable	   practices.	  Michael	   Tanner	   has	   not	   only	  
challenged	   this	   idea,	   claiming	   instead	   that	   such	   ideas,	   “[…]	   are	   not	   so	   much	   activities	  
upon	  which	  evil	  supervenes,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  evil”	  (1994,	  p.	  60),	  but	  has	  also,	  
along	  with	   others,	   attacked	   the	   examples	   intended	   to	   provoke	   imaginative	   failure	   that	  
have	  been	  created	  by	  the	  likes	  of	  Walton	  and	  Carroll.	  
	  
Objections	   raised	   by	   Tanner	   (1994),	   Todd	   (2009),	   Mothersill	   (2006),	   Stock	   (2005),	   and	  
Gendler	   (2000)	  all	  draw	  attention	   to	  what	   they	   take	   to	  be	  a	  major	  problem	  concerning	  
Walton’s	  choice	  of	  examples;	  specifically,	  that	  they	  lack	  any	  form	  of	  supporting	  context.	  
We	   cannot,	   they	   rightfully	   argue,	   imagine	   a	   world	   in	   which	   infanticide	   or	   forced	  
immolation	  is	  morally	  good	  without	  any	  further	  context	  to	  justify	  or	  render	  these	  moral	  
principles	  coherent.	  If	  Walton’s	  example,	  “In	  killing	  her	  baby,	  Giselda	  did	  the	  right	  thing;	  
after	   all,	   it	  was	  a	   girl”	   (1994,	  p.	   37),	   causes	   imaginative	   failure,	  or	   even	   just	   resistance,	  
then	   this	   is	   not	   primarily	   due	   to	   its	   transgression	   of	   conceptual	   properties	   or	  
supervenience	   relationships,	   but	   rather,	   due	   to	   its	   lack	   of	   a	   relevant	   and	   intelligible	  
context.	  As	  Mothersill	  notes,	  “A	  novel	  may	  depict	  genocide	  or	  slavery	  in	  a	  favourable	  light	  
but	  its	  author	  is	  unlikely	  to	  write:	  ‘I	  approve	  of	  genocide	  (or	  slavery)’”	  (2002,	  p.	  78).	  When	  
a	   supporting	   context	   is	   offered	   to	   supplement	   Walton’s	   examples,	   the	   problem	   of	  
imaginative	  failure	  all	  but	  vanishes.	  	  
	  
Even	  with	  only	  minor	  alterations	  these	  propositions	  seem	  to	  be	  much	  easier	  to	  process,	  
and	   we	   can	   imagine	   holding	   them	   as	   being	   ‘fictionally	   true’	   in	   some	   fictional	   world.	  
Consider	  the	  following	  examples21:	  
	  
                                                
21	  Gendler	  also	  offers	  two	  examples	  that	  she	  believes	  dissolve	  the	  imaginative	  resistance	  surrounding	  
Carroll’s	  ‘Giselda’	  example.	  However,	  her	  examples	  differ	  from	  mine,	  on	  account	  that	  where	  I	  add	  
further	  contextual	  information,	  she	  alters	  the	  original	  proposition	  (switching	  ‘girl’	  for	  ‘changeling’	  and	  
‘was	  born	  on	  the	  January	  19)	  (2000,	  p.	  75).	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1. ‘In	  killing	  her	  baby,	  Giselda	  did	  the	  right	  thing;	  after	  all,	   it	  was	  a	  girl.	  And	  Giselda	  
knew	  too	  well	  the	  horror	  that	  her	  daughter	  would	  face	  if	  she	  were	  allowed	  to	  live.’	  
	  
Or	  slightly	  more	  subtle:	  
	  
2. ‘In	  killing	  her	  baby,	  Giselda	  did	  the	  right	  thing;	  after	  all,	  it	  was	  a	  girl.	  And	  on	  planet	  
Vhorn	  this	  was	  unacceptable.’	  
	  
Here,	   through	   the	   inclusion	   of	   only	   a	   minimal	   amount	   of	   context,	   Walton’s	   Giselda	  
example	  becomes	   (at	   least	   for	  me)	  easy	   to	   imagine.	   In	  addition,	   Todd	   suggests	   that	  on	  
encountering	   Walton’s	   original	   propositions	   our	   initial	   reaction	   might	   not	   be	   to	   resist	  
imagining	  that	  the	  actions	  of	  Giselda	  or	  the	  village	  elders	  were	  morally	  praiseworthy,	  but	  
rather,	  to	  try	  and	  imagine	  what	  kind	  of	  context	  might	   justify	  such	  a	  statement	  (2009,	  p.	  
208).	  Of	   course,	  while	   this	   strategy	  might	  work	   for	  Walton’s	   truncated	  examples,	  when	  
engaging	  with	  a	  complete	   fictional	  story	  we	  would	  not	   likely	  have	  the	  creative	  authority	  
to	   ‘import’	   our	   own	   intelligible	   context	   in	   order	   to	   make	   sense	   of	   dubious	   moral	  
propositions.	   Instead,	   we	   would	   expect	   the	   author	   to	   supply	   us	   (either	   explicitly	   or	  
implicitly)	  with	  sufficient	  reasons	  to	  imagine	  and	  respond	  as	  prescribed.	  	  
	  
It	  may	  be	  for	  this	  very	  reason	  that	  Carroll’s	  examples	  are	  less	  prone	  to	  the	  above	  form	  of	  
dismissal.	   Carroll’s	   examples	   consist	   not	   only	   of	   a	   single	   proposition	   but	   rather	   of	   a	  
description	  which	  is	  intended	  to	  firmly	  fix	  the	  context,	  intended	  response,	  and	  with	  it	  the	  
moral	   deviance,	   of	   the	   fictional	   work.	   Assuming	   that	   Carroll	   intends	   both	   Hitler	   and	  
Himmler	   to	  be	  exactly	   the	  same	   in	   the	   fictional	  world	   (by	  means	  of	   their	  character	  and	  
actions)	  as	  they	  were	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  then	  we	  are	  given	  little	  room	  for	  interpretation	  in	  
any	  of	  his	  examples.	  Added	  to	  this	  is	  the	  assumption	  that	  Carroll	  intends	  his	  examples	  to	  
be	  set	   in	  this	  world;	   that	   is,	   the	  world	  of	  his	  examples	   is	  as	  much	   like	  the	  real	  world	  as	  
possible	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  specific	  changes	  that	  Carroll	  himself	  has	  made22.	  These	  
changes	  roughly	  consist	  of	  the	  following	  propositions:	   ‘Himmler	  deserves	  a	  Nobel	  Peace	  
Prize’	   (1998,	   p.	   421),	   ‘Hitler	   gave	   his	   life	   for	   the	   greater	   good	   and	   should	   be	   revered’	  
(2006,	  p.	  84),	  and	   ‘American	   Indians	  are	  vermin	   that	  deserve	   to	  be	   tortured’	   (2000a,	  p.	  
377).	  Again,	  given	  that	  the	  fictional	  world	  of	  these	  examples	  is	  almost	  identical	  to	  the	  real	  
                                                
22	  Walton	  would	  likely	  see	  this	  as	  being	  a	  strong	  case	  in	  which	  his	  ‘reality	  principle’	  would	  apply.	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world	   it	   becomes	   difficult	   for	   us	   to	   find	   any	   intelligible	   reasons	   to	   accept	   that	   these	  
propositions	  are	  fictionally	  true,	  without	  any	  significant	  alteration	  of	  the	  context.	  Hence,	  
Carroll’s	  examples	  seem	  at	  this	  point	  to	  suggest	  that	  we	  will	  find	  ourselves	  either	  unable	  
or	   unwilling	   to	   imagine	   the	   fictional	   truth	   of	   deviant	   moral	   propositions,	   where	  
justification	  is	  either	  not	  present	  or	  unable	  to	  be	  supplied.	  Kathleen	  Stock	  acknowledges	  
the	  problematic	  nature	  of	  propositions	  such	  as	   those	   found	   in	  Carroll’s	  examples23.	  She	  
writes:	  
	  
[…]	  certain	  propositions	  which	  prompt	  imaginative	  failure,	  yet	  for	  which	  it	  
is	  not	   the	  case	   that	   the	  reader	   is	  unsure	  about	  what	  context	   to	  posit	   for	  
them	  –	  where,	   for	   instance,	  we	  already	  have	  detailed	   information	  about	  
which	  context	  is	  being	  fictionally	  posited,	  and	  this	  is	  such	  that	  the	  moral	  or	  
other	   judgement	   employed	   by	   the	   relevant	   proposition	   is	  
straightforwardly	  incompatible	  with	  that	  context	  (2005,	  p.	  623)	  	  
	  
Because	   of	   this	   contextual	   constraint,	   she	   argues	   that	   these	   examples	   will	   cause	  
imaginative	   failure	   through	   their	   conceptual	   impossibility	   (2005,	   p.	   623).	   Stock’s	   view	  
implies	   that	   the	   concepts	   of	   ‘imaginative	   failure’	   and	   ‘fictional	   truth’	   are	   closely	  
connected:	   if	   we	   cannot	   imagine	   the	   truth	   of	   particular	   proposition	   then	   we	   cannot	  
accept	   it	  as	  being	  fictionally	  true.	  And	  although	  this	  connection	  has	  come	  under	  serious	  
scrutiny	   —	   with	   Weatherston	   (2004)	   arguing	   that	   the	   two	   components	   are	   in	   fact,	  
distinct,	   and	   Todd	   (2009)	   lending	   weight	   to	   this	   claim	   through	   offering	   examples	   of	  
propositions	   that	   are	   unimaginable,	   yet	   fictionally	   true24	  —	   Carroll’s	   uptake	   argument	  
relies	  upon	  the	  integration	  of	  imagination	  and	  fictional	  truth.	  	  
	  
If	  one	  were	  to	  experience	  imaginative	  failure	  in	  regard	  to	  Carroll’s	  ‘Saviour’	  yet	  still	  accept	  
the	   fictional	   truth	  of	   the	  prescribed	  perspective	   (that	  Hitler	  gave	  his	   life	   for	   the	  greater	  
good	  and	  should	  be	  revered)	  then	  one	  could	  still	  participate	  in	  what	  Richard	  Moran	  calls	  
                                                
23	  Stock’s	  main	  example	  here	  is	  Moran’s	  alternative	  version	  of	  Macbeth,	  which	  I	  made	  mention	  of	  earlier	  on	  
in	  the	  chapter.	  
24	  “It	  seems	  that	  some	  unimaginable	  things	  can	  be	  fictionally	  true.	  There	  is	  a	  general	  consensus	  amongst	  
philosophers,	  for	  example,	  that	  metaphysical,	  conceptual	  or	  logical	  impossibilities	  can	  be	  fictional,	  such	  
that	  in	  a	  story	  it	  can	  be	  the	  case	  that	  7	  +	  5	  =	  13,	  that	  Godel’s	  theorem	  is	  refuted,	  that	  talking	  eggs	  make	  
words	  mean	  whatever	  they	  wish,	  or	  that	  one	  can	  frequently	  dine	  well	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  universe.”	  (2009,	  
p.	  199)	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“hypothetical	   imagining”	   (1994,	   p.	   105).	   Hypothetical	   imagining	   with	   regard	   to	   the	  
Saviour	  example	  would	  involve	  something	  along	  the	  lines	  of	   imagining	  what	  it	  would	  be	  
like,	  or	  ‘what	  would	  follow’	  in	  the	  event	  that	  Hitler	  really	  did	  give	  his	  life	  for	  the	  greater	  
good	   and	   really	  was	   an	   object	   of	   reverence.	   However,	   because	   as	   Moran	   points	   out,	  
hypothetical	  imagination	  involves	  neither	  a	  “reference	  to	  oneself	  either	  as	  believer	  or	  as	  
any	   sort	   of	   psychological	   subject”,	   or	   “feigning	   belief	   in	   [a]	   proposition	   or	   determining	  
what	  would	  follow	  from	  the	  fact	  of	  one’s	  believing	  it”	  (1994,	  p.	  105),	  it	  fails	  to	  secure	  the	  
‘emotive	  uptake’	  demanded	  by	  Carroll’s	  moderate	  moralism.	  Rather,	  what	  is	  required	  by	  
Carroll	   is	   what	   Moran	   calls	   “dramatic	   imagination”,	   which,	   unlike	   its	   hypothetical	  
counterpart	  involves	  “[…]	  a	  point	  of	  view,	  a	  total	  perspective	  on	  the	  situation,	  rather	  than	  
just	   the	   truth	   of	   a	   specifiable	   proposition	   […]	   ‘trying	   on’	   the	   point	   of	   view,	   trying	   to	  
determine	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  inhabit	  it”	  (1994,	  p.	  105).	  It	  is	  this	  dramatic	  imagination	  that	  
Carroll	   claims	  will	   fail	  when	  we	  are	   asked	   to	   ‘try	   on’	   the	  moral	   perspectives	  present	   in	  
Saviour.	  And,	  although	  we	  might	  be	  able,	  through	  hypothetical	  imagination,	  to	  determine	  
what	  a	  world	   in	  which	  Hitler	  was	  an	  object	  of	  worship	  would	  be	   like,	  Carroll	  maintains	  
that	  the	  failure	  of	  our	  dramatic	  imagination	  we	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  secure	  emotive	  uptake	  
or	  ‘inhabit’	  the	  perspective	  of	  one	  who	  does	  indeed	  revere	  such	  a	  despicable	  man.	  	  
	  
As	  was	  specified	  earlier	  in	  the	  chapter,	  Carroll’s	  notion	  of	  imaginative	  failure	  is	  dubiously	  
connected	   to	   a	   ‘morally	   sensitive	   audience’.	   Again,	   his	   reason	   for	   turning	   to	   such	   an	  
audience	   is	   to	   avoid	   the	   apparent	   plurality	   and	   relativity	   that	   is	   inevitably	   present	   in	  
actual,	  ‘less-­‐than-­‐perfect’	  audiences.	  However,	  Todd	  claims	  that	  imagination	  itself	  should	  
be	  understood	  as	  being,	  “[…]	  subject	  to	  degree,	  and	  dependent	  on	  and	  relative	  to	  a	  range	  
of	   further	  beliefs,	  commitments,	  values	  and	  so	  on”	   (2009,	  p.	  198).	  More	  specifically,	  he	  
persuasively	   argues	   that	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   imaginative	   resistance	   is	   dependent	   on	  
certain	  realist	  commitments	  and	  assumptions	  where	  morality	  is	  concerned	  (2009,	  p.	  198).	  
He	  takes	  it	  as	  an	  “ineliminable	  feature	  of	  moral	  judgement”	  that	  the	  actions	  and	  motives	  
performed	  by	  an	  agent	  may	  be	  interpreted	  or	  perceived	  in	  a	  multitude	  of	  different	  ways,	  
by	  different	  people,	  with	  different	  perspectives	  (2009,	  p.	  195).	  As	  an	  example,	  he	  asks	  us	  
to	   imagine	   that	   it	  were	  possible	   to	   journey	  back	   in	   time	   in	   order	   to	   ‘kill’	  Hitler,	   and	   to	  
consider	  the	  divergence	  of	  moral	  judgements	  that	  would	  be	  likely	  to	  occur	  between	  those	  
who	   adhere	   to	   a	   consequentialist	   moral	   system,	   and	   those	   who	   follow	   a	   Kantian,	   or	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deontological	   approach	   (2009,	   p.	   195)25 .	   He	   suggests	   that,	   the	   dependence	   of	   our	  
imagination	   on	   these	   “theoretical	   and	   pre-­‐theoretical	   moral	   presuppositions	   and	  
principles	  […]	  raises	  the	  prospect	  that	  those	  with	  fixed,	  articulated	  moral	  positions,	  such	  
as	  professional	   philosophers,	  may	  be	  more	  prone	   to	   imaginative	   resistance	  of	   the	   type	  
under	  discussion	  that	  non-­‐philosophers”	  (2009,	  p.	  196).	  Furthermore,	  Todd	  proposes	  that	  
imaginative	  failure	  is	  not	  only	  subject	  to	  moral	  commitments	  or	  concerns,	  but	  also	  others,	  
such	   as	   one’s	   sense	   of	   humour	   or	   aesthetic	   taste.	   He	   further	   suggests	   that	   such	  
commitments	  could	  trigger	  imaginative	  failure	  when	  attempting,	  for	  example,	  to	  imagine	  
the	  hilarity	  of	  a	  particular	   joke	  in	  a	  story,	  or	  upon	  attempting	  to	   imagine	  that	  a	  work	  of	  
poetry	   claimed	   to	   be	   excellent	   within	   the	   fiction,	   is	   truly	   excellent	   (2009,	   p.	   197).	  
Considering	   the	   differences	   between	   the	   imaginability	   of	   moral	   and	   non-­‐moral	  
propositions,	  Todd	  writes:	  
	  
These	  observations	  […]	  suggest	  that,	  on	  one	  hand,	  the	  imaginative	  projects	  
of	   those	   holding	   realist	   commitments	   may	   be	   more	   susceptible	   to	  
resistance	  and	   inability	   than	  those	  holding	  non-­‐realist	  commitments,	  and	  
those	   holding	   articulated	   theoretical	   commitments	   yet	  more	   susceptible	  
than	   those	   possessing	   less	   articulated	   pre-­‐theoretical	   ones;	   and	   on	   the	  
other	  hand,	  that	  the	  imaginability	  of	  normative	  concepts	  and	  propositions	  
may	   be	  more	   relative	   to	   the	   factors	   discussed	   than	   non-­‐normative,	   and	  
hence	   more	   susceptible	   to	   resistance	   and	   inability26	  (2009,	   p.	   197,	   his	  
emphasis)	  
	  
If	  we	  are	  to	  accept	  Todd’s	  claims	  regarding	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  
imaginative	  resistance	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  various	  commitments	  held	  by	   individuals,	   then	  
Carroll	   is	   presented	   once	  more	   with	   the	   threat	   of	   unwanted	   relativism.	   His	   claim	   that	  
moral	   defects	   are	   responsible	   for	   imaginative	   failure	   is	   again	   only	   true	   of	   a	   particular	  
spectrum	   of	   an	   artwork’s	   ‘possible	   audience’.	   Carroll	   might	   proceed	   by	   replacing	   his	  
                                                
25	  I	  placed	  the	  word	  ‘kill’	  in	  inverted	  commas	  because,	  depending	  on	  the	  moral	  commitments	  of	  the	  person	  
making	  the	  judgement,	  it	  could	  be	  replaced	  with	  either	  ‘assassinate’	  or	  ‘murder’.	  
26	  Todd’s	  point	  is	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  argue	  that	  realist	  commitments	  will	  ceteris	  paribus	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  
encounter	  imaginative	  resistance	  or	  failure.	  He	  writes,	  “[…]	  one	  might,	  for	  instance,	  be	  an	  expressivist	  
about	  morality	  with	  very	  strong	  moral	  principles	  that	  make	  it	  at	  least	  psychologically	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  
certain	  claims.	  Conversely,	  one	  might	  be	  a	  ‘relaxed’	  moral	  realist	  and	  able	  to	  imagine	  certain	  claims	  one	  
does	  not	  think	  are	  actually	  true”	  (2009,	  p.	  198).	  However,	  this	  only	  adds	  to	  the	  relativity	  of	  imaginative	  
resistance	  or	  failure.	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‘morally	  sensitive’	  audience	  with	  an	  ‘audience	  of	  moral	  realists’,	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  the	  
claims	  of	  his	  uptake	  argument	  by	  in	  some	  sense	  ‘stacking	  the	  deck’	  with	  an	  audience	  that	  
are	   prone	   to	   imaginative	   failure.	   However,	   this	   would	   again	   beg	   the	   question	   for	  
moderate	  moralism.	  
	  
Regardless,	   it	   may	   remain	   the	   case	   that	   we	   are	   unable	   to	   overcome	   the	   imaginative	  
failure	   that	   Carroll’s	   examples	   invoke.	   Yet	   again,	   this	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   result	   of	   their	  
contextual	  constraints;	  being	  that	  the	  moral	  perspectives	  advocated	  for	  within	  the	  work	  
are	   in	  some	  sense	   ‘incompatible’	  with	  the	  context	  supplied.	   In	   these	  cases,	  attempts	   to	  
engage	  our	   ‘dramatic	   imagination’	  might	   fail,	   and	  will	   at	   the	  very	   least,	   encounter	  high	  
degrees	   of	   resistance.	   However,	   we	   should	   maintain	   that	   the	   tenacity	   of	   Carroll’s	  
examples	   does	   not	   lend	   credibility	   to	   the	   moderate	   moralist	   thesis.	   Even	   though	   they	  
may,	  as	  Carroll	  claims,	  block	  emotive	  uptake	  where	  the	  audience	  is	  concerned,	  they	  fail	  to	  
provide	  any	  evidence	   that	   such	  a	  phenomenon	   is	   likely	   to	  occur	  where	  actual	  artworks	  
are	  at	  stake.	  This	  is	  because	  Carroll’s	  Saviour,	  ‘Himmler’	  and	  ‘Sadistic	  Colonizer’	  examples	  
are	  simply	  unlikely	  to	  spawn	  any	  close	  relations	  in	  the	  actual	  world;	  and	  even	  if	  they	  did	  it	  
would	   be	   folly	   to	   think	   that	   they	   would	   be	   taken	   seriously	   as	   art,	   rather	   than,	   say,	  
propaganda27.	  	  
	  
In	  conclusion,	  Carroll’s	  defence	  of	  moderate	  moralism	  fails	  to	  show	  that	  moral	  defects	  or	  
merits	  constitute	  aesthetic	  defects	  or	  merits.	  As	  was	  argued,	  Carroll’s	  assertion	  that	  the	  
only	  reliable	  audience	  is	  one	  that	  is	  “morally	  sensitive”	  (1998,	  2000a,	  2006,	  2008)	  leaves	  
moderate	  moralism	   begging	   the	   question,	   while,	   a	  move	   away	   from	   such	   an	   audience	  
opens	  his	  account	  up	  to	  responses	  contrary	  to	  his	  claims.	  Furthermore,	  the	  crucial	  claim	  
that	  we	  are	  ‘unable’	  to	  respond	  as	  prescribed	  where	  such	  responses	  are	  morally	  defective	  
was	   shown	   to	   hold	   only	  where	   these	   prescriptions	   are	   removed	   either	   from	  any	  wider	  
context,	  or	  where	  the	  prescription	  and	  the	  context	  are	  ‘incompatible’.	  As	  argued,	  we	  have	  
little	  reason	  to	  accept	  that	  any	  serious	  artworks	  will	  prescribe	  responses	  of	  the	  kind	  found	  
in	   the	  examples	  marshalled	  by	  Carroll	  and	  Walton,	  and	  we	  should	   therefore	   reject	   that	  
their	  account	  of	  imaginative	  failure	  will	  apply	  in	  any	  reliable	  sense	  where	  our	  engagement	  
with	  actual	  artworks	  occurs.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
                                                







While	   both	   ethicism	   and	  moderate	  moralism	   both	   adhere	   to	   the	   valence	   constraint	  —	  
holding	   that	   when	   aesthetically	   relevant	   the	   moral	   value	   of	   an	   artwork	   will	   always	  
positively	   vary	   with	   its	   aesthetic	   value	   (moral	   defects	   will	   always	   constitute	   aesthetic	  
defects,	  and	  moral	  merits	  will	  always	  constitute	  aesthetic	  merits)	  —	  contextualism	  argues	  
instead	   that	   this	   value	   relationship	   can	   co-­‐vary.	   Although	   general	   support	   for	  
contextualism	  has	  been	  forthcoming	  in	  the	  recent	   literature	  there	  has	  been	  little	  by	  the	  
way	  of	  well-­‐established	  positive	  argument	  for	  the	  position;	  Matthew	  Kieran’s	  defence	  of	  
cognitive	   immoralism	   being	   the	   only	   notable	   exception.	   This	   chapter	   will	   begin	   by	  
examining	   the	   contextualist	   claim	   that	   moral	   defects	   are	   sometimes	   fundamental	   to	  
aesthetic	   value;	   an	   objection	   provided	   by	   Berys	   Gaut	   will	   be	   considered,	   and	   a	   reply	  
offered.	  Kieran’s	  cognitive	   immoralism	  will	   then	  be	  considered,	  along	  with	  a	  number	  of	  
objections	   that	   have	   been	   levelled	   against	   both	   Kieran’s	   cognitive	   position,	   and	  
contextualism	   in	   general.	   Finally,	   a	   suggestion	   as	   to	   how	   contextualism	   might	   be	  
reconciled	  with	  the	  moral	  significance	  thesis	  will	  be	  offered.	  This	  will	  specifically	  address	  
the	  ways	  in	  which	  contextualism	  presents	  itself	  as	  a	  more	  attractive	  option	  than	  ethicism	  
or	   moderate	   moralism,	   with	   regard	   to	   its	   ability	   to	   better	   accommodate	   for	   both	   the	  
complexity	   of	   our	   engagement	   with	   art,	   and	   the	   established	   critical	   practices	   that	  
surround	  aesthetic	  evaluation.	  
	  
6.1. The Argument for ‘Ineliminable’ Moral Defects 
	  
In	  Jacobson’s	  paper	  Ethical	  Criticism	  and	  the	  Vice	  of	  Moderation	  he	  defends	  the	  claim	  that	  
“[…]	  the	  moral	  defects	  in	  a	  work	  of	  art	  can	  be	  among	  its	  aesthetic	  virtues”;	  a	  claim	  that	  as	  
he	  notes	  has	  been	  called	  ‘immoralism’,	  but	  which	  he	  instead	  chooses	  to	  describe	  as	  “[…]	  
an	  antitheoretical	  view	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  value”	  (2007,	  p.	  343).	  
His	   reasons	   for	   adopting	   the	   ‘antitheoretical’	   label	   should	   be	   taken	   as	   a	   product	   of	   his	  
belief	  that	  “[…]	  there	  is	  no	  true	  theory	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  value,	  
although	  there	  are	  some	  true	  propositions	  about	   it	   […]”	   (2007,	  p.	  346).	  While	   Jacobson	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prefers	  his	  own	  label,	  his	  position	  is	  certainly	  a	  contextualist	  one;	  and	  as	  such,	  evidence	  of	  
this	   is	   seen	   by	   his	   welcoming	   of	   other	   contextualist	   positions	   into	   the	   antitheoretical	  
camp	   (2007,	   p.	   343).	   In	   defence	   of	   his	   above	   claims,	   Jacobson	   argues	   mostly	   in	   the	  
negative 28 ,	   objecting	   specifically	   to	   Gaut	   and	   Carroll’s	   adherence	   to	   the	   valence	  
constraint.	  He	  does	   also,	   however	   offer	   a	   positive	   argument	   for	   contextualism,	   holding	  
that	  where	  an	  artwork’s	  immoral	  perspective	  is	  an	  ‘irrevocable’	  feature	  in	  explaining	  why	  
the	   work	   is	   aesthetically	   valuable,	   then	   the	  moral	   defect	  must	   constitute	   an	   aesthetic	  
merit	  (2007,	  p.	  352).	  	  
	  
In	  defending	  this	  claim,	  Jacobson	  takes	  his	  lead	  from	  an	  assertion	  put	  forward	  by	  Carroll	  
in	  his	  defence	  of	  moderate	  moralism.	  Where	  Carroll	  argues	  that	   in	  some	  cases	  “[…]	  the	  
evil	  perspective	  of	  the	  artwork	  is	  an	  ineliminable	  factor	  in	  explaining	  why,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  
fact,	   it	   is	   aesthetically	  defective”	   (1998,	  p.	   423),	   Jacobson	  proposes	   that	   the	   valence	  of	  
this	   relationship	   can	   co-­‐vary	   so	   that	   the	   evil	   perspective	   of	   a	   work	   can,	   under	   certain	  
circumstances,	   become	   an	   ‘ineliminable’	   yet	   positive	   feature	   of	   that	   works	   aesthetic	  
value29.	  What	  Jacobson	  has	  in	  mind	  here	  is	  that	  in	  some	  cases	  an	  artwork’s	  moral	  defect	  
can,	   as	  Eileen	   John	  cleverly	  puts	   it,	   “[be]	  pulling	   its	  weight	  along	  with	   the	  work’s	  other	  
virtues”,	   rather	   than	   being	   “[…]	   just	   a	   drag	   on	   the	   positive	   contributions	   of	   other	  
features”	   (John,	   2007,	   p.	   336).	   Drawing	   an	   analogy	   between	   jokes	   and	   works	   of	   art,	  
Jacobson	   claims	   that	   “what	   is	   funny	   about	   some	   jokes	   is	   what	   is	   cruel	   about	   them”,	  
concluding	   that	   in	   such	   cases	   “their	   offensiveness	   is	   integral	   to	   their	   humor”	   (2007,	   p.	  
352).	   Stephanie	   Patridge	   has	   also	   recently	   advanced	   a	   contextualist	   position30	  in	  which	  
she	  claims	  that	  the	  moralist’s	  commitment	  to	  the	  “consistency	  of	  valence”	  thesis	  forces	  
them	  to	  depart	  radically	  from	  typical	  “art	  critical	  practices”	  (2008,	  p.	  181).	  In	  making	  her	  
case	  for	  this	  position	  she	  defends	  a	  claim	  in	  many	  ways	  similar	  to	  Jacobson’s:	  “[…]	  some	  
artworks	  are	  artistically	  good,	  in	  part,	  because	  they	  are	  morally	  bad”	  (2008,	  p.	  182).	  Her	  
method	   of	   arguing	   for	   this	   claim	   involves	   an	   examination	   of	   Pushkin’s	   novel	   Eugene	  
Onegin,	   and	   Balthus’	   erotic	   painting	  Alice,	   in	   which	   she	   attempts	   to	   positively	   link	   the	  
moral	   (or	   more	   accurately,	   immoral)	   attitudes	   that	   they	   prescribe	   with	   their	   aesthetic	  
                                                
28	  See	  chapter	  3	  for	  Jacobson’s	  ‘warranted	  response’	  objection	  against	  Gaut’s	  ethicism.	  
29	  He	  refers	  to	  this	  an	  earlier	  paper	  as	  “the	  incorrigibility	  of	  art”	  (1997,	  p.	  179)	  
	  
30	  Patridge	  develops	  what	  she	  calls	  ‘weak	  moralism’.	  Her	  rejection	  of	  the	  soundness	  constraint	  makes	  this	  
position	  a	  contextualist	  one,	  in	  that,	  an	  artwork’s	  moral	  defect	  might	  count	  as	  an	  aesthetic	  defect	  or	  
merit,	  depending	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  work	  engages	  us.	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value.	   In	   regards	   specifically	   to	   these	  works	   Patridge	   rejects	   the	   suggestion	   that	   when	  
engaging	  with	  them	  we	   ignore	  or	  “tolerate”	  their	  morally	  disturbing	  attitudes31.	  Rather,	  
she	  holds	  that	  the	  immoral	  attitudes	  prescribed	  by	  these	  works	  constitute	  a	  crucial	  part	  
of	  our	  engagement	  and	  aesthetic	  evaluation	  of	  them.	  With	  regard	  to	  Balthus’	  Alice,	  she	  
writes:	  	  
	  
Seeing	  the	  world	  in	  the	  way	  that	  Balthus	  recommends,	  attended	  with	  sexual	  
titillation,	  moral	  disturbance,	  discomfort,	  or	  unsettledness	  is	  part	  of	  why	  we	  
find	  the	  works	  of	  interest;	  part	  of	  why	  we	  think	  so	  hard	  about	  them;	  part	  of	  
why	  we	  find	  ourselves	  returning	  to	  them;	  part	  of	  why	  we	  enjoy	  them	  […]	  If	  
this	  is	  right,	  then	  we	  do	  not	  tolerate	  the	  immoral	  vision	  of	  Alice,	  we	  engage	  
it	  directly	  so	  that	  it	  is	  a	  virtue	  of	  the	  work	  (2008,	  p.	  191).	  
	  
Thus,	  both	  Jacobson	  and	  Patridge	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  cases	  in	  which	  an	  artwork’s	  moral	  
defect	   is	   integral	   to	   its	   aesthetic	   value.	   Jacobson	   argues	   that	   these	   defects	   are	  
ineliminable	  by	  virtue	  of	   their	  being	  crucial	   to	  the	  work’s	  aesthetic	  value;	  and,	  Patridge	  
argues	   similarly,	   that	   it	   is	   our	   direct	   and	   full-­‐blooded	   engagement	   with	   some	   moral	  
defects,	   rather	   than	   our	   merely	   ‘tolerating’	   them,	   that	   reveals	   their	   full	   aesthetic	  
contribution:	   their	   ability	   to	   ‘pull	   their	  own	  weight’.	   Both	  of	   these	  arguments	   take	  aim	  
directly	   at	   the	   valence	   constraint	   and	   intend	   to	   show	   that	   a	   systematic	   relationship	  
between	  an	  artwork’s	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  value	  cannot	  hold;	  that	   is,	  sometimes,	  moral	  
defects	  can	  be	  aesthetic	  merits.	  
	  
6.2. An Objection and Reply to the ‘Ineliminable’ Defects Argument 
	  
In	   his	   defence	   of	   ethicism	   Gaut	   argues	   that	   although	   contextualism	   might	   be	   correct	  
when	   the	   “overall	   aesthetic	  merit”	   of	   an	   artwork	   is	   considered,	   the	   valence	   constraint	  
only	  applies,	  for	  ethicism	  at	  least,	  in	  regard	  to	  pro	  tanto	  or	  intrinsic	  moral	  defects	  (2007,	  
p.	   63-­‐5).	   Consequently,	   he	   argues	   that	   although	   a	   moral	   defect	   might	   be	   both	   an	  
‘ineliminable’	  and	  aesthetically	  valuable	  feature	  of	  an	  artwork,	  this	  value	  is	  extrinsic,	  and	  
because	  of	   this	   the	   contextualist’s	   claim	   fails	   to	  nullify	   the	  pro	   tanto	  claim	  of	  ethicism:	  
                                                
31	  The	  thought	  that	  we	  can	  ‘tolerate’,	  or	  in	  some	  sense	  ‘forgive’	  to	  a	  certain	  extent,	  the	  immoral	  
perspectives	  present	  in	  an	  artwork,	  is	  suggested	  by	  A.	  W.	  Eaton	  in	  “Where	  Ethics	  and	  Aesthetics	  Meet:	  
Titian’s	  Rape of Europa”,	  (2003). 
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that	  the	  same	  moral	  defect	  will	  ground	  an	   intrinsic	  aesthetic	  defect.	  To	  elaborate,	  Gaut	  
offers	  an	  example:	  
	  
[…]	   suppose	   that	   you	  have	   a	   colleague	  who	   is	   prickly	   and	  with	  whom	  you	  
have	   had	   a	   difficult	   history.	   He	   corners	   you	   and	   asks	   you	  what	   you	   really	  
think	  of	  him.	  You	  dislike	  him.	  To	  say	  so	  would	  be	  truthful	  but	  unkind	  (he	  is	  
very	  sensitive).	  To	  dissemble	  would	  be	  to	  lie	  (silence	  is	  not	  an	  option,	  since	  
silence	  would	  be	  eloquent),	  though	  it	  would	  be	  kind	  to	  do	  so	  […]	  Telling	  him	  
that	  you	  like	  him	  would	  be	  good	  insofar	  as	  it	  would	  be	  kind,	  bad	  insofar	  as	  it	  
would	  be	  dishonest;	  telling	  him	  what	  you	  really	  think	  of	  him	  would	  be	  good	  
insofar	  as	  it	  is	  truthful,	  bad	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  unkind	  (2007,	  p.	  61).	  
	  
Gaut	   believes	   that	   the	   above	   example	   is	   able	   to	   capture	   the	   nature	   of	   intrinsic	   and	  
extrinsic	  merits	  and	  defects	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  analogous	  to	  our	  evaluation	  of	  artworks.	  He	  
argues	  that	   if	  we	  choose	  to	  be	  kind	  (and	   lie)	   to	  our	  colleague	  then	  our	  kindness,	  which	  
Gaut	  claims	  is	  an	  intrinsic	  moral	  merit,	  will	  also	  entail	  an	  extrinsic	  moral	  defect	  (as	  lying	  is	  
by	  Gaut’s	  view	  an	  intrinsic	  moral	  defect).	  He	  writes,	  “This	  demerit	   is	  extrinsic,	  since	  it	   is	  
not	   a	   necessary	   feature	   of	   a	   kindly	   action	   that	   it	   be	   an	   untruthful	   one	   –	  we	   are	   often	  
kindly	  without	  having	  to	  lie”	  (2007,	  p.	  62).	  Subsequently,	  Gaut	  claims	  that	  artworks	  that	  
rely	  on	  a	  morally	  defective	  perspective	   for	  part	  of	   their	  aesthetic	  value	  will	   remain	  pro	  
tanto	  aesthetically	  defective	  to	  that	  extent;	  and	  consequently	  they	  will	  remain	  bound	  by	  
the	  valence	  constraint.	  	  
	  
In	  evaluating	  his	  claim	  regarding	  what	   is	  not	  a	   ‘necessary’	   feature	  of	  a	  kindly	  action	  we	  
should	  assume	  that	  Gaut	  considers	  morally	  defective	  artworks	  to	  be	  analogous;	  that	  is,	  it	  
may	  be	  possible	  for	  moral	  defects	  to	  increase	  the	  aesthetic	  value	  of	  an	  artwork,	  yet	  these	  
defects	   are	   never	   a	   necessary	   feature	   of	   the	   work’s	   aesthetic	   value.	   However,	   Gaut’s	  
objection	   fails	   to	   account	   for	   the	   central	   claim	   of	   the	   contextualist	   argument	   outlined	  
above.	   This	   claim	   is	   not	   merely	   that	   such	   artworks	   would	   cease	   to	   be	   aesthetically	  
valuable	  without	  the	  immoral	  attitude	  that	  they	  prescribe	  (Gaut	  grants	  this),	  but	  rather,	  
that	  this	   immoral	  attitude	   is	  exactly	  what	  makes	   them	  aesthetically	  valuable	   in	  the	  first	  
place.	  As	  Jacobson	  puts	  it,	  “[…]	  such	  works	  cannot	  be	  morally	  sanitized	  even	  in	  principle”	  
(2008,	  p.	  352).	  In	  these	  cases,	  the	  contextualist	  holds	  that	  an	  artwork’s	  morally	  defective	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perspective	  is	  not	  seen	  as	  adventitious	  to	  its	  aesthetic	  value,	  but	  rather,	  as	  fundamental.	  
Furthermore,	  if	  an	  artwork’s	  immoral	  attitude	  can	  be	  fundamental	  to	  its	  aesthetic	  value	  
—	   meaning	   that	   it	   is	   in	   fact	   a	   necessary	   feature	   of	   the	   work’s	   aesthetic	   value	   —	   it	  
becomes	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  how	  one	  might	  justify	  a	  negative	  pro	  tanto	  evaluation.	  
	  
However,	   although	   the	   contextualist	   argument	   concerning	   the	   ‘ineliminable’	   nature	   of	  
some	  moral	  defects	  can	  slip	  away	  from	  Gaut’s	  objection,	  it	  still	  fails	  to	  show	  that	  in	  such	  
cases	   it	   is	   the	   ‘moral	   value’	   (or	   lack	   thereof)	   that	   is	   responsible	   for	   the	  works	   positive	  
aesthetic	   value,	   as	   opposed	   to	   some	   other	   feature(s)	   of	   the	   work	   that	   might	   directly	  
surround	  or	  support	  these	  moral	  defects.	  For	  example,	   it	  may	  just	  be	  that	  we	  value	  the	  
coherency,	   clarity,	   or	   even	   incongruity	   that	   surrounds	   the	   immoral	   attitudes	   that	   are	  
prescribed	  in	  some	  works	  of	  art.	  In	  such	  cases	  contextualism	  is	  correct	  in	  saying	  that	  the	  
moral	  defect	  is	  ‘ineliminable’	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  aesthetic	  value	  of	  the	  artwork,	  however	  
it	   does	   not	   follow	   from	   this	   that	   it	   is	   the	   ‘immorality’	   itself	   that	   is	   responsible	   for	  
positively	  contributing	  to	  the	  aesthetic	  value	  of	  the	  work.	  
	  
6.3. Cognitive Immoralism 
 
Kieran’s	   formulation	   and	  defence	  of	   cognitive	   immoralism	   is	   by	   far	   the	   foremost,	  well-­‐
developed	   argument	   in	   the	   contextualist	   repertoire.	   It	   argues	   that	   under	   certain	  
circumstances,	   the	   immoral	   attitudes	   manifested	   by	   an	   artwork	   can	   be	   aesthetically	  
valuable	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  cognitive	  understanding	  that	  can	  be	  gained	  from	  our	  imaginative	  
engagement	  with	  the	  work.	  He	  writes:	  
	  
[…]	  the	  moral	  character	  of	  a	  work	  is	  relevant	  to	  its	  value	  as	  art	  to	  the	  extent	  
it	  undermines	  or	  promotes	   the	   intelligibility	  and	  reward	  of	   the	   imaginative	  
experience	  proffered	  by	  the	  work.	  Thus	  the	  morally	  commendable	  character	  
of	   a	   work	  may	   be	   an	   aesthetic	   virtue	   where	   it	   enhances	   our	   imaginative	  
engagement	  with	  a	  work	  and	  the	  morally	  reprehensible	  character	  of	  a	  work	  
may	   be	   an	   aesthetic	   vice	   where	   it	   undermines	   our	   imaginative	   responses	  
(2006b,	  p.	  56-­‐7,	  his	  emphasis).	  
	  
Kieran	   of	   course	   intends	   to	   differentiate	   his	   position	   from	   that	   of	   the	   other	   moralist	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theories	   by	   denying	   that	   the	   valence	   constraint	   for	   moral	   and	   aesthetic	   value	   holds.	  
Instead,	  he	  writes	  that	  his	  position	  is	  “[…]	  consistent	  with	  holding	  that	  in	  certain	  cases	  the	  
morally	  reprehensible	  character	  of	  a	  work	  may	  constitute	  an	  aesthetic	  virtue	  rather	  than	  
a	  vice”	  (2006b,	  p.	  57,	  his	  emphasis).	  	  
	  
Like	   Gaut	   and	   Carroll,	   Kieran	   is	   primarily	   interested	   in	   the	   affective-­‐responses	   that	  
artworks	   elicit	   from	   their	   audiences,	   and	   throughout	   his	   work	   on	   the	   relationship	  
between	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  value	  he	  has	  argued	  that,	  as	  was	  mentioned	  in	  chapter	  two,	  
artworks	  are	  able	  to	  secure	  the	  responses	  they	  prescribe	  when	  they	  offer	  an	  imaginative	  
experience	   that	   is	   both	   ‘intelligible’	   and	   ‘rewarding’	   (2001,	   pp.	   34-­‐5)	   (2010	   pp.	   699).	  
Indeed,	   it	   is	   this	   notion	  of	   reward	   that	   Kieran	   takes	   to	   distinguish	   great	   artworks	   from	  
lesser	   ones.	  Whereas	   a	   lesser	   work	  might	   draw	   upon	   emotional	   responses	   for	  merely	  
conventional	  purposes	   (consider	  generic	  works	   such	  as	  Scream,	  or	  Amityville	  Horror),	   a	  
more	  rich	  and	  complex	  work,	  he	  argues,	  will	  attempt	  to	  put	  these	  emotional	  responses	  to	  
some	  greater	  purpose.	  When	  a	  work	  attempts	  to	  utilize	  our	  emotional	  responses	  in	  ways	  
which	  we	  would	  normally	  consider	  to	  be,	  at	  best,	  morally	  dubious,	  Kieran	  claims	  that	  we	  
are	   likely	   to	   respond	   when	   there	   is	   some	   expectation	   of	   a	   cognitive	   of	   ‘reward’	   or	  
“payoff”	  (2010,	  p.	  699).	  Although	  Kieran	  is	  not	  entirely	  clear	  as	  to	  what	  such	  a	  ‘reward’	  or	  
“payoff”	  consists	  of,	  one	  might	  take	  him	  simply	  to	  mean	  some	  kind	  of	  ‘exploration’	  of,	  or	  
‘novel’	   approach	   toward,	   the	   moral	   ideas	   and	   attitudes	   manifested	   by	   the	   work.	  
Furthermore,	  he	  argues	  that	  by	  persuading	  us	  to	  engage	  with	  and	  imaginatively	  explore	  
moral	   perspectives	   that	   we	   hold	   to	   be	   defective,	   these	   ‘payoffs’	   can	   “deepen	   our	  
appreciation	  and	  understanding	  in	  ways	  that	  would	  not	  happen	  otherwise”	  (2006,	  p.	  63).	  
The	   crucial	   claim	   for	   cognitive	   immoralism	   is	   that:	   ‘we	   need	   to	   experience	   the	   bad	   to	  
understand	   the	   good’.	  Or	   as	   Kieran	   points	   out,	   “[…]	   that	  morally	   defective	   imaginative	  
experiences,	   including	   taking	   up	   attitudes	   and	   responding	   in	   ways	   that	   are	   morally	  
problematic,	  are	  required	  to	  enable	  one	  more	  fully	  to	  understand	  things	  than	  one	  could	  
otherwise	   have	   done”	   (2006b,	   p.	   63,	   my	   emphasis).	   This	   claim	   is	   crucial	   for	   cognitive	  
immoralism,	  as	  it	  attempts	  to	  show	  that	  as	  only	  morally	  defective	  perspectives	  can	  offer	  
certain,	  valuable	  understanding,	  such	  defects	  are	  essential	  to	  the	  cognitive	  and	  aesthetic	  
value	  of	  the	  works	  that	  possess	  them.	  
	  
This	  claim	  that	  morally	  defective	  experiences	  provide	  a	  kind	  of	  ‘exclusive’	  understanding	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is	  of	  course	  a	  contentious	  one32.	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Kieran	  talks	  of	  the	  
kind	   of	   understanding	   that	   such	   perspectives	   manifest	   as	   being	   one	   of	   “comparative	  
experience”	  (2006b,	  p.	  64).	  For	  example,	  one	  might	  feel	  that	  they	  possess	  a	  full	  and	  rich	  
understanding	   of	   why	   someone	   should	   always	   tell	   the	   truth	   without	   ever	   himself	   or	  
herself	  having	  told	  a	  lie,	  or	  having	  been	  lied	  to.	  Yet,	  Kieran’s	  claim	  is	  that	  if	  such	  a	  person	  
were	  to	  consciously	  lie	  to	  another,	  or	  find	  out	  that	  they	  themselves	  had	  been	  lied	  to,	  they	  
would	  gain	  from	  this	  bad	  or	  morally	  problematic	  experience;	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  or	  
appreciation	  of	  why	  someone	  should,	  or	  should	  not,	  lie.	  It	  is	  implicit	  in	  Kieran’s	  argument	  
that	  the	  understanding	  offered	  by	  this	  kind	  of	  comparative	  experience	  could	  not	  be	  had	  if	  
one	  were	  only	  to	  attend	  to	  instances	  in	  which	  one	  told	  the	  truth.	  If	  one	  never	  lied,	  never	  
acknowledged	  that	  they	  had	  been	   lied	  to,	  or	  never	  witnessed	  the	  consequences	  of	  one	  
person	   lying	   to	   another,	   then	   one	   would	   by	   Kieran’s	   account,	   possess	   only	   a	   shallow	  
understanding	   of	   why	   lying	   is	   ‘wrong’,	   and,	   would	   furthermore,	   fail	   to	   properly	  
understand,	  for	  example,	  why	  telling	  a	  lie	  might	  in	  some	  situations	  be	  considered	  a	  kind,	  
or	  ‘acceptable’	  action	  (“Does	  this	  dress	  make	  me	  look	  fat?”).	  	  
	  
In	   addition,	   Kieran	   argues	   that	   one	   need	   not	   actually	   lie	   to	   someone,	   be	   lied	   to,	   or	  
witness	   an	   example	   of	   lying	   and	   its	   consequences	   in	   the	   real-­‐world	   to	   have	   this	  
comparative	  experience.	  Rather,	  he	  holds	  that	  one	  could	  dramatically	  imagine	  (to	  borrow	  
Moran’s	  term)	  what	  might	  happen	  if	  they	  were	  to	  lie,	  or	  how	  they	  might	  feel	  if	  they	  were	  
lied	   to.	   Kieran’s	   claim	   here	   is	   that	   “imaginative	   experience	   can	   be	   an	   indirect	   and	  
informative	  means	  of	  learning	  by	  experience”	  (2006b,	  p.	  68).	  	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  defend	  this	  claim	  that	  we	  can	  enhance,	  or	  deepen,	  our	  understanding	  through	  
morally	  problematic	   imaginings,	   Kieran	  offers	   an	  example	   from	  Graham	  Greene’s	   short	  
story	  The	  Destructors.	  He	  argues	  that	  Greene’s	  work,	  as	  it	  depicts	  a	  gang	  of	  young	  boys	  
that	  needlessly	  destroy	  an	  old	  man’s	  house,	  prescribes	  that	  we	  adopt	  a	  morally	  defective	  
perspective	   towards	   the	   series	   of	   events	   that	   develop.	   Kieran	   claims	   that	   we	   “do	   not	  
merely	  admire”	  the	  egregious	  acts	  of	  callousness	  and	  destruction	  presented	  by	  the	  work,	  
but	   rather	   that	   our	   responses	   are	   guided	   by	   the	   work	   in	   a	   way	   that	   leads	   us	   to	  
imaginatively	  endorse	  these	  actions	  and	  to	  want	  them	  to	  succeed.	  
                                                
32	  Kieran	  claims,	  “[…]	  experiencing	  bad	  responses	  and	  attitudes	  in	  ways	  which	  are	  problematic,	  with	  respect	  
to	  moral	  and	  non-­‐moral	  values,	  affords	  a	  kind	  of	  comparative	  experience	  or	  perspective	  that	  could	  not	  
otherwise	  be	  had”	  (2006,	  p.	  64,	  my	  emphasis).	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The	   upshot,	   Kieran	   argues,	   is	   that	   we	   can	   come	   to	   learn	   “[…]	   how	   and	   why	   the	  
destruction	  of	  things	  deeply	  precious	  to	  another	  can	  be	  joyful,	  an	  exercise	  of	  power	  and	  
an	  assertion	  of	   strength”	   (2006b,	  p.	  69).	  Furthermore,	  he	  adds	   that	   in	  doing	  so	  we	  can	  
understand	  “[…]	  not	  just	  how	  and	  why	  this	  can	  be	  the	  case	  with	  respect	  to	  other	  people	  
but,	   importantly,	  how	  and	  why	  this	  can	  be	  the	  case	  with	  respect	  to	  ourselves:	  precisely	  
because	  we	  have	  come	  to	  respond	  in	  ways	  we	  actually	  deem	  to	  be	  immoral”	  (2006b,	  p.	  
69).	  While	  Kieran’s	   interpretation	  of	  the	  moral	  attitude	  prescribed	  by	  The	  Destructors	   is	  
arguably	  not	  the	  only	  one	  that	  could	  be	  defended,	  it	  is	  at	  least	  a	  plausible	  one.	  Another	  
reading	   of	   the	  work	  might	   also	   plausibly	   interpret	   it	   as	   condemning	   the	   actions	   of	   the	  
gang,	   and	  prescribing	   instead,	   that	  we	   respond	  with	  outrage	  and	  disgust.	  Nonetheless,	  
Kieran’s	  interpretation	  offers	  an	  example	  of	  how	  he	  thinks	  that	  imaginatively	  taking	  up	  an	  
immoral	  perspective	  might	  lead	  us	  to	  understand,	  in	  detail,	  the	  ways	  by	  which	  we	  might	  
be	  persuaded	  into	  acting	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  morally	  reprehensible.	  
	  
So,	   cognitive	   immoralism	   holds	   that	   while	   morally	   defective	   experiences	   might	   not	  
directly	   contribute	   to	   our	   moral	   understanding,	   they	   can	   at	   the	   very	   least	   offer	   a	  
comparative	   experience	   that	   is	   able	   to	   “confirm,	   undermine	   or	   deepen	   our	  
understanding”	  (2006b,	  p.	  67).	  Furthermore,	  it	  holds	  that	  these	  comparative	  experiences	  
are	  achievable	  through	  the	  deployment	  of	  our	  imagination.	  Kieran	  suggests:	  “One	  of	  the	  
things	  that	  art	  enables	  us	  to	  do	  is	  to	  explore	  attitudes	  and	  responses	  we	  would	  try	  not	  to	  
in	  real	   life	  given	  our	  moral	  prohibitions.	  So	  perhaps	  we	  might	  only	   learn	  how	  we	  might	  
respond	  to	   the	  appeal	  of	  violence,	   the	  allure	  of	  adultery	  and	  so	  on	   through	  works	   that	  
deliberately	  speak	  to	  those	  desires”	  (2006a,	  p.	  140).	  	  
	  
If	  Kieran’s	  position	  is	  correct	  then	  although	  the	  moral	  value	  of	  an	  artwork’s	  perspectives	  
might	   not	   constitute	   part	   of	   its	   aesthetic	   value	   the	   cognitive	   and	  moral	   understanding	  
manifested	   by	   those	   perspectives	   will.	   Furthermore,	   because	   morally	   defective	  
perspectives	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  present	  us	  with	  understanding	  —	  via	  experience	  —	  that	  
we	  could	  not	  otherwise	  have	  these	  defective	  perspectives	  can	  positively	  contribute	  to	  the	  
aesthetic	  value	  of	  the	  artwork.	  However,	  even	  if	  we	  accept	  Kieran’s	  account,	  in	  taking	  the	  
cognitive	  approach	  all	  he	  has	  succeeded	  in	  showing	  is	  that	  the	  immorality	  of	  an	  artwork	  is	  
a	   necessary	   feature	   for	   providing	   a	   certain	   kind	   of	   cognitive	   insight.	   Like	   the	   earlier	  
 84 
argument	   for	   ‘ineliminable’	  moral	   defects,	   cognitive	   immoralism	   fails	   to	   show	   that	   it	   is	  
the	   immorality	   of	   the	   artwork	   that	   is	   responsible	   for	   positively	   affecting	   the	   work’s	  
aesthetic	   value.	   Rather,	   the	   immorality	   secures	   the	   cognitive	   insight,	   and	   this	   insight	  
secures	  the	  aesthetic	  value33.	  
	  
6.4. Objections against Cognitive Immoralism 
	  
The	   obvious	   objection	   against	   cognitive	   immoralism	  would	   be	   to	   attack	   Kieran’s	   claim	  
that	  in	  works	  such	  as	  Greene’s	  The	  Destructors,	   it	   is	  the	  ‘immorality’	  of	  the	  work	  that	  is	  
responsible	   for	  both	   its	   valuable	  understanding,	  and	   its	  aesthetic	  value.	   Indeed,	  Robert	  
Stecker	   argues	   that	   this	   same	   understanding	   could	   be	   conferred	   by	   a	   work	   that	  
condemns,	   rather	   than	   endorses,	   the	   kind	   of	   appetite-­‐for-­‐destruction	   that	   we	   find	   in	  
Greene’s	   story,	   and	   as	   a	   consequence,	   this	   understanding	   is	   not	   essentially	   tied	   to	   the	  
immoral	  perspective	  of	   the	  work	   (2005a,	  p.	  442)34.	  Stecker	  writes,	  “many	  ethical	  works	  
[…]	  give	  us	  great	  insights	  into	  vices,	  gross	  immorality,	  and	  other	  morally	  suspect	  matters	  
[…]	   So	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   why	   the	   immorality	   of	   a	   work	   that	   also	   gives	   us	   such	   insights	   is	  
responsible	   for	   its	   cognitive	   advantages”	   (2008a,	   p.	   152).	   If	   this	   objection	   holds,	   then	  
cognitive	   immoralism	   will	   have	   failed	   to	   show	   that	   the	   ‘moral	   defect’	   has	   played	   any	  
crucial	   role	   in	  enhancing	  our	  understanding,	   and	  will,	   as	   a	   consequence,	  have	   failed	   to	  
show	  that	  the	  moral	  defect	  has	  contributed	  to	  the	  aesthetic	  value	  of	  the	  work.	  
	  
Kieran	  has	  attempted	  to	  dismiss	  this	  species	  of	  objection	  by	  replying	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  
might	  come	  to	  the	  same	  understanding	  through	  engaging	  with	  an	  artwork	  that	  is	  morally	  
valuable	   is	   neither	   here	   nor	   there.	   That	   is,	   he	   claims	   that	   Stecker’s	   objection	   merely	  
misses	   the	   point	   of	   cognitive	   immoralism.	   His	   point	   is,	   he	  writes,	   “whether	   or	   not	   the	  
(im)moral	   character	   of	   a	   work	   cultivates	   my	   understanding.	   Immoral	   or	   morally	  
problematic	  aspects	  of	  a	  work,	  where	  they	  cultivate	  understanding,	  can	  contribute	  to	  a	  
work’s	   artistic	   value	   rather	   than	   detract	   from	   it”	   (2006a,	   p.	   140).	   Unfortunately,	   for	  
Kieran,	   it	   looks	   as	   if	   here	   he	   also	  misses	   Stecker’s	   point.	   Stecker	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   be	  
disputing	  the	  idea	  that	  an	  artwork	  possessing	  an	  immoral	  perspective	  can	  cultivate	  one’s	  
                                                
33 Eaton draws a similar conclusion (2012, p. 289). 
34	  This	  line	  of	  objection	  has	  much	  in	  common	  with	  one	  presented	  by	  moderate	  autonomism:	  the	  reasons	  for	  
an	  artwork	  being	  both	  morally	  and	  aesthetically	  defective	  are	  not	  the	  same.	  See,	  Anderson	  &	  Dean,	  
“Moderate	  Autonomism”,	  (1998).	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understanding,	   but	   rather	   that	   in	   those	   cases	   it	   not	   clear	   that	   it	   is	   the	   morality	   or	  
immorality	   of	   the	   perspective	   that	   is	   essential	   in	   providing	   this	   cultivation.	   Inasmuch,	  
Kieran’s	  reply	  to	  the	  objection	  is	  insufficient.	  
	  
Yet,	  more	  can	  be	  said	  in	  response	  to	  Stecker’s	  objection.	  Kieran	  might	  argue,	  for	  example,	  
that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  how	  the	  objection	  could	  hold,	  as	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  how	  
we	  might	  gain	  the	  same	  kind,	  or	   level,	  of	  understanding	  from	  an	  artwork	  which	  did	  not	  
prescribe	  that	  we	  actually	  endorse,	  or	  take-­‐up,	  a	  perspective	  that	  is	  morally	  defective.	  An	  
artwork	  of	  the	  kind	  that	  Stecker	  has	  in	  mind	  —	  one	  that	  condemns	  Greene’s	  perspective	  
(as	   it	   is	   interpreted	  by	  Kieran)	  —	  might	  allow	  us	  to	  understand	  a	  number	  of	  things.	  For	  
example,	  why	  the	  boys	  in	  the	  story	  acted	  in	  the	  way	  that	  they	  did,	  or	  how	  the	  need	  to	  ‘fit-­‐
in’	  might	  cause	  people	  to	  do	  things	  that	  they	  normally	  would	  not.	  However,	  it	  would	  be	  
plausible	  for	  Kieran	  to	  claim	  that	  in	  this	  case	  we	  would	  miss	  something;	  something	  that	  
we	  might	  have	  gained	  if	  we	  ourselves	  had	  responded	  in	  a	  way	  that	  was	  morally	  defective.	  
For	  example,	  if	  we	  were	  to	  endorse	  or	  take-­‐up	  the	  moral	  perspective	  that	  Kieran	  claims	  is	  
manifested	  in	  The	  Destructors,	  we	  might	  learn	  something	  about	  how	  we	  would	  respond	  
under	  similar	  circumstances.	  
	  
This	   reply	  holds	   that	  artworks	  prescribing	   immoral	  attitudes	  might	  differ	   from	  artworks	  
which	   condemn	   those	   same	   attitudes	   in	   regards	   to	   the	   experiences	   they	   offer,	   and	  
therefore,	   in	   the	   understanding	   that	   they	  manifest.	   If	   correct,	   this	  may	   occur	   because	  
only	   in	   the	   former	  are	  we	  asked	  to	  endorse	  and	  experience	   first	  hand	  what	   it	   is	   like	   to	  
hold	  such	  an	  attitude.	  So	  while	  it	  may	  be	  objected	  that	  the	  understanding	  Kieran	  takes	  as	  
being	  both	  cognitively	  and	  aesthetically	  valuable	  could	  be	  manifested	  in	  a	  way	  that	  does	  
not	   require	   us	   to	   adopt	   or	   endorse	  morally	   defective	   attitudes,	   it	   is	   at	   least	   intuitively	  
plausible	  that	  doing	  so	  would	  offer	  us	  an	  understanding	  that	  was	  more	  rich,	  or	  valuable.	  
	  
Another	  area	  of	  contention	  from	  which	  we	  might	  form	  an	  objection	  to	  Kieran’s	  cognitive	  
immoralist	   thesis	   concerns	   the	   definition	   of	   what	   constitutes	   a	   ‘moral	   defect’.	   One	  
specific	  line	  of	  objection	  here	  questions	  whether	  an	  artwork	  that	  affords	  us	  some	  kind	  of	  
cognitive	  gain	  through	  its	  rich	  and	  vivid	  exploration	  of	  an	  ‘immoral’	  perspective	  should	  be	  
counted	   as	   being	   ‘morally	   defective’.	   James	   Harold	   (2008)	   has	   claimed	   that	   cognitive	  
immoralism	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  responses	  that	  artworks	  invite	  unto	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their	  moral	  perspectives.	  He	  writes,	  “As	  the	  immoralists	  note,	  artworks	  invite	  us	  not	  only	  
to	   imagine	  certain	  ways	  of	  seeing	  the	  world,	  but	  also	  to	  respond	  to	  those	  perspectives.	  
But	  responses	  are	  not	  only	  approving	  or	  disapproving.	  A	  response	  can	  be	  rich	  (or	  not)	  and	  
it	  can	  be	  reflective	  (or	  not)”	  (2008,	  p.	  58-­‐9,	  his	  emphasis).	  The	  crux	  of	  Harold’s	  argument	  
holds	  that	  where	  artworks	  invite	  complex	  and	  rich	  responses	  towards	  moral	  perspectives	  
that	  we	  take	  to	  be	  reprehensible,	  they	  possess	  “real	  moral	  value”,	  and	  are	  therefore	  not	  
morally	   defective	   (2008,	   p.	   61).	   Artwork’s	   that	   provide	   a	   rich	   or	   reflective	   imaginative	  
experience	   that	   might	   “[…]	   expand	   our	   moral	   possibility”	   are,	   according	   to	   Harold,	  
morally	  valuable,	  and	  can	  because	  of	   this	  be	  aesthetically	  valuable	   (2008,	  p.	  61).	  Eaton	  
agrees,	  herself	  providing	  an	  account	  of	  the	  above	  objection,	  she	  writes,	  “Like	  moralism,	  
[cognitive	   immoralism]	  saps	   immoral	  art	  of	   its	   threat	  and	  menace,	   rendering	   it	  not	   just	  
benign	  but	  even	  morally	  beneficial”	  (2012,	  p.	  289).	  Furthermore,	  because	  these	  are	  the	  
kinds	  of	  artworks	  that	  cognitive	   immoralism	  singles	  out	  as	  being	  cognitively	  valuable	  by	  
virtue	   of	   their	   morally	   defective	   perspective	   both	   Harold	   and	   Eaton	   conclude	   that	  
cognitive	  immoralism	  is	  flawed.	  However,	  unlike	  Eaton,	  Harold’s	  objection	  is	  committed	  
to	  the	  valence	  constraint	  (which	  he	  explicitly	  endorses)	  and	  as	  such,	  he	  holds	  along	  with	  
Gaut,	   that	  only	  morally	  valuable	   responses	  can	  provide	   the	  kind	  of	  cognitive	  value	   that	  
Kieran’s	  immoralism	  counts	  as	  being	  aesthetically	  valuable.	  	  
	  
Stephanie	   Patridge	  makes	   a	   suggestion	   similar	   to	   those	   above,	  writing	   that	   “[in]	   cases	  
where	   our	   responses	   are	   immoral,	   and	   count	   as	   good	  making	   features,	  we	   should	   see	  
them	  as	  cases	  where	  our	  responses,	  because	  artistically	  contextualized	  in	  a	  certain	  way,	  
are	  not	  immoral,	  and	  are	  good	  making	  features”	  (2008,	  p.	  193).	  Patridge,	  however,	  differs	  
from	  Harold	  in	  that	  she	  argues	  against	  the	  valence	  constraint.	  She	  believes	  that	  the	  claim	  
offered	   above	   should	   ground	   a	   form	   of	   “weak	   moralism”,	   by	   which	   artworks	   can	   be	  
considered	  ‘immoral’	  when	  we	  evaluate	  their	  moral	  perspective	  as	  presenting	  a	  defective	  
account	  of	  how	  one	  should	  live,	  or	  behave.	  However,	  when	  evaluated	  as	  a	  work	  of	  ‘art’	  
she	  argues	  that	  the	  context	  of	  our	  engagement,	  in	  that	  our	  responses	  are	  not	  responses	  
toward	  the	  real	  world,	  makes	  a	  normative	  difference	  that	  effectively	  strips	  the	  work	  of	  its	  
immorality	   (2008).	   As	   such,	   Patridge	   is	   in	   agreement	  with	   Harold	   insofar	   as	   they	   both	  
claim	   that	  when	  an	  artwork	   is	  evaluated	  as	  being	  aesthetically	   valuable	  by	  virtue	  of	   its	  
morally	  reprehensible	  attitude,	  immoralism	  (cognitive	  or	  otherwise)	  need	  not	  follow.	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The	  objection	  that	  Harold	  and	  Patridge	  make	  regarding	  the	  moral	  value	  of	  complex	  and	  
contextualized	   perspectives	   that	   are,	   at	   first	   glance,	   morally	   defective	   recalls	   a	   point	  
made	   in	   the	   third	   chapter.	  What	   both	   of	   these	   objections	   seem	   to	   value	   are	   not	   the	  
moral	   ideas	  or	  perspectives	  themselves,	  but	  rather,	   the	  shaping	  or	  exploration	  of	   these	  
moral	  ideas	  and	  perspectives.	  Harold	  makes	  this	  particularly	  clear	  in	  that	  he	  argues	  “It	  is	  
not	  morally	  appropriate	  to	  feel	  simple	   joy	  at	  the	  triumph	  of	  good	  over	  evil,	  or	  evil	  over	  
good	   […]	   In	   real	   life,	   things	   are	   not	   simple,	   and	   we	   should	   not	   approve	   of	   simplistic,	  
unreflective	  responses	  to	  serious	  moral	  situations”	  (2006,	  p.	  265).	  He	  continues,	  writing,	  
“[a]	  work	  that	  invites	  its	  reader	  to	  respond	  with	  enjoyment	  to	  scenes	  of	  torture,	  but	  that	  
does	  so	  in	  mediated	  way,	  with	  round	  characters,	  may	  invite	  instead	  a	  complex,	  reflective	  
response	   that	   is	  morally	  praiseworthy	  because	   the	   reader	   is	   encouraged	  not	  merely	   to	  
accept	   simplistic	   moral	   rules”	   (2006,	   p.	   266).	   In	   light	   of	   this,	   it	   may	   be	   that	   Kieran	   is	  
attending	   only	   to	   the	  moral	   ideas	   or	   perspectives	  manifested	   by	   the	   artwork	  when	   he	  
points	  to	  ‘moral	  defects’;	  and	  as	  such,	  if	  something	  like	  Harold’s	  account	  is	  correct	  then	  
cognitive	  immoralism	  will	  be	  flawed	  insofar	  as	  what	  is	  cognitively	  valuable	  is	  not	  morally	  
defective.	  
	  
It	   is	  difficult	  to	  offer	  a	  reply	  on	  behalf	  of	  cognitive	   immoralism	  without	  first	  providing	  a	  
clear	   and	   coherent	   account	   of	   exactly	   what	   counts	   as	   a	   moral	   defect.	   However,	   the	  
problems	   presented	   in	   attempting	   to	   propose	   a	   clear	   and	   univocal	   definition	   of	  moral	  
defects	  and	  merits	  plague	  not	  only	  cognitive	  immoralism,	  but	  the	  very	  foundation	  upon	  
which	  the	  ethical	  criticism	  of	  art	  resides.	  
	  
Jenn	   Neilson	   (2012)	   has	   argued	   that	   the	   debate	   surrounding	   ethical	   criticism	   has	  
proceeded	  on	  an	  inadequate	  definition	  of	  exactly	  what	  counts	  as	  a	  moral	  defect	  or	  merit,	  
and	  that	  as	  a	  result	  the	  discussion	  has	  continued	  in	  a	  fashion	  that	  confuses	  rather	  than	  
clarifies	  the	  problems	  and	  positions	  involved	  (p.	  66).	  While	  Neilson’s	  aim	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  
definition	   of	   exactly	  what	   constitutes	   a	  moral	   defect,	   her	   argument	   is	   founded	   on	   the	  
language	  of	  ‘moral	  realism’,	  and	  therefore,	  it	   is	  not	  clear	  that	  any	  such	  definition	  would	  
be	   accepted	   univocally.	   Rather,	   her	   attempt	   is	   indicative	   of	   the	   problem	   surrounding	  
ethical	   criticism,	  with	   each	   position	   assuming	   a	   definition	   of	  what	   constitutes	   a	   ‘moral	  
defect’	  that	  best	  suits	  its	  needs	  and	  rejecting	  those	  that	  thwart	  their	  ends.	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Yet,	  contextualism	  might	  avoid	  this	  problem	  by	  taking	  an	  approach	  that	  is,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  
unavailable	  to	  ethicism	  and	  moderate	  moralism.	  By	  accepting	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  moral	  or	  
cognitive	   value,	   but	   rather	   the	  moral	   significance	   of	   an	   artwork	   that	   is	   aesthetically	  
valuable	  the	  contextualist	  can	  circumvent	  the	  problem	  of	  how	  to	  define	  a	  ‘moral	  flaw’,	  or	  
‘moral	  value’,	  while	  still	  being	  able	  to	  provide	  an	  account	  of	  how	  the	  ethical	  and	  aesthetic	  
spheres	  interact.	  	  
	  
In	  what	   follows	  we	  will	   see	  a	  brief	  attempt	  at	   reconciling	  contextualism	  with	  the	  moral	  
significance	   thesis	  which,	  given	   the	   failure	  of	   the	  preceding	  value	  based	  accounts	  must	  
stand	   as	   a	   viable	   account	  of	   how	  morality	   and	   aesthetic	   value	  might	   interact	  with	  one	  
another	  where	  works	  of	  art	  are	  concerned.	  
	  
6.5. Contextualism and Moral Significance: a Possible Approach 
 
Contextualism	  is	  an	  attractive	  position	  in	  that	  it	  attempts	  to	  account	  for	  the	  complexity	  of	  
our	   engagement	   with,	   and	   evaluation	   of,	   art.	   Whereas	   both	   ethicism	   and	   moderate	  
moralism,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   formulate	   and	   defend	   a	   ‘systematic’	   relationship	   of	   the	  
interaction	  between	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  value,	  based	  largely	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  our	  moral	  
evaluations	  of	  artworks	  inform	  our	  aesthetic	  ones,	  contextualism,	  instead,	  proposes	  that	  
our	  moral	   and	   aesthetic	   evaluations	   are	   not	   so	   clearly	   distinguished.	   Harold	   (2006)	  —	  
although	   he	   does	   not	   explicitly	   defend	   contextualism	   —	   agrees	   that	   the	   relationship	  
between	  our	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  evaluations	  of	  artworks	  is	  a	  matter	  more	  complex	  than	  
is	  often	  accounted	   for.	  As	  was	  noted	   in	   the	   third	  chapter,	  he	  writes	   that:	   “Rather	   than	  
saying	   that	   we	   make	   a	   moral	   judgment	   and	   then,	   on	   that	   basis,	   make	   an	   aesthetic	  
judgment,	   or	   vice	   versa,	   it	   is	  more	   plausible	   to	   suppose	   that	   aesthetic	   judgments	   and	  
moral	   judgments	   overlap	   in	   that	   they	   invoke	   some	   of	   the	   same	   considerations	   by	  
appealing	  to	  some	  of	   the	  same	  qualities”	   (p.	  268,	  his	  emphasis).	  Here	  the	  suggestion	   is	  
that	  in	  order	  to	  evaluate	  an	  artwork	  —	  either	  morally,	  or	  aesthetically,	  —	  we	  must	  attend	  
to	  both	   its	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	   features.	  One	  cannot	  simply	   judge	  one	  kind	  of	  value	  as	  
being	   entirely	   distinct	   from	   the	   other.	   As	   was	   also	   noted	   in	   chapter	   two,	   Eileen	   John	  
proposes	   something	   similar	   in	   claiming	   that:	   sometimes	   we	   need	   to	   acknowledge	   the	  
morally	   relevant	   features	   of	   an	   artwork	   as	   being	   “morality-­‐serving-­‐the-­‐needs-­‐of-­‐
literature”	   (2010,	   p.	   285).	   John	   explores	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   moral	   attitudes	   that	   art	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presents	  might	  be	  “exploited”	  for	  literary	  purposes;	  that	  is,	  rather	  than	  being	  “left-­‐alone”	  
and	  presented	  as	  true	  or	  substantiated	  moral	  attitudes,	  artworks	  might	  shape	  morality	  to	  
realize	  specific	  literary	  goals.	  She	  writes,	  “[…]	  literary	  practice	  also	  takes	  great	  advantage	  
of	  morality	   as	   a	   resource	   for	   creating	   compelling,	   complex,	   dramatic,	   engaging	  works”	  
(2010,	  p.	  285).	  John’s	  claim	  raises	  concerns	  for	  cognitive	  accounts	  trading	  on	  the	  value	  of	  
the	   ‘moral	  understanding’,	  or	   lessons	   that	   they	  argue	  works	  of	  art	  offer;	   for	   if	  art	  does	  
indeed	   treat	   morality	   as	   malleable,	   then	   surely	   we	   must	   question	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  
understanding	   that	   it	   imparts.	   In	   addition,	   Eaton	  has	   recently	  defended	  a	  position	   that	  
she	  calls	  “robust	  immoralism”	  (2012).	  She	  argues	  that	  in	  special	  cases,	  the	  immorality	  of	  
an	   artwork	   can	   be	   aesthetically	   valuable,	   yet	   her	   account	   of	   how	   this	   relationship	  
pertains	   is	   based	   neither	   on	   ineliminable	   defects	   nor	   on	   cognitive	   gains.	   Rather,	   Eaton	  
claims	  that	  artworks	  that	  prescribe	  immoral	  response	  towards	  “rough	  heroes”	  (2012,	  p.	  
283)	  can	  be	  aesthetically	  valuable	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  ability	  to	  “[set]	  up	  and	  skilfully	  [solve]	  
an	  ambitious	  artistic	  problem	  and	  [induce]	  in	  its	  audience	  a	  complex	  and	  enduring	  sort	  of	  
pleasure”	  (2012,	  p.	  290).	  Eaton’s	  account	  thus	  squares	  nicely	  with	  our	  established	  notion	  
of	   moral	   significance,	   in	   that	   her	   account	   sees	   the	   aesthetic	   value	   of	   the	   immoral	  
perspective	   as	   resting	   with	   the	   complex	   way	   in	   which	   the	  work	   ‘sets-­‐up’,	   explores,	   or	  
shapes	  our	  responses	  towards	  certain	  types	  of	  morally	  defective	  characters.	  What	  all	  of	  
these	  claims	  attempt	  to	  bring	  to	  light	  is	  that	  the	  complexity	  of	  our	  engagement	  with	  art	  
makes	   it	   increasingly	  difficult	   to	  clearly	  distinguish	  or	  quarantine,	  as	   it	  were,	   these	   two	  
spheres	  of	  value.	  	  
	  
There	   is	   indeed	   little	   doubt	   that	   the	   relationship	   between	   ethics	   and	   aesthetics	   is	   a	  
deeply	   complex	  one.	  And,	  as	  we	  have	   seen	   throughout	   the	  previous	   chapters,	   theories	  
which	  seek	  to	  explain	  this	  relationship	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  one	  value	  directly	  constituting	  the	  
other	  inevitably	  miss	  much	  of	  what	  we	  take	  to	  matter	  in	  our	  engagement	  with	  artworks.	  
Both	   the	   argument	   for	   ineliminable	  moral	   defects	   and	   cognitive	   immoralism,	   although	  
they	  attempt	  to	  account	  for	  a	  kind	  of	  complexity	  in	  their	  denial	  of	  the	  valence	  constraint,	  
maintain	   that	   it	   is	   the	  moral	   or	   cognitive	  value	   (or	   lack	   thereof)	   that	   is	   responsible	   for	  
affecting	  aesthetic	  value.	  Yet,	  if	  contextualism	  were	  to	  argue	  instead	  that	  it	  is	  the	  moral	  
significance	   of	   artworks	   rather	   than	   their	   moral	   or	   cognitive	   value	   that	   interacts	   with	  
their	   aesthetic	   value,	   they	   might	   both	   successfully	   deny	   the	   valence	   constraint.	   They	  
might	  also	  offer	  an	  account	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  ethics	  and	  aesthetics	  that	  does	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not	   compromise	   complexity	   for	   explanatory	   power.	   The	  moral	   significance	   thesis,	   as	   it	  
was	  outlined	  in	  the	  third	  chapter,	  argues	  that	  an	  artwork’s	  moral	  content	  can	  be	  morally	  
significant	  when	  the	  work	  explores	  or	  shapes	  its	  particular	  moral	   ideas,	  perspectives,	  or	  
attitudes,	  in	  a	  rich,	  vivid,	  and	  complex	  way.	  Furthermore,	  the	  thesis	  holds	  that	  the	  moral	  
significance	  of	   an	   artwork	  persists	   in	   a	   complex	   ‘two-­‐way’	   relationship	  with	   the	  work’s	  
aesthetic	  value.	  Furthermore,	  the	  moral	  significance	  thesis	  holds	  that	  we	  can	  evaluate	  an	  
artwork’s	  rich	  and	  complex	  exploration	  of	  moral	  ideas	  and	  attitudes	  as	  being	  aesthetically	  
valuable	  even	  if	  we	  hold	  that	  such	  ideas	  and	  attitudes	  are	  morally	  defective.	  And,	  in	  the	  
same	   way,	   we	   can	   evaluate	   the	   understanding	   (or	   misunderstanding)	   an	   artwork	  
manifests	  as	  being	  aesthetically	  valuable,	  even	  if	  we	  take	  that	  understanding	  to	  be	  in	  the	  
grip	  of	  some	  error.	  
	  
Crucially,	  this	  relationship	  is	  not	  one	  whereby	  one	  value	  is	  taken	  to	  add	  or	  detract	  from	  
the	   other,	   but	   one	   where	   both	   values	   are	   seen	   as	   mutually	   dependent.	   Indeed,	   the	  
language	   of	   aesthetic	   cognitivism	   and	   value	   based	   moralism	   (including	   here	   the	  
contextualist/immoralist	  positions	  outlined	  earlier	  in	  this	  chapter)	  often	  makes	  reference	  
to	   the	   idea	   that	   artworks	   can	   “[get]	   us	   to	   feel	   the	   force	  of	   a	   particular	   claim	  or	   truth”	  
(Gaut,	  2007,	  p.	  85,	  his	  emphasis),	  or	  “[use]	  artistic	  means	  to	  engage	  the	  imagination	  and	  
thereby	   see	   things	   in	   a	   new	   light,	   make	   connections	   [and]	   convey	   insights”	   (Kieran,	  
2006b,	   p.	   132).	   And,	   as	   such,	   throughout	   this	   thesis	   we	   have	   seen	   that	   ethicism,	  
moderate	  moralism,	  and	  value	  based	  contextualism,	  only	  apply	  to	  the	  moral	  perspectives	  
and	  attitudes	  that	  art	  prescribes	  when	  they	  are	  aesthetically	  relevant;	  a	  stipulation	  that	  
lends	  weight	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  such	  perspectives	  and	  attitudes	  must	  be,	   in	  some	  sense,	  
aesthetically	   valuable	   (or	   at	   least	   aesthetically	   realized)	   before	   they	   can	   be	   morally	  
valued.	  What	  this	  seems	  to	  suggest	  is	  that	  the	  moral	  or	  cognitive	  value	  of	  an	  artwork	  is	  
determined	  to	  some	  extent	  by	  its	  aesthetic	  value.	  And,	  therefore,	  any	  theory	  that	  simply	  
holds	   the	  moral	  value	  of	  an	  artwork	   to	  count	  against	  or	   constitute	  part	  of	   its	  aesthetic	  
value	  will	  have	  failed	  to	  account	  for	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two.	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	  an	  account	  of	  contextualism	  taking	  moral	  significance	  as	  being	  the	  focus	  of	  
the	  relationship	  between	  ethics	  and	  aesthetics	  might	  better	  resist	  the	  valence	  constraint	  
where	   a	   value	   based	   account	   would	   fail.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   value	   based	   accounts	  
consistently	   fail	   to	   show	   that	   it	   is	   in	   fact	   the	  moral	  value	   that	   contributes	  positively	  or	  
 91 
negatively	   towards	   an	   artwork’s	   aesthetic	   value;	   a	   point	   to	   which	   the	   moderate	  
autonomist	  often	  draws	  attention.	  If	  we	  recall,	  Anderson	  and	  Dean	  grant	  that,	  “In	  some	  
instances	  the	  legitimate	  aesthetic	  criticism	  of	  a	  work	  can	  surround	  aspects	  of	  the	  moral	  
subject	  matter	  of	  a	  work,	   i.e.	   the	  moral	  content	  of	  a	  work	  can	  contribute	   to	  or	  detract	  
from	  the	  aesthetic	  aspects	  of	  a	  work”	  (1998,	  p.	  153).	  However,	  they	  argue	  “[…]	  it	  is	  never	  
the	  moral	  component	  of	  the	  criticism	  as	  such	  that	  diminishes	  or	  strengthens	  the	  value	  of	  
an	   artwork	   qua	   artwork”	   (1998,	   p.	   153).	   The	   problem	   that	   the	  moderate	   autonomists	  
identify	  within	  the	  value-­‐based	  positions	  is	  that	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  show	  that	  the	  reason	  
a	  work	   is	  morally	  defective	  and	  aesthetically	  defective	   is	   the	  same.	  This	  criticism	   is	  one	  
that	  has	  been	  reinforced	  throughout	  the	  previous	  chapters.	  The	  moral	  significance	  thesis,	  
however,	   agrees	   with	   moderate	   autonomism	   insofar	   as	   it	   holds	   that	   the	   moral	   or	  
cognitive	   value	  of	   an	   artwork	   is	   never	   the	   aspect	   that	   adds	   or	   detracts	   from	   aesthetic	  
value;	   instead	   it	   is	   the	   interaction	   between	   the	   moral	   and	   aesthetic	   properties	   of	   an	  
artwork	   that	   produces	   an	   exploration	   or	   a	   ‘shaping	   of	   ideas’	   that	   is	   both	   morally	  
significant	  and	  aesthetically	  valuable.	  	  
	  
Such	  a	  view	  can	  resist	  the	  valence	  constraint,	  as	  it	  does	  not	  take	  ‘moral	  value’	  as	  the	  sole	  
measure	   of	  what	   constitutes	   an	   aesthetic	   defect	   or	  merit.	   Rather,	   it	   allows	   that	  moral	  
perspectives	   and	   ideas	   of	   any	   valence	   can	   positively	   or	   negatively	   affect	   the	   aesthetic	  
value	   of	   an	   artwork,	   not	   by	   virtue	   of	   their	   ‘moral	   value’,	   but	   through	   their	   ‘moral	  
significance’.	  
	  
In	  moving	  away	  from	  a	  value-­‐based	  account	  of	  how	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  values	  interact,	  
contextualism	  might	  succeed	   in	  avoiding	   the	  problems	   that	  accounts	   focusing	  solely	  on	  
moral	   and	   cognitive	   value	   face.	   Adopting	   a	   ‘moral	   significance’	   approach	   would	   allow	  
contextualism	   to	   retain	  much	  of	  what	  makes	   the	  position	  attractive:	   its	   account	  of	   the	  
complex	  ways	   in	  which	  we	   engage	  with	   and	   evaluate	   art,	   its	   acknowledgement	   of	   the	  
symbiotic	  relationship	  that	  exists	  between	  the	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  realms	  of	  value,	  and	  
its	  claim	  that	  the	  exploration	  of	  immoral	  attitudes	  and	  perspectives	  can	  be	  aesthetically	  
valuable.	  Such	  an	  account	  would	  further	  avoid	  problems	  surrounding	  a	  proper,	  univocal	  
definition	   of	   what	   constitutes	   a	   moral	   defect	   or	   merit,	   given	   that	   moral	   significance,	  
remains	   (to	   the	   most	   extent)	   distinct	   from	   moral	   or	   cognitive	   value	   or	   disvalue.	  
Therefore,	   significance-­‐based	   contextualism	   —	   as	   it	   could	   be	   referred	   to	   —	   cuts	   a	  
 92 
position	  that	  could	  go	  a	  long	  way	  in	  providing	  an	  account	  of	  how	  the	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  
components	   of	   artworks	   interact	   with	   one	   another.	   Carving	   out	   a	   niche	   between	  
moderate	  autonomism	  and	  value	  based	  moralism,	  this	  position	  can	  maintain	  that	  these	  
two	  spheres	  of	  value	  are	  neither	  conceptually	  distinct	   (as	  the	  former	  argue),	  nor	   linked	  
solely	   by	   the	   value	   or	   valence	   of	   their	   moral	   propositions	   (as	   claimed	   by	   the	   latter).	  
Rather,	  they	  are	  —	  like	  an	  alloy	  —	  fused	  together	  in	  a	  way	  that	  seems	  to	  deny	  their	  being	  
‘teased-­‐apart’	  and	  evaluated	  one	  against	  the	  other.	  
	  
Significance-­‐based	   contextualism	  would	   provide	   an	   account	   that	   is	   able	   to	   capture	   the	  
full	   range	   of	   works,	   including	   those	   works	   with	   ambiguous	   moral	   perspectives	   that	  
positions	   such	  as	  ethicism	  are	  unable	   to	  account	   for.	   Furthermore,	   it	  would	  be	  able	   to	  
evaluate	   works	   that	   offer-­‐up	   multiple	   interpretations	   without	   weakening	   its	   scope.	  
Indeed,	   it	   could	   even	   be	   argued	   that	   works	   in	   which	   a	   plurality	   of	   plausible	  
interpretations	   are	   available	   are	   morally	   significant	   in	   virtue	   of	   this.	   Importantly,	  
significance-­‐based	  contextualism	  can	  square	  away	  our	  intuitions	  and	  feelings	  concerning	  
the	  fact	  that	  we	  often	  find	  morally	  defective	  works	  of	  art	  both	  engaging	  and	  aesthetically	  
valuable,	   while	   at	   other	   times	   we	   find	   morally	   praiseworthy	   artworks	   to	   be	   dull	   and	  
shallow.	  In	  such	  cases	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  connect	  the	  ‘moral	  value’	  of	  the	  work	  with	  its	  
aesthetic	   value.	   Instead,	  we	   should	   see	   the	  aesthetic	   value	  of	   these	  works	  as	  being,	   to	  
some	  extent,	  related	  to	  the	  moral	  significance	  of	  the	  work:	  to	  how	  it	  explores	  and	  shapes	  






My	   aim	   throughout	   this	   thesis	   has	   been	   twofold.	   First,	   to	   examine	   the	  major	  moralist	  
positions	  with	   specific	   regard	   to	   the	   success	   or	   failure	   of	  what	   I	   have	   argued	   are	   their	  
‘value-­‐based’	  approaches;	  and	  second,	   to	  determine	  whether	  an	  alternative	   ‘non-­‐value-­‐
based’	  account	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  features	  of	  artworks	  
could	   present	   a	   plausible	   and	   attractive	   option.	   A	   general	   cognitive	   argument	   for	  
moralism,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  account	  of	  the	  ‘moral	  significance	  thesis’	  was	  offered	  in	  chapter	  3.	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In	  chapters	  4,	  5,	  and	  6,	  the	  value-­‐based	  moralist	  theories	  (ethicism,	  moderate	  moralism,	  
and	   ‘value-­‐based-­‐contextualism’)	  have	  been	  examined	   in	  detail.	   It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  
none	   of	   these	   positions	   provides	   a	   convincing,	   or	   complete	   account	   of	  why	  we	   should	  
accept	  that	  moral	  or	  cognitive	  defects	  and	  merits	  constitute	  or	  ground	  aesthetic	  defects	  
and	  merits.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  different	  reasons	  as	  to	  why	  each	  of	  the	  three	  moralist	  
accounts	  failed.	  	  
	  
Gaut’s	  account	  of	  ethicism	  fails	  to,	  among	  other	  things;	  defend	   its	  normative	  claim	  that	  
we	  ought	  not	  to	  respond	  to	  artworks	  as	  prescribed,	  if	  such	  a	  response	  would	  be	  unethical.	  
Furthermore,	  although	  Hazlett	  (2009)	  has	  attempted	  to	  provide	  a	  supplementary	  account	  
of	  response	  moralism	  in	  favour	  of	  Gaut’s	  claim,	  his	  argument	  regarding	  our	  ‘exportation’	  
of	  moral	  propositions	  from	  fiction	  into	  the	  actual-­‐world	  is	  unconvincing.	  	  
	  
Carroll’s	  moderate	  moralism	  was	  shown	  to	  fail	  on	  two	  counts.	  First,	  it	  was	  shown	  to	  beg	  
the	  question	  by	  relying	  on	  a	  ‘morally	  sensitive	  audience’	  that	  —	  in	  the	  case	  of	  an	  artwork	  
that	   manifested	   an	   immoral	   perspective	   —	   would	   fail	   to	   respond	   as	   prescribed,	   thus	  
securing	   the	   very	   claim	   that	   Carroll	   set	   out	   to	   argue.	   Second,	   it	   was	   argued	   that	   the	  
empirical	   claim	   entailed	   by	   moderate	   moralism	   —	   that	   we	   are	   unable	   to	   achieve	  
imaginative	  ‘uptake’	  where	  immoral	  perspectives	  are	  concerned	  —	  was	  false.	  	  
	  
And	   finally,	   (value-­‐based)	   contextualism	   —	   including	   Kieran’s	   account	   of	   cognitive	  
immoralism	  —	  was	  shown	  to	  be	  unconvincing	  as	   it	   failed	  to	  show	  that	   it	  was	  the	  moral	  
defect	   that	   was,	   in	   itself,	   responsible	   for	   directly	   contributing	   or	   constituting	   to	   the	  
aesthetic	  value	  of	  the	  work.	  
	  
Although	  these	  positions	  all	  fail	  for	  different	  reasons,	  all	  of	  them	  overlook	  or	  dismiss	  the	  
complexity	  of	  our	  engagement	  with	  works	  of	  art,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  notion	  that	  our	  moral	  and	  
aesthetic	   evaluations	  of	   artworks	  often	   refuse	   clean,	   or	   complete,	   separation.	  As	   these	  
moralist	  positions	  fail	  to	  show	  that	  ‘moral	  value’	   is	  able	  to	  constitute	  and	  directly	  affect	  
aesthetic	   value,	   the	   moderate	   autonomist	   position	   introduced	   in	   the	   second	   chapter	  
might	  be	  understood	  as	  being	  vindicated.	  However,	  although	  they	  may	  be	  correct	  in	  their	  
claim	  that	  ‘moral	  value’	  cannot	  constitute	  aesthetic	  value	  they	  are,	  I	  maintain,	  incorrect	  in	  
their	  claim	  that	  the	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  spheres	  of	  evaluation	  remain	  entirely	  distinct.	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As	  was	  argued	   in	  chapters	  3	  and	  6,	   the	  way	  by	  which	  an	  artwork	  explores	  or	  shapes	   its	  
moral	   ideas	   can	   be	   both	   ‘morally	   significant’	   and	   aesthetically	   valuable.	   This	   notion	   of	  
moral	   significance	   presents	   itself	   as	   a	   viable	   option	   for	   those	   who	   wish	   defend	   a	  
contextualist	   position	   for	   a	   number	   of	   reasons.	   The	   points	   in	   its	   favour	   are	   as	   follows.	  
First,	   it	  avoids	  the	  valence	  constraint	  by	  dealing	  not	  with	   ‘moral	  value’	   (or	  disvalue)	  but	  
with	  moral	  significance.	  Second,	   it	  allows	  for	  both	  artworks	  that	  are	  morally	  ambiguous	  
and	   artworks	   from	   which	   we	   can	   plausibly	   interpret	   a	   number	   of	   different	   moral	  
perspectives.	  Third,	  it	  offers	  us	  an	  explanatory	  account	  as	  to	  why	  we	  sometimes	  feel	  that	  
artworks	   might	   be	   aesthetically	   valuable	   by	   virtue	   of	   their	   immoral	   perspectives	   and	  
attitudes.	  And	  last,	   it	  squares	  nicely	  with	  the	  intuition	  that	  art’s	  greatest	  contribution	  to	  
our	  understanding	  of	  that	  which	  we	  call	  ‘moral’,	  comes	  not	  through	  the	  manifestation	  of	  
particular	   ‘ideas’	   or	   ‘perspectives’,	   but	   rather	   comes	   through	   art’s	   ability	   to	   shape	   and	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